美國Say-on-pay制度介紹與引進可行性之分析

Abstract

Say-on-pay制度，係指股東會就公司經營報酬表示贊成與否之投票，即公司於股東會開會前公告經營報酬相關資訊予股東，經股東衡量後，於股東會中投票議決，表示支持或反對公司經營報酬之政策或措施。Say-on-pay制度濫觴自英國，以從報酬與績效連結性出發，認為經營者受領報酬應與其經營表現具正向關係始稱正當；倘公司年度績效不佳，則握有公司經營大權之經營者自不宜繼續受領高薪。此理念亦影響了美國，而於二○一○年制定之華爾街改革與消費者保護法中增訂一九三四年證券交易法第14A條，要求所有公開發行公司每三年至少舉行一次Say-on-pay投票，使股東能定期檢視公司經營報酬政策之妥適性。按經營報酬為公司治理制度之一環，若公司無妥適之報酬制度，不但無法激勵經營者為公司開創利益，反使眾人搶當肥貓，競相分食公司資源。自英美兩國先後採納Say-on-pay制度觀之，該制度於全球公司治理中扮演的角色越顯重要，我國公司法不宜忽視，並有必要加以徹底理解，詳細分析與評估該制度於我國實施之可行性。甚者，美國為公司治理領先國家，近來該國法制動態對我國公司法發展與影響越為重要，具相當指標意義，因此，本文即有以該國新制度為研究素材之動機產生。結論上，本文認為就目前我國法制與商業環境而論，尚不宜引進該制。主要原因不外乎為我國公司法就經營報酬採「股東會中心主義」，而Say-on-pay制度為「董事會中心主義」之產物，兩者性質有異。另我國實務散戶投資人眾多且公司普遍缺乏強而有力之機構投資人，與市場缺少顧問公司協助股東行使表決權等原因，以致於該制以我國現有條件言，應無法發揮其就公司治理之效益。基此，本文就該制引進暫採保留看法。

Say-on-pay provides shareholders with an opportunity to express their voices on the appropriateness of the executive compensation practices of their invested companies. Under Say-on-pay, a company has obligations to disclose compensation-related information before annual meetings and shareholders can review the information, such as the amount of compensation, industry standard, company performance, working time and expertise of the executives into account and decide to vote “for” or “against” the company’s executive compensation practices. Since the invention of Say-on-pay in U.K., many countries such as Australia, Spain, Netherlands, Switzerland, Demark and Norway have introduced such an institution as a good corporate governance practice. In 2010, by passing the “Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” the U.S. Congress also followed this trend and enacted Article 14A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requesting reporting companies to have one Say-on-pay vote from shareholders at least every three years. As more and more countries have adopted Say-on-pay, no one can deny that the institution will play an important role in the context of global corporate governance. Thus, the Say-on-pay reforms around the world should draw our attention, and a comprehensive analysis of such an institution should be necessary for our policymakers who may consider introducing such an institution into Taiwan in the future. Thus, this paper provides such an analysis. In my conclusion, I argue that Say-on-pay may not fit in our governance system for several reasons. First, Say-on-pay would be unnecessary when a shareholders’ meeting has the ultimate power to decide directors’ compensation packages, as provided in Article 196 of the Taiwan Company Act. Second, without the presence of powerful institutional investors and professional proxy advisors in Taiwan, Say-on-pay is less likely to function well as it is expected in the U.S.