美國與台海兩岸信心建立措施

Abstract

自1996年台海危機以來，美國政府改變消極不介入台海兩岸的立場，轉為積極建議台海兩岸思考建立軍事互信。柯林頓政府官員如亞太助理國務卿陸士達鼓勵台海兩岸在一些困難議題上，結合「信心建立措施」進行對話，並獲致「中程協議」。小布希政府亦鼓勵台北與北京開始推動信心建立措施，降低因為軍事誤算而爆發事故的機率，提升一旦爆發危機雙方溝通的品質。美國政府主張台海兩岸透過政治、功能性、安全議題的對話，達成一些「信心建立措施」，來降低誤判、誤解，減少軍事衝突的可能性。但是，美國政府不能直接迫使台北接受類似的安排。美國所建議的「信心建立措施」與「中程協議」有些關連性，一旦履行可能會影響美國對台軍售。美國雖然排除在台海之間扮演調停者角色，但對台軍售及美中台關係發展，勢將對台北在考慮台海兩岸「信心建立措施」造成衝擊。台北與北京對美國在台海所扮演角色有不同的期待，對美國建議台海「信心建立措施」及「中程協議」也有不同的期待，而影響到此一倡議的前景。

Since the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the U.S. has modified its formerly passive attitude of non-involvement to an active role of promoting trust and confidence between the PRC and Taiwan. The Clinton administration advised that Taiwan and China should do all they can to build confidence and avoid provocative actions and words. Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth indicated that he would like to see cross-Strait dialogue lead to ”interim agreements, perhaps in combination with specific confidence building measures, on any number of difficult topics,” but that the U.S. ”will avoid interfering as the two sides pursue peaceful resolution of differences” The Bush administration also encourages Taipei and Beijing to begin exploring confidence-building measures that reduce the chance for military miscalculation and accidents, and improve the quality of communications in the event of a crisis. CBMs and an interim agreement in the Taiwan Strait are closely related, and their implementation might have an impact on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. While the U.S. has been rejecting the role of mediator in the Taiwan Strait, the arms sale policy toward Taiwan, the stand on Taiwan`s future status, and the relationship with the PRC, etc., will have great implications for Taipei to move toward a CBM mechanism with Beijing. Taipei and Beijing have different expectations for the U.S. role in the Taiwan Strait dispute. Reactions from Taipei and Beijing on U.S.-proposed CBMs and interim agreements might determine the outcome of this peace initiative in the Taiwan Strait.