論「中國共產黨黨內監督條例（試行）」：從機制設計理論角度分析

Abstract

為因應黨內監督的不足，引發方興未艾的黨內腐敗，中共制訂了黨內監\\r督條例，建構了十套配套制度來加強黨內的監督管理。然而，黨內監督條例\\r能否充分貫徹從而減少貪腐，穩定中共政權的運作，並提高其執政合法性，\\r令人十分好奇。\\r中共其實從不缺乏反貪與監督制度，所欠缺的是如何讓制度可以落實，\\r而這牽涉到制度設計是否符合人性，對此經濟學方面的機制設計理論有深入\\r的探討。因此，本文擬引用機制設計理論，從資訊效率與激勵相容觀點，來\\r分析中共黨內監督條例的設計與運作，探索其成效與未來發展。

Corruption is one of serious problems in the PRC. The damages of corruption have jeopardized the sovereignty of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Anti-Corruption now has got serious attention of CCP and carries “The Inner-Party Supervision Regulations of CCP” into execution. In fact, CCP already have many anti-corruption systems before the ISR. What China and CCP need is how to put the system into practice. Can the ISR make differences? This paper attempts to employ the mechanism design theory to analyze the design and exercise of ISR, investigating the informational efficiency and incentive compatibility, ISR can create, with a view to exploring the effects and developments ISR can reach in anticorruption.