美國控制股東「公平對待義務」之法制探源——兼論我國控制股東之濫權問題

Abstract

有鑑於我國控制股東濫權問題普遍且公司法上對控制股東濫權行為約束之相關法制設計有限，美國法上控制股東對公司及少數股東之「受託義務」，為值得我國考慮是否應予移植之制度。惟美國法下控制股東「受託義務」之內涵隱晦，本研究從大量美國法案例中，依據公司形態、州法院不同審理標準，及不同時期受託義務審理原則，梳理美國控制股東之受託義務，並於一般營運型交易、現金逐出式合併、控制權移轉等代表性案例中，歸結出可免於使美國法院採取「完全公平原則」審查控制股東是否違反義務之「安全港」要件。從案例分析及美國重要法律文獻中，本研究發現控制股東「受託義務」意涵已發生轉變，傳統定義下之受託義務已不存在，以「公平對待義務」稱之更能表現其內涵，倘日後我國能移植「控制股東公平對待義務」，由控制股東負擔舉證「交易過程公平」與「價格公平」之責任，或能對控制股東濫權問題起到相當實際之約束作用。

Abuse of power by controlling shareholders is seriously jeopardizing the quality of corporate governance in Taiwan. This problem is aggravated by the lack of effective legal mechanisms that hold controlling shareholders liable. To meet these challenges, it is well worth considering the American common law doctrine of controlling shareholders’“fiduciary duty” toward minority shareholders. However, the content of this common doctrine is highly elusive. This article seeks to shed light on its dynamic development by conducting a comprehensive critical literature review and case analysis into the contemporary understanding of controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duty. The investigation is carried out along the dimensions of type of corporation (closed v. public corporation), variation among state courts (centering on Massachusetts and Delaware), and historical evolution of the concept of fiduciary duty. I then investigate three types of cases, namely the ongoing operation of the company, freezeout and transfer of control, and summarize the “safe harbor” doctrine, which the courts have developed to avoid the “entire fairness principle.” I argue that the meaning of “fiduciary duty” of controlling shareholders has undergone material change. “duty of fair dealing” has become a better concept than “fiduciary duty” in terms of accuracy and adequacy. Under the “Duty of fair dealing,” controlling shareholders should operate under the principle of “proportional distribution of benefits according to shareholding ratio,” and should pay due attention to fairness in both transactional procedures and price-setting. This renewed understanding of the American law will offer a significant point of reference for comparative corporate law in Taiwan regarding the issue of controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duty.