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Title: 九一八事變時期的日中政治動員與軍事作戰
Other Titles: Japanese and Chinese Political Mobilization and Military Tactics during the Mukden Incident
Authors: 黃自進
Hung, Tzu-chin
Keywords: 九一八事變;滿洲國;關東軍;張學良;不抵抗政策
Mukden Incident;Manchukuo;Kwantung Army;Zhang Xueliang;nonresistance policy
Date: 2006-11
Issue Date: 2016-06-02 14:46:20 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 「一戰二和三撫」是關東軍的作戰策略三部曲。面對遼寧省的東北軍,關東軍主「戰」,因為掌握南滿鐵路可謂是關東軍的首要作戰目標。除了掌握運輸線,確保軍隊的調動自如的軍事上目的以外,南滿鐵路沿線的25個城市,本來就是東北的精華區。掌握了鐵路,自然也就掌握了這些沿線都市,掌握了這些精華區,遼寧省也就大致底定。 至於對付吉林省,關東軍是主「和」的。吉林省代理主席熙洽能於事變爆發後的第3天,開城迎敵,第10天就率眾投降。這份效率,這份默契無一不在說明,熙洽在事變期所有的活動,皆是精心設計下的產物。特別是熙洽一顆棋子,就能讓吉林省7個步兵旅、1個騎兵旅,85%的步兵、100%的騎兵放棄抵抗甘願接受關東軍收編,由此也可見識到關東軍在政治謀略上的成效。 對付黑龍江省,關東軍則以「撫」為主軸,黑龍江省俗稱北滿,原本就是蘇聯的勢力範圍區,日本在當地本為勢力,借用特區長官,也就是東北政界耆老張景惠在東北政界、軍界的影響力,安撫黑龍江省的地方勢力是關東軍在事變初期所擬定的政治謀略。 相較於關東軍的「一戰二和三撫」,東北軍卻以「拒戰、懼戰、觀戰」為回應。雙方的優劣差距,不僅反映在關東軍的因地制宜力求主動之作戰模式上,也反映在東北軍的因循苟且坐以待斃的消極回應模式中。除了雙方在軍事策略上主被動的明顯差異,關東軍的政治動員能力更是不容忽視。吉林市可在1個星期,瀋陽可在3個月之內,恢復原貌。這份效率,無疑的可為關東軍對東北地方事務的熟悉及掌握,提供最佳的說明。也由於關東軍對東北事務有十足的掌握,九一八事變的戰事中因而得以在關東軍所設計的軌道上進行。
“First,war; second, talk; and third, reassurance” was the tripartite military tactics taken by the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army took “war” to the Nationalist’s Northeast Garrison Force of Liaoning, since its first and foremost goal was to seize the Southern Manchurian Railway. In addition to gaining control over transportation lines and thereby assure the free movement of the armies, the 25 cities along the Southern Manchurian Railway also provided the best target for takeover in Manchuria, since control of the railway lines meant control of the core. The Kwantung Army tackled Jilin Province with “talk”. Xiqia, the representative chairman of Jilin, opened up the door to the Kwantung Army on the third day following the Mukden incident, and leading the whole provincial surrender soon came on the tenth day. Xiqia's attitude from war to peace was the entire elaborate plan during the incident. With a chessman Xi-qia, 7 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade, 85 percent of the Nationalist infantry and 100 percent of the cavalry troops, abandoned resistance and willing to accept the adjustment. Hence, it is clear that the Kwantung Army’s political strategy was a great success. For Heilongjiang, the Kwantung Army offered reassurance, since this area, commonly called northern Manchuria, remained under the influence of USSR. Japan had no power on this area. However, it used the commissioner Zhang Jinghui, a respected man who had power to influence political and military affairs in Manchuria, to build up its power. As opposed to the Kwantung Army’s strategy “First, war; second, talk; and third, reassurance,” the Nationalist’s Northeast Garrison responded with “refuse battle, fear battle, and observe battle”. The response of the military operations with positive or passive decided who would win or lose. The Kwantung Army took positive actions according to the local conditions, while the Nationalist Northeastern Garrison remained the same old rut and waited to death. Aside from the two sides’ different military strategies, the Kwantung Army’s capacity for political mobilization cannot be ignored. Jilin recovered within a week and Mukden within two and a half months. The Kwantung Army’s ability to lead the recovery is explained by its intimate knowledge of Manchurian conditions. Given the Kwantung’s Army’s mastery of Manchurian conditions, the Mukden incident progressed according to its plans.
Relation: 政治大學歷史學報, 26, 169-232
The Journal of History
Data Type: article
Appears in Collections:[政治大學歷史學報 THCI Core ] 期刊論文

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