反分裂國家法與允諾策略

Abstract

本文以允諾策略的角度分析「反分裂國家法」的賽局意涵。在兩岸對峙賽局上我們修正黃秋龍與王光正的連鎖體系賽局(Chain-Store Game)，並以其作分析的基礎。我們的研究發現，「反分裂國家法」具備允諾策略的兩項特性：第一，允諾策略限制允諾策略提出者的可能策略集；第二，允諾策略改變賽局中參賽者的報酬。經濟學及政治學在允諾策略的研究上皆有相當豐富的研究成果，本文對這些文獻作了相當詳細的回顧，並且將「反分裂國家法」與這些文獻對允諾策略的看法作了完整的連結。

In this paper we analyze the game implications of Anti-Secession Law from the viewpoint of commitment strategy. We also try to modify the Chain-Store Game on cross-Strait relationship of Huang and Wang (2000) as a basis of our argument. We find Anti-Secession Law possesses two characteristics of the commitment strategy. One is to restrict the player`s strategy sets, while the other is to change their payoffs. Various literatures in economics and political science discuss the role of commitment strategy in different games. This paper focuses not only on theoretical analyses but also on the linkage of researchers between economics and political science.