Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/96682
題名: 董事會功能性分工之法制課題
其他題名: The Functional Diversity of the Board of Directors—A Study for Legal Issues
作者: 王志誠
Wang, Chih-Cheng
關鍵詞: 董事會; 董事長; 常務董事; 並列制; 單層制; 獨立董事; 審計委員會; 薪酬委員會; 執行委員會; 執行長
Board of Directors; Representative Director; Executive Director; Dual Structure of Management System; One-Tier System; Independent Directors; Audit Committee; Compensation Committee; Executive Committee; Chief Executive Officer
日期: Aug-2006
上傳時間: 16-May-2016
摘要: 我國現行公司法主要是沿襲日本明治三十二年(一八九九年)「商法」之立法例,以董事會為業務執行機關、監察人為內部監督機關,並由最高意思決定機關之股東會所選任。觀諸我國於二○○六年一月十一日修正公布之證券交易法,不僅引進獨立董事制度,並引進單層制經營機關之董事會結構,規定公開發行公司應擇一設置審計委員會或監察人。問題在於,在單層制經營機關之董事會結構下,將董事會結構再分化成各種功能性委員會,是否可以提高其決策品質及效率,實為研究公司治理結構亟需探討之問題。又在現行並列制經營機關之董事會結構下,是否不容許公司依其實際需要,以章程規定或董事會決議之方式,自行決定其設置各種功能性委員會或其他內部組織之自治空間,亦為公司法學所應正視之問題。\\r本文首先探討董事會之應有功能,並借重其他社會科學之理論分析,說明將董事會分化成各種功能性委員會,是否較符合公司治理之精神。其次,則從理論及實務之見解,剖析在並列制經營機關之董事會結構下,是否存在改革董事會結構之自治空間。再者,由於我國證券交易法業已引進單層制經營機關之董事會結構,故本文亦介紹當前美國及日本有關董事會功能性分工之法制現況,期能從比較法制之觀點,具體建構我國法制之應有內容。又如引進獨立董事制度,其在並列制經營機關或單層制經營機關之董事會結構中,究應扮演何種角色,始能發揮其應有功能,亦為本文探討之重點。最後,提出本文之結論及建議,用供各界指正。
In the Taiwanese corporate management system, the board of directors and, especially, the representative director, have real power to govern the corporation. Auditors monitor the legality of a corporation’s finances and its directors’ business administration. Historically, the dual structure of this management system originated from the Japanese Commercial Code in 1899, and there are quite significant differences between the American one-tier system and the dual structure management system. The Amendment of the Securities Exchange Law (hereinafter called “the Amendment”) of 2006 was aimed to introduce the American one-tier system into Taiwanese corporate governance reform. The Amendment will establish one mechanism to enable Taiwanese public corporations to adopt an American one-tier system. The Amendment expands on the previous provisions by creating at least two distinct corporate governance options for Taiwanese firms. Public companies can either maintain the conventional system and have at least two independent directors from among all directors in accordance with the articles of incorporation, or move entirely to an American one-tier system, including an audit committee with at least two independent directors of all directors. A number of academic considerations suggest that small board committees may be preferable. A large board of directors tends to be contentious and fragmented, which reduces their collective ability to monitor and discipline senior management. By contrast, in theory, a number of factors favor large boards. A larger size may facilitate a board`s resource-gathering function. What is the optimal size of a decision-making group? Another question is whether companies can establish other board committees by self-governance? This article first explores the roles of corporate boards under different corporate management systems. Part II analyzes whether a board committee is capable of reaching management efficiency. In addition, Part II discusses the possibility of establishing an executive committee, a chief executive officer or an audit committee under a two-tiered management system. Part III asks whether two heads are indeed better than one? What is more, is having a large board indeed better than having a small board committee? Parts IV and V introduce the functional diversity of corporate boards in the United States and Japan, respectively, and discuss the trend of corporate governance reform in Taiwan based on a comparative study. Finally, this article proposes a modest conclusion.
關聯: 法學評論, 92, 301-394
資料類型: article
Appears in Collections:期刊論文

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