公共建設執行之組織型式甄選

Abstract

本文主要分析夥伴型與單核型組織對公共建設執行之影響。雖然技術的演進對公共建設執行的影響深遠，惟從整合交易成本經濟學與規模經濟性之觀點，分就資產專業性與組織形式選取之分析，本文認為從事專業公共建設服務的夥伴型組織，基於其對計畫專業知識累積的規模經濟性、不確定性資訊的掌握、適當誘因設計的配合及組織內不同部門間的產出互補性，使其計畫執行的績效高於組織單元中所選公共建設僅為其業務功能之一的單核型組織。但夥伴形組織的優勢亦有其上限。當不確定性或計畫專業性甚高而難以掌握時，兩組織形式並未產生重大計畫執行績效差異。同時，當公共建設計畫執行的專業性係來自服務之範圍經濟性時，單核型組織因功能業務的整合能力較高，而顯現較佳之計畫績效。此外，當不確定增加時，因關係契約存在所產生的合作承諾將使交易成本的降低，致使計畫執行績效提高。

A central theoretical question is how organization makes a difference to economic performance of public infrastructure project delivery. Obviously, technology will have a great bearing on the way a project performs. The thesis of this paper is that a partner public infrastructure firm, by virtue of the fact that it manages the project delivery function for multiple-discipline infrastructure projects, is privileged to information not available to the focal agencies. In this paper, the conditions under which privileged information allows the partner firm to construct superior incentives for its employees, resulting in superior infrastructure project delivery are derived. Further, the circumstances under which outsourcing will not provide additional benefit, and what sorts of organizational forms are likely to provide the greatest benefit are detailed. The two main findings are that for low levels of uncertainty, both in-house and relational contract procurement are equally acceptable. However, as uncertainty from technology increases, the value of relational contract procurement increases. Conclusions are drawn and extensions are proposed, related to economies of scale and transaction costs.