中國電力市場的地區封鎖與地方治理─以「四川二灘水電站巨額虧損案」為例

Abstract

本案二灘水電站的虧損是四川省和重慶市的電力公司在該地區的電力市場上採取地區封鎖所造成，這些公司寧願使用本地高污染的高價電而捨棄二灘水電站無污染的低價電，雖有悖於企業正常的經營策略，卻使二灘水電站虧損累累，中國政府為此改革其電力體制，提出「廠網分開」，打破壟斷，引入競爭機制，但只打破發電環節的壟斷現象，卻忽略輸電、配電也要同時進行改革，使改革結果反而造成「廠網不分」的新壟斷現象，電網公司仍然控股不少供電公司。地方政府基於地方利益例如地方經濟發展、稅收、職工就業等的考量，也出現規制不力現象，使電力體制改革不徹底，也難到位，二灘水電站的虧損，政府也難辭其咎。

The regional barriers in the electricity market of the area adopted by Utilities Electric Co. of Sichuan Province and Chongqing accounts for the loss of two beach power stations. These companies prefer to use higher price electricity that would cause pollution and give up the low price electricity, which is pollution-free, in two beach power stations. Since this strategy is against enterprise`s normal management tactics, two beach power stations thus suffer from innumerable loss. Chinese Government reforms its electric system as a result, proposing the idea to “separate the factory from electric network”, breaking up the monopoly, and introducing competitive mechanism. Nevertheless, the appeal only breaks up the link of the generating electricity monopoly, oblivious to the reform and cooperation between the electricity transmission and distribution. The reform result leads to new monopoly phenomenon on “factory network division.” Yet, electric wire-network company still controls over the interest in electricity companies. Due to the consideration for the local interests, such as local economic development, tax revenue, worker employment etc., the local government faces structural and regulatory difficulties, which makes the electric system reform even more problematic. Accordingly, the author holds that the local government should take responsibility for the loss of two beach power stations.