Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/99615
題名: 專利池對非洲治療公衛相關被忽略的熱帶疾病之研究
Study of patent pool in treatment of public health related neglected tropical diseases in Africa
作者: 范家堃
Fan, Chia Kwung
貢獻者: 沈宗倫
Shen, Chung Lun
范家堃
Fan, Chia Kwung
關鍵詞: 「被忽視」的熱帶疾病
失能調整人年
TRIPS杜哈公衛宣言
強制授權
BVGH專利池
Neglected Tropical Diseases
Disability Adjusted Life-Years
TRIPS Agreement
Doha Declaration
Compulsory Licensing
BVGH Patent Pool
日期: 2016
上傳時間: 3-Aug-2016
摘要: 「被忽視」的熱帶疾病(NTDs)中的寄生蟲疾病(Parasitic Diseases; PDs)除對非洲人群健康之危害甚鉅外,並進而對非洲地區社經體系造成嚴重衝擊與造成巨大的「失能調整人年」損失。由於不易取得治療PDs傳統基本藥物的問題,許多非洲民眾便以其部落社區的傳統治療師所採用的傳統草藥來進行PDs的治療,雖然這些傳統草藥容易取得,但是成分的內容和藥效品質甚或產生嚴重的致命副作用。雖然TRIPS協定第31條和杜哈宣言的第五和第六段對於製藥能力不足或大部分皆無製藥能力的貧窮國家,可以基於「國家緊急危難或其它緊急狀況」的事由,以強制授權方式取得專利藥或較便宜的學名藥以解決造成國家危難的特定公共健康事件,但是國際大藥廠認為無利可圖,不願意花費資金投注於預防或治療此類疾病藥物的相關研發外,高收入的國家為保護其大藥廠的藥物專利,也往往使用一些經濟制裁手段逼迫上述國家就制定國內專利法以保護其藥物專利。雖然經杜哈宣言修正TRIPS協定第31(f)條有關強制授權對外出口的障礙,但是出口國對於強制授權程序與是否能取得政治上和藥廠業者的支持,仍充滿困難。應用「專利池」可以減少交易成本或法律爭議而可調和「強制授權」與解決「權利耗盡」的爭議,有助於解決非洲開發中國家取得專利藥物的困境。PDs造成非洲開發中國家民眾失能等長期痛苦與健康生活損失,類推適用SARS模式,可依TRIPS協定第31條(b)與杜哈宣言第五段(c)將之視為「造成國家緊急危難或其它緊急狀況」的重大公共健康的事由而可行使強制授權。雖然「生醫專利池BVGH」的「非獨家個別授權與免授權費」的操作模式與傳統電信技術專利池不盡相同,但因藥廠不願投入治療PDs的傳統基本藥物存在的副作用與抗藥性的新藥研發,為鼓勵對治療PDs的藥物進行創新研發, BVGH彈性的授權方式與免繳交授權費,將有利於解決開發中國家未來取得新專利藥的困境。除BVGH外,建議結合全球獎勵基金以「激勵拉拔」的方式獎助願意投入治療PDs新藥研發並將專利自願授權給BVGH的藥廠。鑒於全球暖化與最近中東難民潮大量湧進歐洲,罕見的PDs可預期會大量傳播開來,將嚴重衝擊歐洲等先進國家良好的公共衛生體系,而使得「NTDs尤其是PDs不再只是專屬於貧窮國家的疾病,亦將常現於富有的先進國家」。這些NTDs疾病將提供藥廠進行新藥研發的利基,然而在未來可能產生專利池的反競爭問題,導致支配市場獨占性的隱憂值得關注。
Parasitic diseases (PDs) not only cause the huge health hazards to African populations, but also they further severely impact on African socio-economic system as resulting in huge economic and health losses as assessed by disability adjusted life-years. Since it is not easy for Africans to access the essential medicine to treat PDs, many of them will seek for the help of local healers in tribal communities to treat PDs. Although these traditional herbs are readily available, the content and quality of drug ingredients may even cause serious fatal side effects. Poor countries with insufficiencies or lacks of the pharmaceutical capacities may still access the patented medicines or cheaper generics to solve the national crisis caused by the specific public health events through compulsory licensing (CL) based on "national emergency or the other emergency situations" according to TRIPS Article 31 and Doha Declaration on the fifth and sixth paragraph due to that the large international pharmaceutical companies consider unprofitable, unwilling to spend money to invest on the research and development (R&D) of new drugs for prevention or treatment purpose. Moreover, the high-income countries also tend to exert some of the economic sanctions to force those poor countries to enact national patent law in order to protect drug patents. Furthermore, the mandatory obstacle of exportation authorized by CL from the amended TRIPS Agreement Article 31 (f) by the Doha Declaration has been improved; nevertheless, it is still fraught with difficulties in utilization of CL for the exporting countries because this should be dependent on whether they may actually get the supports from political and the pharmaceutical industry. Application of patent pools model may benefit to reduce transaction costs or legal dispute thus reconciling and resolving issues related to CL as well as doctrine of patent exhaustion and that it is beneficial to help solve dilemma for African countries to access patented drugs. Because Africans severely suffer from disabled caused by PDs thus leading to long-term pain and health life losses, African countries can grant CL as PDs may be regarded as national crisis like SARS causing "national emergency or the other emergency situations" as authorized from TRIPS Agreement Article 31 (f) and Doha Declaration paragraph 5 (c). Although the practice of individual licensing with royalty-free for BVGH is somewhat different from that of traditional patent pools, this licensing practice mode is beneficial to innovation in new drugs R&D to improve the side effects and drug-resistance of traditional essential medicines and help African countries to access patented new drugs in the future. Finally, it is recommended to cooperate with Award Foundation to encourage incentive for pharmaceutical companies which contribute most to new drugs R&D and voluntary licensing to BVGH. Owing to global warming and recent emergence of huge refugees into Europe rare PDs will be obviously spread out thus causing severe impacts on well-established public health system as leading to emergence of PDs in developed countries like Europe. Altogether, such situations definitely provide a good incentive in new drugs R&D for pharmaceutical companies; however, it guarantees concerns on anti-competitive and monopoly issues derived by biomedical pools in the future.
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描述: 碩士
國立政治大學
法律科際整合研究所
101652012
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101652012
資料類型: thesis
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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