中國大陸的分權改革與地方政府投資行為－財政誘因的觀點

Abstract

本研究從財政誘因觀點詮釋轉型時期中國大陸地方政府的投資行為。給定地方政府追求稅收或預算極大化的前提，我們認為財政誘因是地方政府於不同轉型階段，呈現不同投資行為的根本原因。由於財政分權改革衍生差異性的稅收制度安排（包括稅率、稅種和稅收管理）， 導致地方政府可獲得之收益來源有所變化。為追求地方財政收益最大化，地方政府會偏向投資那些可以帶來大量財政收入的產業或部門。準此，地方政府在轉型的第一階段（1978- 1993）熱衷投資加工製造業；在第二階段（1994－迄今）則積極投資於基礎設施。

This paper analyzes local government investments durning China’s reform era. Fiscal incentives are regarded as the principal factor in decisionmaking of local government investment. As the central-local fiscal relations change, the incentive structure of local governments have adapted to fiscal systems. Therefore, the salient differences in local government investments are to respond to the change of revenue resources. Consequently, local governments heavily invest in the processing and manufacturing industry under the revenue-sharing system（RSS）during the 1980s and the early 1990s. The tax-sharing system（TSS）reform in 1994, however, shifts local tax base to business tax and value-added tax. These taxes are closely associated with local infrastructure investment. Accordingly, local governments have plunged into local infrastructure investment since the mid-1990s.