議會至上與人大至上——從英國違憲審查的發展看中國違憲審查的未來

Abstract

中國雖於一九五四年即通過公布第一部憲法，但憲法作為國家根本大法的規範性格，並未同時確立。隨著市場經濟的持續發展，如何進一步落實憲法根本大法的規範效力，回應人權保護的要求，建構法律及行政法規牴觸憲法時的違憲審查或監督機制，遂成為一項重點課題。本文擬借鏡採取與「人大至上」相似的「議會至上」原則的英國違憲審查制度發展經驗，探究中國司法機關在違憲審查制度中可能扮演的角色，特別是若尊重中國憲法文本，採取以人民大會常務委員會為中心的違憲審查機制下，各級法院是否仍有參與法規合憲控制的空間？又該如何參與？凡此，均是本文研究的核心問題。

In 1954, the People’s Republic of China promulgated its first constitution; however, at the time, the idea that the constitution is the supreme law of the land was not established. As China’s market economy continues to grow, how to carry out the fundamental mandate of the Constitution, respond to the demand for human rights protection, and create an effective system of constitutional review on laws and regulations become important issues. Based on the development of constitutional review in the United Kingdom under the doctrine of “supremacy of Parliament,” which is similar to the Chinese principle of “supremacy of People’s Parliament,” this article will explore the potential roles that Chinese courts can play in China’s constitutional review process. As the Chinese Constitution explicitly specifies that the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress has the authority to interpret the Constitution and to invalidate subordinate legislation, special attention will be paid to the questions whether and how the Chinese courts can perform constitutional review on parliamentary legislation and other subordinate regulations.