歐洲主權債務危機之解析

Abstract

歐債危機的發生表現在數個歐元會員國面臨高政府赤字、高負債的財政困境，故被統稱為歐債危機，但事實上此一危機是由數個性質不盡相同的個別危機所組成：希臘危機本質上為一財政紀律蕩然的政府治理危機；愛爾蘭與西班牙危機則為美國次貸危機所引發的不動產資產泡沫與銀行危機；義大利與葡萄牙危機則涉及結構性的長期成長危機。依此本質而言，德國所推動的撙節方案與財政公約僅涉及到公部門改革與恢復財政紀律等面向，只能對危機的終結提供部分的答案。財政紀律的執行與危機的解決有賴成長與就業的提供以及完全的財政聯盟之建立。在歐盟層次上的擴張型財政政策與財政資源移轉尚未實現的限制下，本文建議賦予危機國家在財政主權上可衡酌國內成長與就業的變化，雙向動態調整政府支出的彈性與空間。經分析後發現，危機事件顯露出五項特質：德法軸心的中心地位、希臘個案的特殊性、會員國凌駕超國家組織、歐盟經濟治理趨向德國標準、與財政面向外的國際與結構性因素等。

The European sovereign debt crisis emerged from a few euro members being stuck with high-deficits and high-indebtedness, and thus is oversimplified to be referred to as the euro debt crisis. It, in fact, consists of several individual crises with different causes. The Greek crisis was a governance crisis that lacks of fiscal disciple by nature; the Irish and Spanish crises were the bubble crisis of the property sector and banking crisis caused by the US sub-prime crisis; the Italian and Portuguese crises involve more structural and long-term growth crisis. Accordingly, the austerity and the fiscal compact that Germany promoted, referring to the reforms of the public sector and the restoration of fiscal disciple, can only offer partial answers to the end of the crisis. The implementation of fiscal discipline and the resolution of the crisis depend on the provision of economic growth and jobs and the establishment of a full-blown fiscal union. With the absence of expansionary fiscal policy and fiscal transfer at the EU level, this paper suggests that the crisis countries should be granted with the maneuver of expanding/contracting government spending according to the changes in growth and jobs. The crisis reveals five characteristics: the centrality of Franco-German axis; the specialty of the Greek case; national governments’ triumph over supranational institutions; the convergence of the EU’s economic governance with the German model; the need to address non-fiscal dimensions.