公開募集或私募有價證券之決定因素及其市場反應

Abstract

台灣於2002年2月6日修訂《證券交易法》首度允許公開發行公司用私募方式發行股票或公司債，嗣後企業可用公開募集或私募方式來籌資及融資。本研究首先探討台灣上市櫃公司私募有價證券之決定因素，實證結果發現：台灣上市櫃公司是否選擇私募有價證券（包括「普通股」及「公司債」）受到發行成本、逆選擇成本、道德危險成本、所有權結構等因素之影響，而股市榮枯與是否為電子業兩因素僅會影響私募普通股，而不會影響私募公司債。值得注意者為經理人之持股比率在私募普通股與私募公司債之影響因素相反：當經理人之持股比率越低，企業越會採行私募普通股之籌資方式以引進新團隊，當經理人之持股比率越高，企業越會採行私募公司債之籌資方式而避免稀釋股權。其次，就私募之市場反應而言，本研究發現：台灣股市對上市櫃公司宣告私募「普通股」，相較於宣告公開募集普通股，更有顯著之正面市場反應，顯示對私募企業資訊不對稱及公司治理改良之期望，然而企業宣告私募「公司債」之市場反應與並不與公開募集「公司債」有顯著差異。\\r關鍵詞：私募、公開募集、逆選擇、道德危險

Through an amendment to the Securities Exchange Law, the Securites and Future Bereau of Taiwan started to allow private placement from February 6, 2002 on. We investigate a firm’s choice between public offering and private placement for listed firms in Taiwan. Our empirical results show that the issue cost, the adverse-selection cost, the moral-hazard cost, and the ownership structure are significant determinants for the choice of private placement for both stock issuance and bond issuance. The stock market performance and the electronic-industry attribution are also determinants for the private placement for stock issuance, but not for bond issuance. The associations between managers’ shareholdings and private placement for stock issuance and bond issuance are in opposite direction. For stock issuance, the lower the managers’ shareholdings are, the higher the probability of private placement will be. For bond issuance, however, the higher the managers’ shareholdings are, the higher the probability of private placement will be. We also examine the market reactions to the announcements of offering choices. Tests of the shareholders wealth effects of offering-choice announcements reveal that, as expected, the market reaction to the announcement of private equity placement is significantly positive compared to that of the public equity offering. The positive market responses to the private equity offering are significantly related to the adverse-selection cost, the morale-hazard cost, and cthe orporate-governance cost. However, market does not significantly react differently to private placement and public offerings for debt securites. Keywords: Private placement, Public offering, Adverse selection, Morale hazard.