契約主義下「績效」與「公平」的兩難：台灣就業服務體制的社會風險管理分析

Abstract

為因應二年後高失業率以及政府人力不足的雙重壓力，台灣就業服務體制在二三年實施就業保險法時，同時進行導入契約主義的重要變革，經過五年以來的施行，雖然確實達到「補充服務人力」與「有限度提升服務績效」以降低失業率的目的，但是台灣就業服務體制在採取派遣契約服務模式進行社會風險管理時，卻使特定對象失業者在獲得公平服務的權益方面受到損害，形成「績效」與「公平」之間的道德風險兩難困局。建議的解決之道，包括簡化失業給付認定流程、將失業給付與推介就業二項業務分開受理服務窗口、對於申請辦理失業給付量大之就業服務站能夠增加一定比例的人力，藉以改善目前的困境，並提升服務品質與成效。

This paper analyze the Taiwan’s Employment Service Regime change by implementing contractualism to compressed high unemployment rates and increasing manpower of government at the same time of Employment Insurance Act carried out after Year 2003. Although indeed performing the effects of “supplementing service manpower” and “improving service performance” after change, but also producing the dilemma of moral hazard between performance and equality to damage the fair service benefits of particular unemployed. There are suggestions as follow: simplify the identification process of unemployment benefit, detach the service window of unemployment benefit and employment service, increasing manpower for the employment service stations of large unemployment benefit.