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題名 生態傾銷下最適關稅協定之研究
作者 吳吟咨
貢獻者 賴育邦
吳吟咨
關鍵詞 生態傾銷
跨國污染
貿易自由化
關稅
污染稅
ecological dumping
transboundary pollution
trade liberalization
tariff
pollution tax
日期 2009
上傳時間 9-May-2016 15:15:47 (UTC+8)
摘要 在世界及地區性貿易組織的努力下, 近來關稅等貿易障礙已經普遍降低。但與此同時, 環境品質向下沉淪的疑慮也隨之而來。儘管相關的討論不在少數, 但大部分著重於外生貿易障礙調降下的策略性環境政策, 以及其對應之福利變動; 或是在合作與非合作環境政策下, 同時決定環境與貿易政策, 然而也相對較少將環境階段的扭曲納入貿易政策制定的考量中。因此, 本文旨在探討若將生態傾銷的誘因納入考量,並改採序列賽局分別決定最適環境稅與關稅時, 貿易政策合作下所制定之最適關稅協定為何?
另一方面, 我們也觀察生產性跨國污染的大小對最適關稅的影響, 並發現當污染不具跨國外溢效果時, 此時不論環境政策合作與否, 最適關稅應對該污染性財貨提供進口補貼。相對地, 若跨國污染超過一定程度時, 除非環境政策能夠合作, 否則此時應對其課徵關稅, 以避免過度生產減損社會福利。
By constructing a reciprocal-dumping model, we investigate a second-best tariff agreement when considering the linkage between the trade and the environmental policy. Though there has been much discussion about the linkage, most existing literature rarely considers the distortion when setting a trade agreement. We also take the transboundary strength of production pollution into account.
Our results show that: (1) in the absence of transboundary pollution, the optimal tariff should be an import subsidy. Thus, whether both countries coordinate on their environmental policies or not, a bilateral reduction in tariffs will enhance the global welfare. (2) On the contrary, if the transboundary pollution is sufficiently strong, then the second-best tariff should be positive,
while the first-best level is negative. In this situation, trade liberalization might decrease global welfare.
參考文獻 賴育邦與王嘉慧(2001), “關稅政策, 環境政策與福利效果之分析,” 經濟研究, 40, 1–31.
Barrett, S. (1994), “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade,”Journal of Public Economics, 54, 325–338.
Beghin, J., D. Roland-Holst, and D.V.D. Mensbrugghe (1997), “Trade and Pollution Linkages: Piecemeal Reform and Optimal Intervention,” The Canadian Journal of Economics, 30, 442–455.
Brander, J.A. (1981), “Intra-industry Trade in Identical Commodities,”Journal of International Economics, 11, 1–14.
Brander, J. and P. Krugman (1983), “A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International Trade,” Journal of International Economics, 15, 313–323.
Brander, J.A. and B.J. Spencer (1985), “Export Subsidies and Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 83–100.
Burguet, R. and J. Sempere (2003), “Trade Liberalization, Environmental Policy, and Welfare,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46, 25–37.
Copeland, B.R. (2000), “Trade and Environment: Policy Linkages,” Environment and Development Economics, 5, 405–432.
Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (2005), “Environmental Taxation in Open Economies: Unilateralism or Partial Harmonization,” Southern Economic Journal, 72, 352–371.
Duval, Y. and S.F. Hamilton (2002), “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade in Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets,” International Tax and Public Finance, 9, 259–271.
Ferrara, I., P. Missios, and H.M. Yildiz (2009), “Trading Rules and the Environment: Does Equal Treatment Lead to a Cleaner World? ,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2008.11.002.
Fung, K.C. and A.M. Maechler (2007), “Trade Liberalization and the Environment: The Case of Intra-industry Trade,” The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development,16, 53–69.
Hatzipanayotou P., S. Lahiri, and M.S. Michael (2002), “Can Cross-Border Pollution Reduce Pollution?,” The Canadian Journal of Economics, 35, 805–818.
Kennedy, P.W. (1994), “Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 27, 49–63.
Lai, Y.-B. and C.-H. Hu (2008), “Trade Agreements, Domestic Environmental Regulation, and Transboundary Pollution,” Resource and Energy Economics, 30, 209–228.
