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題名 策略性環境政策、跨國性污染與最適出口補貼協定 作者 張伊君
Chang, Yi-Chun貢獻者 賴育邦
張伊君
Chang, Yi-Chun關鍵詞 消費性污染
跨國性污染
貿易協定
出口補貼
污染稅稅率
Consumption externality
Transboundary pollution
Trade agreement
Export subsidy
Environmental taxes日期 2009 上傳時間 9-五月-2016 15:15:49 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文將貿易政策與環境政策做連結, 建構一雙邊貿易之架構, 設立一三階段之序列賽局,以之探討: 當具有跨國性質之消費性污染存在時, 在考量兩國政府皆有誘因在環境政策上採取非合作的態度下, 兩國政府應如何藉由貿易政策之協定, 訂定其最適之出口品補貼政策, 以矯正環境政策非合作下之不效率。本文研究發現: 在兩國政府僅能夠進行政策的部分合作時, 當需求參數愈大, 兩國政府之最適貿易政策是應將給予其各自國家出口品之單位補貼調升;但若伴隨消費財貨所排放之污染對環境具有較高之邊際污染, 或是其本身之外溢效果愈強, 兩國政府對出口品之最適補貼則應該調降。我們同時也發現, 此時即使各國政府之最適貿易政策是調降出口補貼, 會使得各國之污染稅稅率更低, 但卻不會使其更加偏離兩國政府在環境政策上合作下之最適稅率, 並且仍會為全球帶來更高之社會福利。
This paper constructs a reciprocal-market model, which contains a three-stage game to investigate how the two countries decide the optimal export subsidy agreement when they do not coordinate their environmental policy. We find that the level of optimal export subsidy should decrease with the strength of transboundary pollution, which is associated to consumption activities. In addition, the export subsidy agreement should increase with the demand parameter. We also find that even a reduction in the export subsidy will decrease the non-coordinated environmental tax rate, it will not deviate the tax rate away from the coordinated one and still enhance the social welfare.參考文獻 Barnett, S. (1994), “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade,”Journal of Public Economics, 54, 325–338.Brander, J.A. (1981), “Intra-industry Trade in Identical Commodities,”Journal of International Economics, 11, 1–14.Brander, J.A., and B.J. Spencer (1984), “Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition,” In: Kierzkowski, H. (Ed.) Monopolistic Competition and Product Differentiation and International Trade, Oxford Economic Press, New York, pp. 194–206Brander, J.A., and B.J. