Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Other Titles: ||Application of Conflict Clauses under the WTO Agreements|
|Issue Date: ||2016-05-20 11:17:26 (UTC+8)|
In the case of U.S. upland cotton initiated by Brazil to argue that certain U.S. subsidies for the domestic production of upland cotton, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings that Step 2 payments to domestic users of U.S. upland cotton were subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods that were inconsistent with Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. The United State argued that Step 2 payments were better characterized as part of its amber box domestic support program and were subject to “reduction commitment” under Article 6 of the Agriculture Agreement. According to the preamble of Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement and Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, the latter should prevail over the Articles of the SCM Agreement. The Panel rejected this argument, stating that no conflict existed between the two provisions unless they contained mutually exclusive obligations. The narrow definition of conflict will lead to an unanticipated outcome should it be applied to the export subsidies for agricultural products. The core and important questions are what the definition of the conflict is and what kinds of relationship between the provisions of the WTO Agreements are accumulative and exclusive. This article attempts to make a description of the conflict clauses inserted in the WTO Agreements and discuss the related problems that arise from their application.
|Relation: ||法學評論, 105, 217-270|
|Data Type: ||article|
|Appears in Collections:||[法學評論 TSSCI] 期刊論文|
Files in This Item:
All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.