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題名 合作對局與雙方配對
作者 陳欣怡
CHEN, XIN-YI
貢獻者 李子壩
陳欣怡
CHEN, XIN-YI
日期 1992
1991
上傳時間 2-五月-2016 15:17:02 (UTC+8)
參考文獻 一、中文書目：
     (1) 李子壩，"新制大學聯考分發問題之分析"，數學傳播，7卷3期，民國72年9月.
     (2) ──，"大學聯招同分增額錄取模式的研究"，國科會報告，民國79年8月.
     二、英文書目：
     [1] Crawford,Vincent P. and Elsie, Marie Knoer( 1981 )," Job Matching With Heterogeneous Firms and I,i`ilorkers" ,Econometrica,49,437-450.
     [2] Debreu, G. and Scarf, H.(1963)," A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy", International Economic Review,4,235-246.
     [3] Demange,Gabrielle and David, Gale(1985),"The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets" , Econometrica,53,873-888.
     [4] Fred, S. Roberts(1976),Discrete Mathematical Model, Prentice-Hall, Englewood.
     [5] Gusfield, D. and Ivring, R.W.(1989), The Stable Marria.ge Problem: Structure and Algorithm, MIT, Cambridge, Press.
     [6] Herve, M.(1988),Axioms of cooperative Decision M aking, Cambridge Univ. Press.
     [7] James, W. Friedman(1991),Game Theorys With Applications to. Ecnomics, Oxford, Univ. Press.
     [8] Kelso, Alexander S.,Jr. and Crawford, Vincent P.(1982)," Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes" ,Econometrica,50,1483-1504.
     [9] Liu,C.L.(1977),Element of Discrete Mathematics, McGraw-Hill, New York.
     [10] Lovasz, L. and Plummer, M.(1986),Matching Theory, North-holland, Amsterdam.
     [l1] Marilda, S. and Roth, A.E.(1988),"Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets" ,Journal of Economic Theory,45,85-101.
     [12] Rochford, C. Sharon( 1984),"Symmetrically Pairwise-Bargained Allocations in a Assignment Market" ,Journal of Economic Theory,34,263-281.
     [13] Rosenmulier,J.(1981), The Theory of Games and Markets, North-Holland company.
     [14] Roth, A.E.(1979),Axiomatic Models of Bagaining,Springer-Verleg.
     [15] (1984)," Stability and Polarization of Interests In Job Matching" ,Econometrica, 52,47-57.
     [16] Roth A.E. and Sotomayor Marilda( 1991), Two-Sided Matching A Study In Game Theoretic Modelling and Analysis, Cambridge, Univ. Press.
     [17] Scarf, E. Herbert(1967)"The Core of an N Person Game" ,Econometrica, 35,51-69.
     [18] Scarf, E.H. and Hansen Terje( 1973), The Computation of Economic Equilibria, Yale Univ. Press.
     [19] Shapley, L.S. and Herbert Scarf(1974),"On Cores and Indivisibility", Journal of Mathematical Econometrics,I,23-28.
     [20] Shapley, L.S. and Shubik M.(1972),"The Assignment Game I :The Core", International Journal of Game Theory,1,,111-130.
     [21] Shapley, L.S. and Gale, D.(1962),"College admissions and the stability of Marriage" ,Amer. Math.Monthly,69,9-15.
