中國大陸國有企業改革的路徑選擇──基於賽局理論的分析

Abstract

本研究主要分析中國大陸國有企業民營化的原因。我們從地方政府與銀行關係的角度，建立完全訊息動態賽局的理論架構，對此一議題加以探討。於地方政府擁有國有企業，且國有企業積欠銀行大量貸款的情況下，地方政府面臨是否民營化的選擇，而銀行則考量是否對國有企業催討欠款還是債轉股，兩者間的策略互動決定出均衡。研究發現，國有企業民營化的結果，受到企業內部重組後的獲利水準、貼現率以及銀行的催討能力，三個主要因素的影響。當通膨的預期愈高、參與者愈缺乏耐心，民營化愈是地方政府的最適選擇。國有企業獲利水準愈高，愈會強化地方政府進行內部重組、銀行選擇債轉股的動機，對於獲利優良但是未達相對夠高水準的國企，地方政府仍會選擇民營化。此外，國有企業資產價值與民營化的關係，取決於銀行的催討能力，隨著銀行的催討能力強化，地方政府愈傾向於將資產價值高的國有企業民營化。

The purpose of this paper attempts to analyze the causes of the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China by a dynamic game theory. Although local governments control SOEs, banks have power to affect the operation of them because banks make tremendous loans to SOEs owing to soft budget constraints. Local governments face the choice of whether privatization, and banks consider whether debt-equity swap of SOEs. Therefore, the strategic interaction between local governments and banks give rise to equilibrium. Accordingly, the result of privatization of SOEs rests on the profit level of SOEs, the discount rate and the bargaining power of banks. The higher inflation expectations and the more impatient of players, the more possible that local governments privatize SOEs. In contrast, if SOEs are able to obtain high profit, then local governments are more likely to restructure them and banks prefer to the way of debt-equity swap. In addition, the relationship between asset value of SOEs and privatization depends on the bargaining power of banks. As the augment of banks’ bargaining power, such as the central macro-control, local governments tend to privatize those SOEs with high value assets.