蔣中正的東北經驗與九一八事變的應變作為－兼論所謂「銑電」及「蔣張會面說」

Abstract

同時，筆者在文中也對研究九一八事變所謂「不抵抗政策」時，兩個史料上的問題──民國20年8月16日的「銑電」及九一八事變前夕蔣中正與張學良在於石家莊會面的「蔣張會面說」進行探討。

So far the research on the Nationalist Government’s responses to the Mukden Incident of 1931 have mainly focused on political aspects by analyzing the changing situations at home and abroad that challenged the central government. If we make an analysis of political power structure, however, we will know that Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Nationalist Government, was the man who took responsibility of making final decisions at that time. Chiang’s decision-making of national policies resulted mostly from his personal views. When we study Chiang’s reactions to the Mukden Incident, we must pay close attention to his understandings of Northeastern China. Chiang was among the Kuomintang leaders who knew a lot about Northeastern China. He not only wrote something about Northeastern China, but visited there for more than twenty days in 1914 by order of Sun Yat-sen. This field trip did help him better understand the problems of Northeastern China and formulate his own conceptions. Judging from his remarks after the Mukden Incident, we can find that his earlier experiences in Northeastern China had some effects on his reactions to the problems of Northeastern China, especially on his management of the Japanese invasion. This paper intends to discuss how Chiang’s trip to Northeastern China in 1914 and his understanding of that area influenced his dealing with the Mukden Incident. In addition, my paper will also examine two controversies relating to historical materials of so-called “non-resistance policy”: one is the telegram of August 16, 1931, the other is about Chiang’s meeting with Chang Hsueh-liang at Shihchiachuang shortly before the Mukden Incident.