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|Title:||強幹弱枝或外重內輕？ 從中共「十七大」 展望「十八大」後的央地關係|
|Other Titles:||Centralization or Decentralization: The Prospect of a Central-Local Relationship after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China|
Jiguandi (Place of Ancestry Origin);Jueqidi (Place of Rise to Power);Xianzhidi (Place of Current Position);Political Interests;Political Heritage
|Issue Date:||2016-07-20 16:18:46 (UTC+8)|
By comparing the political power transfer patterns between Xi Jinping and Hua Guofeng and Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, it is rational to assume that Xi Jinping consolidated his power in the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). However, Xi Jinping is being questioned over his assertiveness to carry out decrees. During both Jiang’s and Hu’s administrations, they confronted local resistance. How does Xi interpret the resistance from local governments? Will the resistance recur after the 18th National Congress of the CPC? How will Xi overcome the challenge from localists? To answer the above questions this research utilizes a political interest model to make predictions about the 18th National Congress through analysis of the 17th Congress. The result indicates that, if the 18th Congress follows the deployment of the last two congresses, each province can appoint two delegates in the Central Committee, ten in the Politburo of CPC, and two in the Politburo Standing Committee. In terms of the local delegates in the Politburo, the priority provincial/municipal committee secretaries are those from Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hubei, and Xinjiang. As for the delegates in the Politburo Standing Committee, Wang Yang and Bo Xilai are the likeliest candidates. Decentralization can be avoided in a central-local relationship. Although local governments may resist the central decrees, few provinces and cities with higher political interests will resist the central government. For this, we can regard Guangdong and Shanghai as indices. In the future, the central government will centralize authority through personnel redeployment.
|Relation:||東亞研究, 43(1), 1-38|
East Asia Studies
|Appears in Collections:||[東亞研究] 期刊論文|
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