論股東代表訴訟的變革方向——以美國法為研析基礎

Abstract

依現行公司法規定，董事對公司責任得由公司自行訴追，亦得由股東基於公司利益提起代表訴訟追訴之。經由公司自行訴追現實上易遭董事與大股東阻撓，而代表訴訟僅須少數股東意志即可提起，可避免上開問題，達到真正追訴有責任者的功能。代表訴訟不僅能回復公司損害以維護全體股東權益，亦得藉由訴追不法董事責任，遏制董事違法的意願。因此，代表訴訟得確保董事義務與責任規範的建立，達到強化公司治理的積極功能。可惜的是，我國代表訴訟於實務推展結果極為有限。主要原因在於現行法下，預防濫訴的起訴門檻規範過於嚴格，致使潛在有益訴訟亦遭排除。且我國法設計上嚴重忽略股東起訴誘因，理性的少數股東考量後通常不願提起有利於「全體股東」的訴訟類型。因此，代表訴訟於我國法制下的推展不佳，本為該制先天的宿命。惟多數學者認同代表訴訟於公司治理中的重要地位，如何使該制真正落實的課題仍應值得吾等重視。本文擬以美國法為研究基礎，除介紹美國代表訴訟制度外，並對我國法現行規範的缺失提出分析與探討，最後提出未來應有的修法方向，期望將來能活化我國代表訴訟法制，真正發揮該制於公司治理的意義。

Under Company Law, either a corporation or its shareholders may be able to file a lawsuit against directors who breach their fiduciary duty owed to the corporation. However, it may be in reality impractical or non-enforceable for a corporation to sue its decision-makers who have tools to entrench them from being sued. In contrast, derivative suits may be brought by minority shareholders without having interruptions by directors or even controlling shareholders. The institution of derivative suits, functionally speaking, is a mechanism protecting the benefits of a corporation and its shareholders as a whole by suing wrongdoers for recovery, which thereby can be an effective deterrence preventing directors from possible deviations harmful to the corporation and shareholders. Unfortunately, such an institution has been surprisingly impractical as a result of high procedural hurdles required and rare incentives for shareholders to sue under Company Law. Since such an institution is admittedly essential in the context of corporate governance, the issue about how to make it work effectively should draw our attention. This article examines U.S. laws, including an introduction to U.S. derivative suits and an analysis of whether and how current regulations under Company Law should be amended. Finally, this article will propose some thoughts and suggestions for future reforms on derivative suits.