立法委員特殊利益提案與中央政府計畫型補助款的分配：從民國94 年至98 年之資料探析

Abstract

臺灣立法委員在立法院的個人提案如果不併在政黨提案或是行政院提案，其實很少有機會能夠三讀通過成為正式法律。既然如此，為什麼立法委員仍然熱衷於此，而且一屆比一屆增加？尤其在具有成本分散且利益集中特質的特殊性利益（particularized benefit）提案數量上更是如此？除了象徵性地應付選區選民或利益團體的要求、證明他們在立法院的努力、增加知名度或是建立聲望之外，我們認為立法委員的特殊利益提案行為可能還具有其他更積極的功能。這種積極的功能在於傳達訊息給行政部門，告訴行政部門立法委員有多麼需要選區的利益，間接地要求行政部門分配超額的政策利益至他們的選區。基於這樣的假設，我們利用中央政府在95年至98 年度分配至選區（縣市）的計畫型補助款進行分析，驗證區域立委的特殊利益提案行為與計畫型補助款分配額度之間的關係。\\r 統計分析結果發現，在控制相關變數之後，立委特殊利益提案比例越高的縣市，它們獲得的計畫型補助款的確也會越多。而其他過去分配政治研究常用的政治及制度性因素雖然沒有顯著的影響，但是我們仍然發現政治景氣循環現象存在的可能性。最後，我們也發現計畫型補助款在縣市的分配存在明顯的預算慣性，並且補助預算的分配也反映了地方財政結構以及補助需求。這些研究發現顯示行政官僚體系一方面雖然受到立法委員特殊利益提案的壓力而影響計畫型補助款在縣市的分配，但是以需求做為資源分配準據的防線仍能維持。

Previous study showed that the number of particularistic benefit bills initiated by individual member of Legislative Yuan in Taiwan increased dramatically. However, these bills barely passed the whole legislative process and then became the public law. If initiating particularistic benefit bills were ineffective, why did legislators in Taiwan spend so much time and energy initiating these bills? In this paper, we argue that the reason why legislators initiate so many particularistic benefit bills is to send signals to bureaucracies how badly they need on particularistic benefits for their constituencies. Under this circumstance, one of the political consequences would be that rational bureaucracies distribute disproportionate benefits to greedy legislators’ districts (cities or counties) so that the good relationship between the legislative and the executive branches can be kept. As we expect, the statistical results show that there is a positive association between particularistic benefit bills initiated by legislators and categorical grants that districts received from central government, in the sense that the more particularistic benefit bills that legislators initiated (measured by ratio), the more categorical grants flowed to their districts. While we find significant effect of legislator’s bill-initiating behavior on the distribution of categorical grants, we still find that needs based criteria and budget inertia are at work. To some extent it means that bureaucracies are doing their job quite well, even though they compromise political pressure somewhat to greedy legislators.