評2005年關於不能未遂的修法——兼論刑法上行為規範與制裁規範的區分

Abstract

一個人對於「為什麼要處罰未遂行為」這個問題的看法，會直接影響到他如何看待不能未遂的立場。德國刑法學界對於這個問題的討論，已經有兩百年以上的歷史。事實上，這裡所涉及的也就是「制裁規範的正當性基礎為何」這一個問題。而這個問題並不是只有在未遂的情形才會出現，未遂行為只不過是把這個刑法上的根本難題拉上檯面。精確地說，主要的爭執點在於：對於一個行為（無論是既遂還是未遂）所施加的刑罰，究竟是為了應報它過去所引起的惡害，還是為了達到未來的預防效果？如果我們堅持刑法的任務是保護法益，那麼就免不了接受預防這一個選項。依照本文的看法，處罰一個行為的意義應該是在於「以法益保護為導向之積極的一般預防」，因此刑法處罰未遂行為的理由與處罰既遂行為的理由相同，都是在於行為規範的維護。依此，則一個未遂行為是否不能、有無危險，都不會影響到其抵觸行為規範的本質，只不過立法者可以在極端例外的情形（亦即當行為人是出於重大無知而未能既遂的情形），基於欠缺一般預防上的「刑罰需要性」而將法律效果定為「不罰」。客觀未遂理論想要將未遂行為的可罰性限於行為具有客觀危險性的主張，無論是在技術上還是在規範上都有無法克服的問題。

The perspective of punishing the crime of attempt (Versuch) directly affects how legal and factual impossibility (der untaugliche Versuch) are evaluated. German scholars of criminal law first discussed this issue more than two hundred years. Actually, the issues involved here are the legitimate bases of criminal sanctions (Sanktionsnorm), which is an issue far beyond the scope of the crime of attempt. Instead, the crime of attempt simply reveals the fundamental difficulty of the question. Precisely speaking, the major issue is wshall be the retribution for the damage or danger it has caused, or the prevention from future occurrence? If we insist on the idea that the task of criminal laws is to protect legal interests (Rechtsgüter), then we have no option but to accept the latter idea, i.e., prevention from future occurrence. This paper argues that the meaning of punishment for certain behaviour is an active general prevention (positive Generalprävention) toward protection of legal interests. As a result, the reason to punish a crime of attempt is the same as that to punish a completed crime, i.e., to maintain the behavioural norm. Accordingly, whether or not it is impossible, whether or not it is dangerous, does not affect the nature of attempt which violates the behavioural norm. Only in extremely exceptional cases in which actors fail to complete the crime due to significant ignorance (grober Unverstand), legislatures can stipulate the legal effect as no punishment (straflos), as the necessity to punish for general prevention does not exist. The argument of the “Objective Theory of Attempt” (die objektive Versuchstheorie) that the criminal culpability of attempt should be limited to its objective danger faces difficulties in techniques as well as in evaluation.hether the purpose of punishment for a criminal act, completed or not,