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題名 合作對局與公共費用的分攤
Cooperation Game and Allocation of the Common Cost作者 馬鈺閔
Maa, Yuh Min貢獻者 李子壩
Li, Jzy Bang
馬鈺閔
Maa, Yuh Min關鍵詞 合作對局
解概念
分攤
Cooperation Game
Solution concepts
Allocation日期 1993 上傳時間 29-四月-2016 16:44:00 (UTC+8) 摘要 政府的一些公共政策，如水資源開發計劃對工程費用的分攤；興建公共設施時公共費用的分攤等，都是屬於訊息互通且協商具約束力的合作對局，是著重於如何將合作帶來的利益，做一適當的分配，而此分配問題是現今社會中非常重要的一環。另外，破產問題是工商業社會經常發生的事情，如鴻源、龍祥等企業的破產曾造成軒然大波，因此尋求一妥善而公平的處理將可減低債權人的紛爭。然而面對每一件問題，我們希望有一通盤解決的方案而不是個案的解決，更希望有一嚴密的理論做為基礎，而對局理論能夠提供此一理論基礎。因此本文將以合作對局理論透過數學模式的建立與分析來提供決策者做為解決以上問題的參考。 參考文獻 [1] AUlnann, R. J. and lvIaschler, lvI.. (1985), "Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem frOIn the Taln1ud," Journal of Economic Theory, 36, 195-213. [2] Friedman, J. VV. (1991), Game Theory with Application to Econo`mics , Second Edition, Oxford University Press. [3] Gately, D. (1974), "Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: a Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power, " International Economic Review, 15, 195-208. [4] Littlechild, S. C. (1974), "A Simple Expression for the Nucleolus in a Special Case," Int. J. Game Theory,. 3, 21-30. [5] Littlechild, S. C. and Owen, G. (1973), "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Sci. 20, 370-372. [6] Littlechild, S. C. and Owen, G. (1977), "A Further Note on the Nucleolus of the Airport Game ,:` Int. J. Game Theory} 5, 91-95. [7] Littlechild, S. C. and TOlnpson, C. F. (1977), "Aircraft Landing Fees: a Game Theoretic Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 186-205. [8] lvIaschler, M. and Peleg, B. (1966), "A Characterization, Existence Proof and Dimension Bounds for the Kernel of a Game," Pacific I Math. ) 18, 289-328. [9] lvIaschler, IVI. , Peleg, B. and Shapley, L. S. (1972), "The Kernel and Bargaining Set for Convex Game," Int. I Game Theory) 1, 73-93. [10] lvIoulin, H. (1988), Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press. [11]Owen,G.(1982),Game Theory, Second Edition, Academic Press, New York. [12]Schmeidler, D.(1969), “The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game,” SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 17, 6, 1163-1170. [13]Shapley, L.S.(1953),”A Value for n-person Game,”Ann. Of Math.Studies, 28,307-317. [14]Straffin,P.D.and Heaney,J.P.(1981), “Game Theory and Tennessee Valley Authority,”Int. J. Game Theory, 10, 35-43. [15]Tijs, S.H. and Driessen,T.S.H.(1986),”Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problem,”Management Science, 32, 1015-1028. [16]Williams, M.A.(1988),”An Empricial Test of Cooperative Game Solution Concepts,” Behavioral Science, 33, 224-237. [17]Young,H.P.(1985),”Monotonic Solution of Cooperative Game,”Int. J.Game Theory, 14, 65-72. [18]Young,H.P.,Okada, N. and Hashimoto,T.(1982), “Cost Allocation in Water Resources Development,”Water Resources Research , 18, 463-475. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
統計學系
G80354012資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004197 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 李子壩 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Li, Jzy Bang en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 馬鈺閔 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Maa, Yuh Min en_US dc.creator (作者) 馬鈺閔 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Maa, Yuh Min en_US dc.date (日期) 1993 en_US dc.date.accessioned 29-四月-2016 16:44:00 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 29-四月-2016 16:44:00 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 29-四月-2016 16:44:00 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) B2002004197 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/89022 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 統計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) G80354012 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 政府的一些公共政策，如水資源開發計劃對工程費用的分攤；興建公共設施時公共費用的分攤等，都是屬於訊息互通且協商具約束力的合作對局，是著重於如何將合作帶來的利益，做一適當的分配，而此分配問題是現今社會中非常重要的一環。另外，破產問題是工商業社會經常發生的事情，如鴻源、龍祥等企業的破產曾造成軒然大波，因此尋求一妥善而公平的處理將可減低債權人的紛爭。然而面對每一件問題，我們希望有一通盤解決的方案而不是個案的解決，更希望有一嚴密的理論做為基礎，而對局理論能夠提供此一理論基礎。因此本文將以合作對局理論透過數學模式的建立與分析來提供決策者做為解決以上問題的參考。