     [22] Shubik, Martin(1982), Game Theory In the Social Sciences Concepts and Solutions, MIT Press, Cambridge.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
統計學系
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004641
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 李子壩zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) 陳欣怡zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) CHEN, XIN-YIen_US
dc.creator (作者) 陳欣怡zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) CHEN, XIN-YIen_US
dc.date (日期) 1992en_US
dc.date (日期) 1991en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2-五月-2016 15:17:02 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-五月-2016 15:17:02 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-五月-2016 15:17:02 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) B2002004641en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/89230-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 統計學系zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 前言.................... 1
     第二章 對局理論的基本概念
     第一節 轉換效用N 人合作對局.................... 3
     第二節 非轉換效用N 人合作對局.................... 12
     第三節 合作對局-核的存在性.................... 14
     第三章 雙方配對問題
     第一節 穩定的婚姻配對....................27
     第二節 穩定婚姻配對和合作對局.................... 35
     第四章 指派對局
     第一節 指派對局的模式....................38
     第二節 買方策略....................44
     第五章 對稱的成對交易分配
     第一節 對稱的成對交易分配模式的建立....................53
     第二節 對稱的成對交易分配的求法及性質....................58
     第六章 結論....................66
     參考文獻.................... 67		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004641en_US
dc.title (題名) 合作對局與雙方配對zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文書目：
     (1) 李子壩，"新制大學聯考分發問題之分析"，數學傳播，7卷3期，民國72年9月.
     (2) ──，"大學聯招同分增額錄取模式的研究"，國科會報告，民國79年8月.
     二、英文書目：
     [1] Crawford,Vincent P. and Elsie, Marie Knoer( 1981 )," Job Matching With Heterogeneous Firms and I,i`ilorkers" ,Econometrica,49,437-450.
     [2] Debreu, G. and Scarf, H.(1963)," A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy", International Economic Review,4,235-246.
     [3] Demange,Gabrielle and David, Gale(1985),"The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets" , Econometrica,53,873-888.
     [4] Fred, S. Roberts(1976),Discrete Mathematical Model, Prentice-Hall, Englewood.
     [5] Gusfield, D. and Ivring, R.W.(1989), The Stable Marria.ge Problem: Structure and Algorithm, MIT, Cambridge, Press.
     [6] Herve, M.(1988),Axioms of cooperative Decision M aking, Cambridge Univ. Press.
     [7] James, W. Friedman(1991),Game Theorys With Applications to. Ecnomics, Oxford, Univ. Press.
     [8] Kelso, Alexander S.,Jr. and Crawford, Vincent P.(1982)," Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes" ,Econometrica,50,1483-1504.
     [9] Liu,C.L.(1977),Element of Discrete Mathematics, McGraw-Hill, New York.
     [10] Lovasz, L. and Plummer, M.(1986),Matching Theory, North-holland, Amsterdam.
     [l1] Marilda, S. and Roth, A.E.(1988),"Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets" ,Journal of Economic Theory,45,85-101.
     [12] Rochford, C. Sharon( 1984),"Symmetrically Pairwise-Bargained Allocations in a Assignment Market" ,Journal of Economic Theory,34,263-281.
     [13] Rosenmulier,J.(1981), The Theory of Games and Markets, North-Holland company.
     [14] Roth, A.E.(1979),Axiomatic Models of Bagaining,Springer-Verleg.
     [15] (1984)," Stability and Polarization of Interests In Job Matching" ,Econometrica, 52,47-57.
     [16] Roth A.E. and Sotomayor Marilda( 1991), Two-Sided Matching A Study In Game Theoretic Modelling and Analysis, Cambridge, Univ. Press.
     [17] Scarf, E. Herbert(1967)"The Core of an N Person Game" ,Econometrica, 35,51-69.
     [18] Scarf, E.H. and Hansen Terje( 1973), The Computation of Economic Equilibria, Yale Univ. Press.
     [19] Shapley, L.S. and Herbert Scarf(1974),"On Cores and Indivisibility", Journal of Mathematical Econometrics,I,23-28.
     [20] Shapley, L.S. and Shubik M.(1972),"The Assignment Game I :The Core", International Journal of Game Theory,1,,111-130.
     [21] Shapley, L.S. and Gale, D.(1962),"College admissions and the stability of Marriage" ,Amer. Math.Monthly,69,9-15.
     [22] Shubik, Martin(1982), Game Theory In the Social Sciences Concepts and Solutions, MIT Press, Cambridge.		zh_TW