論經營判斷法則於我國法下適用之可能——以明基併購西門子手機部門一案為例

Abstract

經營判斷法則鼓勵企業冒險以追求高額的利潤, 為公司帶來更大的利益. 然而, 高利潤相對應者即是高風險,而高風險所呈現的即是公司經營者的決策斷對公司可能衝擊極大, 甚至造成市場系統性風險. 於我國法制上是否引進商業判斷法則, 學界論著甚豐, 而目前實務似尚未肯認之. 本文以臺灣所發生之案例, 公司經營者為追求企業的轉型與外部成長, 進行了以小併大、存在高度風險的併購行為-即明基併西門子手機部門一案. 該案可謂係為經營判斷法則所量身定作的經典案例, 來探討經營判斷法則的內涵與運作. 美國法院採行經營判斷法則已久, 本篇藉由文中所提及的五個美國經典個案事實及法院見解, 與明基西門子一案比較分析, 輔以我國學界與實務對於經營判斷法則的研析, 探討在臺灣企業普遍具有交叉持股、金字塔型持股結構、對公司負責人究責制度尚未完妥、企業文化不同於美國等現象下, 是否適宜引入經營判斷法則. 本文認我國目前暫不適宜引入經營判斷法則, 同時亦重新審視企業經營者注意義務的架構設計. 在我國既有民法委任關係的注意義務體系下, 以明基併購西門子一案檢視商業決策迥異於民事案件的特點, 配合外國法制之相關規範, 提出注意義務的動態衡量標準, 以及不同於民法責任全有或全無的思考, 更為細緻化地去衡量公司負責人的商業判斷, 期使未來企業經營者在追求高風險、高利潤下, 承擔相對應的責任, 注意義務在重新架構下也能更順利的適用於商事案件.

The Business Judgment Rule encourages corporations to take risks for the sake of higher returns; however, higher returns imply a greater risk association. As such, corporate executives’ decision-making would not only have significant impact on a firm’s overall performance; it would also bring about systematic risk. There are numerous academic studies regarding the adaptation of the Business Judgment Rule into Taiwan’s legal system; nevertheless, the Rule has not yet been established firmly in practice. This paper is based on a Taiwan case, in which the Ben-Q corporate director, in pursuit of business transformation and external growth, inspite of the great risk, bid on the acquisition of the mobile division of a giant firm─the Siemens Corp. This would be the perfect case to explore the nature and the application of the Business Judgment Rule in Taiwan. With the acceptance of the Business Judgment Rule under the US court system, this paper analyzes five classic US cases and related court opinions, supplementing this analysis with Taiwanese research on the Business Judgment Rule from both the academic and the practical perspective, and then examines the findings in the context of the BenQSiemens case. The objective of the paper is to explore whether the Business Judgment Rule should be adopted into Taiwan’s legal system, since the business culture differs from that of the US in areas such as cross-holdings, pyramid structure, and a system that has yet to hold corporate directors fully accountable. This paper concludes that, at the current stage, it is not appropriate to adopt the Business Judgment Rule in Taiwan and that the duty of care regulations should be redesigned. The BenQ-Siemens case demonstrates how business judgment possesses characteristics uncommon to judgments in average civil cases. This paper recommends an alternative approach to the existing liability structure under Taiwan’s civil law, namely, the adaptation of a dynamic measurements accessing the standard of duty of care; such a standard would classify business judgments by directors in a more subtle fashion, and doing so would add accountability to future corporate managers who seek higher returns while taking on greater risks.