Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/95627
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.creator傅岳邦;高文彬zh_TW
dc.creatorFu, Yueh-Pang;Gau, Wen-Bing-
dc.date2009-03-
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-09T08:40:51Z-
dc.date.available2016-05-09T08:40:51Z-
dc.date.issued2016-05-09T08:40:51Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/95627-
dc.description.abstract全球環境治理結構愈是偏向行動者剩餘控制權利懸殊的階層關係,各行動者所須付出的治理成本愈高,愈偏好傾向無政府關係的全球環境治理結構,以降低治理成本;另一方面,全球環境治理結構愈是偏向行動者剩餘控制權利相若的無政府關係,各行動者所須付出的機會主 義預期成本愈高,愈偏好傾向階層關係的全球環境治理結構,以降低機會主義預期成本。-
dc.description.abstractDue to the presence of states’ various implementing conditions of Kyoto Protocol since December 1997, this essay intends to analyze the factors through dimensions of rights of residual control, global environmental governance structure, transaction cost, and the adaptation of global environmental governance structure from relational contracting approaches. Actors tend to choose more anarchical relations of global environmental governance structure to decrease high governance costs resulted from hierarchical relations of global environmental governance structure; in the other hand, actors tend to choose more hierarchical relations of global environmental governance structure to decrease high expected costs of opportunism resulted from anarchical relations of global environmental governance structure.-
dc.format.extent2295519 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.relation問題與研究, 48(1), 97-131-
dc.relationIssues & studies-
dc.subject京都議定書; 履行; 關係締約途徑; 剩餘控制權利; 機會主義預期成本; 治理成本-
dc.subjectKyoto Protocol; implementation; relational contracting approach; rights of residual control; expected costs of opportunism; governance costs-
dc.title京都議定書的國家履行zh_TW
dc.title.alternativeThe States` Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol-
dc.typearticle-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.openairetypearticle-
item.grantfulltextrestricted-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
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