Long, N.V. and A. Soubeyran (1998), “Pollution, Pigouvian Taxes, and Asymmetric International Oligopoly,” CIRANO Working Paper, 98s-30.
Markusen, J.R. (1975), “International Externalities and Optimal Tax Structures,”Journal of International Economics, 5, 15–29.
Mæstad, O. (1998), “On the Efficiency of Green Trade Policy,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 11, 1–18.
Neary, J.P. (2006), “International Trade and the Environment: Theoretical and Policy Linkages,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 33, 95–118.
Ricardo, D. (1973), The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, New York: Dutton.
Singh, N. and X. Vives (1984), “Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 546–554.
Straume, O.R. (2006), “Product Market Integration and Environmental Policy Coordination in an International Duopoly,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 34, 439–563.
Sturm, D.M. (2003), “Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature,”pp. 119–149. in: L. Marsiliani, M. Rauscher, and C. Withagen (eds.), Environmental policy in an international perspective, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tanguay, G.A. (2001), “Strategic Environmental Policies under International Duopolistic Competition,” International Tax and Public Finance, 8, 793–811.
Turunen-Red, A.H. and A.D. Woodland (2004), “Multilateral Reforms of Trade and Environmental Policy,” Review of International Economics, 12, 321–336.
Ulph, A. (1996), “Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers Act Strategically,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30, 265–281.
Walz, U. and D. Wellisch (1997), “Is Free Trade in the Interest of Exporting Countries when There is Ecological Dumping?,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 275–291.
World Trade Organization (2008), World Trade Report 2008 – Trade in a Globalizing World, Geneva: WTO.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
96255003
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255003
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 賴育邦zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 吳吟咨zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 吳吟咨zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2009en_US
dc.date.accessioned 9-May-2016 15:15:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 9-May-2016 15:15:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 9-May-2016 15:15:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0096255003en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/95132-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 96255003zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在世界及地區性貿易組織的努力下, 近來關稅等貿易障礙已經普遍降低。但與此同時, 環境品質向下沉淪的疑慮也隨之而來。儘管相關的討論不在少數, 但大部分著重於外生貿易障礙調降下的策略性環境政策, 以及其對應之福利變動; 或是在合作與非合作環境政策下, 同時決定環境與貿易政策, 然而也相對較少將環境階段的扭曲納入貿易政策制定的考量中。因此, 本文旨在探討若將生態傾銷的誘因納入考量,並改採序列賽局分別決定最適環境稅與關稅時, 貿易政策合作下所制定之最適關稅協定為何?
另一方面, 我們也觀察生產性跨國污染的大小對最適關稅的影響, 並發現當污染不具跨國外溢效果時, 此時不論環境政策合作與否, 最適關稅應對該污染性財貨提供進口補貼。相對地, 若跨國污染超過一定程度時, 除非環境政策能夠合作, 否則此時應對其課徵關稅, 以避免過度生產減損社會福利。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) By constructing a reciprocal-dumping model, we investigate a second-best tariff agreement when considering the linkage between the trade and the environmental policy. Though there has been much discussion about the linkage, most existing literature rarely considers the distortion when setting a trade agreement. We also take the transboundary strength of production pollution into account.
Our results show that: (1) in the absence of transboundary pollution, the optimal tariff should be an import subsidy. Thus, whether both countries coordinate on their environmental policies or not, a bilateral reduction in tariffs will enhance the global welfare. (2) On the contrary, if the transboundary pollution is sufficiently strong, then the second-best tariff should be positive,
while the first-best level is negative. In this situation, trade liberalization might decrease global welfare.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論............................................... 1
第一節 研究動機與目的...................................... 1
第二節 研究方法與限制....................................... 3
第三節 本文架構............................................ 4
第二章 文獻回顧............................................ 5
第一節 策略性環境政策工具.................................... 5
第二節 次佳環境與貿易政策.................................... 9
第三節 討論............................................... 12
第三章 基本模型設定........................................ 14
第一節 消費者行為.......................................... 14
第二節 廠商行為........................................... 16
第三節 政府之策略性行為.................................... 19
第四章 最適污染稅.......................................... 21
第一節 非合作環境政策下之最適污染稅.......................... 21
第二節 合作環境政策下之最適污染稅............................ 24
第五章 最適關稅........................................... 26
第一節 充分合作之最適關稅................................... 26
第二節 部分合作之次佳關稅................................... 28
第六章 考量跨國污染之環境與貿易政策.......................... 30
第一節 充分合作之最適污染稅與關稅............................ 31
第二節 部分合作之次佳污染稅與關稅............................ 33
第七章 結論............................................... 35
參考文獻.................................................. 36		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255003en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 生態傾銷zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 跨國污染zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貿易自由化zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 關稅zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 污染稅zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ecological dumpingen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) transboundary pollutionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) trade liberalizationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) tariffen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) pollution taxen_US
dc.title (題名) 生態傾銷下最適關稅協定之研究zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 賴育邦與王嘉慧(2001), “關稅政策, 環境政策與福利效果之分析,” 經濟研究, 40, 1–31.
