Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/98683
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.advisor張文揚zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorChang, Wen Yangen_US
dc.contributor.author善學zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorShattuck,Thomasen_US
dc.creator善學zh_TW
dc.creatorShattuck, Thomasen_US
dc.date2016en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-01T08:08:31Z-
dc.date.available2016-07-01T08:08:31Z-
dc.date.issued2016-07-01T08:08:31Z-
dc.identifierG0103862003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/98683-
dc.description碩士zh_TW
dc.description國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description國際研究英語碩士學位學程 (IMPIS)zh_TW
dc.description103862003zh_TW
dc.description.abstract美國只好在巴基斯坦和葉門使用無人機,做為打擊基地組織及其分支機構的武器。這本研究評估四個美國的反恐目標,是否在這些國家使用無人機攻擊基地組織。這四個目標是(1)破壞,降解,搗毀和擊敗基地組織及其附屬機構; (2)消除安全避難所; (3)建立持久反恐的夥伴關係,和能力; (4)對抗基地組織的意識形態和共振,減少暴力,基地組織攻擊的特定的驅動程序。無人機攻擊葉門和巴基斯坦,當他們不實現任何的這些目標時,以及在某些情況下,反對他們的工作時。無人機攻擊無法有效在定位和消除正確的目標,增加反美情緒和復仇的慾望,在與基地組織戰鬥中葉門和巴基斯的政府表現出無能,並為基地組織有迴盪消息,宣傳利用。美國必須改革使用無人駕駛飛機,才能真正消滅基地組織構成的嚴重威脅,衛護其國家安全和海外利益。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThe American use of unmanned aerial vehicles in Pakistan and Yemen has become the sole mechanism to combat al Qaeda and its affiliates. This study evaluates four U.S. counterterrorism goals to determine whether or not drone strikes in these countries can defeat al Qaeda. The four goals are (1) disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates; (2) eliminate safe havens; (3) build enduring counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities; and (4) counter al Qaeda ideology and its resonance and diminish the specific drivers of violence that al Qaeda exploits. Drones strikes in Yemen and Pakistan do not achieve any of these goals, and in some cases, work against them. They are not effective at eliminating the proper targets, increase anti-American sentiments and the desire for revenge, demonstrate Yemen’s and Pakistan’s incompetence at fighting al Qaeda, and provide al Qaeda with a reverberating message to exploit with propaganda. The U.S. must reform its use of drones in order to truly eliminate al Qaeda as a serious threat to its national security and interests abroad.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsChapter One: Introduction 1\n1.1 Background 1\n1.2 Research Importance and Implications 10\n1.3 Research Limitations 12\n1.4 Research Methodology and Approach 13\nChapter Two: Literature Review 16\n2.1 The U.S. Drone Program: An Evaluation of its Effectiveness and Effects 16\n2.2 The Legality of the U.S. Drone Program 24\n2.3 Practical and Theoretical Issues with the Program 29\n2.4 Military Coercion Theory 33\nChapter Three: Drones in Pakistan 36\n3.1 Military Coercion and Drones in Pakistan 36\n3.2 U.S. Counterterrorism Goals and Drone Usage in Pakistan 37\n3.3 Evaluation of U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan 49\nChapter Four: Drones in Yemen 53\n4.1 Military Coercion and Drones in Yemen 54\n4.2 U.S. Counterterrorism Goals and Drone Usage in Yemen 56\n4.3 Evaluation of U.S. Drone Program in Yemen 71\nChapter Five: Conclusion 74\n5.1 Recommendations for U.S. Drone Programs 74\n5.2 Policy Implications 80\n5.3 Further Research Suggestions 82\nBibliography 84zh_TW
dc.format.extent1235732 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.source.urihttp://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103862003en_US
dc.subject無人戰機zh_TW
dc.subject無人機zh_TW
dc.subject反恐zh_TW
dc.subject巴基斯坦zh_TW
dc.subject葉門zh_TW
dc.subjectunmanned aerial vehiclesen_US
dc.subjectdronesen_US
dc.subjectcounterterrorismen_US
dc.subjectPakistanen_US
dc.subjectYemenen_US
dc.title巴基斯坦和葉門的無人機:在美國反恐戰爭中是有效或是破壞穩定的戰術?zh_TW
dc.titleUnmanned Aerial Vehicles in Pakistan and Yemen: Effective or Destabilizing Tactic in the U.S. War on Terrorism?en_US
dc.typethesisen_US
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