論中國入世之過渡時期紡品特別防衛承諾─以美中紡品限額談判的實踐為例

Abstract

加入世界貿易組織, 被視為是中共追求經貿發展的戰略性策略, 但中國入世工作小組報告書第242號段落所律定的過渡時期紡品特別防衛承諾, 卻隱藏不利於中共的規範. 該款不但在法理上賦予世貿會員歧視中共紡品的合法性, 其定義的的模糊, 更是直接授予世貿會員在國內相對立法上的自由裁量權. 美國依據中共入世承諾, 在國內所頒布的相對規範, 即進一步強化了該等歧視性條款原所具有的殺傷力. 美國的實踐顯示, 中共入世之自願性不對等承諾, 已成為美國打擊中共經貿發展的便利工具, 不但壓縮中共處理與美國經貿爭端的解決管道, 更提供美國將其他政經議題與中美經貿衝突掛勾的機會. 2005年5月的美中紡品經貿風暴, 勾勒出美國針對過渡時期紡品特別防衛承諾的運作模式, 對於未來中共在追求經貿發展過程中, 所可能遭遇到的技術性經貿限制, 尤具有指標性的意義.

China`s accession to the World Trade Organization could be seen as a strategic step to pursue further national economic development. However, provisions of Transitional Textile Special Safeguard(TTSS) written in paragraph 242 of the Working Party Report adopted by the Accession Protocol are discriminative and disadvantage to China. Unclear definitions give WTO members unlimited discretion to impose discriminative measures against Chinese textiles. Although these discriminative provisions were brought to WTO Dispute Settlement Body, China could hardly earn fair treatment. US experience shows that the textile discriminative mechanism has become an efficient tool for the US to get more political and economic interests from China. The incident of the Sino-American textile disputes in the 2005 mark the economic and political challenges that China may face in the future.