Barrett, S. (1994), “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade,”Journal of Public Economics, 54, 325–338.
Beghin, J., D. Roland-Holst, and D.V.D. Mensbrugghe (1997), “Trade and Pollution Linkages: Piecemeal Reform and Optimal Intervention,” The Canadian Journal of Economics, 30, 442–455.
Brander, J.A. (1981), “Intra-industry Trade in Identical Commodities,”Journal of International Economics, 11, 1–14.
Brander, J. and P. Krugman (1983), “A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International Trade,” Journal of International Economics, 15, 313–323.
Brander, J.A. and B.J. Spencer (1985), “Export Subsidies and Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 83–100.
Burguet, R. and J. Sempere (2003), “Trade Liberalization, Environmental Policy, and Welfare,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46, 25–37.
Copeland, B.R. (2000), “Trade and Environment: Policy Linkages,” Environment and Development Economics, 5, 405–432.
Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (2005), “Environmental Taxation in Open Economies: Unilateralism or Partial Harmonization,” Southern Economic Journal, 72, 352–371.
Duval, Y. and S.F. Hamilton (2002), “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade in Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets,” International Tax and Public Finance, 9, 259–271.
Ferrara, I., P. Missios, and H.M. Yildiz (2009), “Trading Rules and the Environment: Does Equal Treatment Lead to a Cleaner World? ,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2008.11.002.
Fung, K.C. and A.M. Maechler (2007), “Trade Liberalization and the Environment: The Case of Intra-industry Trade,” The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development,16, 53–69.
Hatzipanayotou P., S. Lahiri, and M.S. Michael (2002), “Can Cross-Border Pollution Reduce Pollution?,” The Canadian Journal of Economics, 35, 805–818.
Kennedy, P.W. (1994), “Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 27, 49–63.
Lai, Y.-B. and C.-H. Hu (2008), “Trade Agreements, Domestic Environmental Regulation, and Transboundary Pollution,” Resource and Energy Economics, 30, 209–228.
Long, N.V. and A. Soubeyran (1998), “Pollution, Pigouvian Taxes, and Asymmetric International Oligopoly,” CIRANO Working Paper, 98s-30.
Markusen, J.R. (1975), “International Externalities and Optimal Tax Structures,”Journal of International Economics, 5, 15–29.
Mæstad, O. (1998), “On the Efficiency of Green Trade Policy,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 11, 1–18.
Neary, J.P. (2006), “International Trade and the Environment: Theoretical and Policy Linkages,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 33, 95–118.
Ricardo, D. (1973), The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, New York: Dutton.
Singh, N. and X. Vives (1984), “Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 546–554.
Straume, O.R. (2006), “Product Market Integration and Environmental Policy Coordination in an International Duopoly,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 34, 439–563.
Sturm, D.M. (2003), “Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature,”pp. 119–149. in: L. Marsiliani, M. Rauscher, and C. Withagen (eds.), Environmental policy in an international perspective, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tanguay, G.A. (2001), “Strategic Environmental Policies under International Duopolistic Competition,” International Tax and Public Finance, 8, 793–811.
Turunen-Red, A.H. and A.D. Woodland (2004), “Multilateral Reforms of Trade and Environmental Policy,” Review of International Economics, 12, 321–336.
Ulph, A. (1996), “Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers Act Strategically,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30, 265–281.
Walz, U. and D. Wellisch (1997), “Is Free Trade in the Interest of Exporting Countries when There is Ecological Dumping?,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 275–291.
World Trade Organization (2008), World Trade Report 2008 – Trade in a Globalizing World, Geneva: WTO.		zh_TW