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 前言‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧ １ 第二章 合作對局的基本概念‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧ ３ 第一節 n人合作對局‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧ ３ 第二節 核與least core‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧ ５ 第三節 Shapley value‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧ １３ 第四節 Kernel、Pre-kernel與Nucleolus‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧ １９ 第三章 破產對局‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧２５ 第一節 破產對局的核‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧２５ 第二節 破產對局的nucleolus解‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧ ２８ 第三節 一個古時猶太法典的例子‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧３６ 第四章 機場對局‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧３９ 第一節 機場對局的Shapley value‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧４０ 第二節 機場對局的Nucleolus解‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧ ４５ 第三節 伯明罕機場實例‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧５３ 第五章 水資源合作計劃的成本分配‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧６２ 第一節 節省對局與淨利潤對局‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧６３ 第二節 實用成本分配方法‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧６４ 第三節 實例‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧６９ 第四節 資料缺失時的處理‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧８２ 第六章 結論‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧８５ 參考文獻‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧‧８７ zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004197 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 合作對局 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 解概念 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 分攤 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cooperation Game en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Solution concepts en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Allocation en_US dc.title (題名) 合作對局與公共費用的分攤 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Cooperation Game and Allocation of the Common Cost en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [1] AUlnann, R. J. and lvIaschler, lvI.. (1985), "Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem frOIn the Taln1ud," Journal of Economic Theory, 36, 195-213. [2] Friedman, J. VV. (1991), Game Theory with Application to Econo`mics , Second Edition, Oxford University Press. [3] Gately, D. (1974), "Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: a Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power, " International Economic Review, 15, 195-208. [4] Littlechild, S. C. (1974), "A Simple Expression for the Nucleolus in a Special Case," Int. J. Game Theory,. 3, 21-30. [5] Littlechild, S. C. and Owen, G. (1973), "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Sci. 20, 370-372. [6] Littlechild, S. C. and Owen, G. (1977), "A Further Note on the Nucleolus of the Airport Game ,:` Int. J. Game Theory} 5, 91-95. [7] Littlechild, S. C. and TOlnpson, C. F. (1977), "Aircraft Landing Fees: a Game Theoretic Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 186-205. [8] lvIaschler, M. and Peleg, B. (1966), "A Characterization, Existence Proof and Dimension Bounds for the Kernel of a Game," Pacific I Math. ) 18, 289-328. [9] lvIaschler, IVI. , Peleg, B. and Shapley, L. S. (1972), "The Kernel and Bargaining Set for Convex Game," Int. I Game Theory) 1, 73-93. [10] lvIoulin, H. (1988), Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press. [11]Owen,G.(1982),Game Theory, Second Edition, Academic Press, New York. [12]Schmeidler, D.(1969), “The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game,” SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 17, 6, 1163-1170. [13]Shapley, L.S.(1953),”A Value for n-person Game,”Ann. Of Math.Studies, 28,307-317. [14]Straffin,P.D.and Heaney,J.P.(1981), “Game Theory and Tennessee Valley Authority,”Int. J. Game Theory, 10, 35-43. [15]Tijs, S.H. and Driessen,T.S.H.(1986),”Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problem,”Management Science, 32, 1015-1028. [16]Williams, M.A.(1988),”An Empricial Test of Cooperative Game Solution Concepts,” Behavioral Science, 33, 224-237. [17]Young,H.P.(1985),”Monotonic Solution of Cooperative Game,”Int. J.Game Theory, 14, 65-72. [18]Young,H.P.,Okada, N. and Hashimoto,T.(1982), “Cost Allocation in Water Resources Development,”Water Resources Research , 18, 463-475. zh_TW
