Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/98011
題名: 邏輯推斷抑或意志行為?——對凱爾森晚期規範理論中一個命題的批判
其他題名: Logical Inference or Act of Will? Critique on a Thesis in Hans Kelsen`s Late Theory of Norms
作者: 雷磊
Lei, Lei
關鍵詞: 邏輯推斷; 道義語句; 作為真值的效力; 邏輯證立
Logical Inference; Validity as Truth; Deontic Sentence; Logical Justification
日期: Dec-2012
上傳時間: 17-Jun-2016
摘要: 漢斯‧凱爾森的晚期規範理論處理的一個核心問題是規範與邏輯的關係。其主要主張可被表述為「不可推斷命題」,即,一般性規範與相應的個別規範之間並不存在邏輯推斷關係。這一觀念主要得到了意志論據與不適格論據的支持,但兩者都不成立。意志論據混淆了兩種規範的概念,因而犯了「打擊錯誤」。作為道義語句的規範具有語義效力(真值),它包含著邏輯向度。在規範三段論中,一般性道義語句與個別道義語句間彼此處於邏輯關係之中,後者具有真值傳遞的功能,故而不適格論據同樣是失敗的。此外,「邏輯推斷」應當正確地被理解為「邏輯證立」。
Hans Kelsen’s late theory of norms deals with the relation of norms and logic. One of his main concerns is expressed by the Non-Inferential Thesis, i.e. the relation between a general and a corresponding individual norm cannot be characterized as a logical inference. This opinion is supported chiefly by the Argument of Will and the Argument of Non-Qualification. But neither of them are tenable. The Argument of Will is based on a confusion of two conceptions of norms, thus it mistakes in attack. Norms as deontic sentences have semantic validity as truth which contains the logical dimension. The general and individual deontic sentences in a normative syllogism are proved to stand in logical relation to each other, which assumes the function of transference of truth. So the Argument of Non- Qualification also fails. “Logical inference” should be properly understood as “logical justification.”
關聯: 法學評論, 130,159-198頁
Chengchi law review
資料類型: article
Appears in Collections:期刊論文

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