國賠案件中基層官僚機關的行為動機與行為類型

Abstract

基層官僚機關在公共政策過程上扮演關鍵性的角色，除了聽命執行以外亦創制決策。政府實務與學術研究皆追尋優良的公共服務品質，如何驅使基層官僚機關致力於良好的服務是大哉問，對其服務動機與行為的探討更是一項重要的研究課題。本研究利用司法判決做為評斷標準，以二手分析法取材於法院的裁判書與報紙的新聞報導，藉以探究基層官僚機關在國家賠償案件中的反應，以此釐清其行為類型、辨明其動機所在。結果顯示，基層官僚機關在49.48% 的案件中以私利為考量，消極地面對民眾的國賠訴求。

Street-level bureaucracy casts the important role in the process of public policy. It does implementation and makes decisions. Both government and scholar circle devoted to develop excellent quality of public services. How to drive street-level bureaucracy to provide good services would be a big question. To detect and explore street-level bureaucracy’s behaviors and motives is rather a significant research question. This research takes court judgment as analytic standard, uses secondary analysis by collecting results of judgments and rulings and newspaper data, and then studies street-level bureaucracy’s behavioral motives and styles by exploring their response in State Compensation cases. The results show that street-level bureaucracy responses with self-interest and passively in 49.48% cases.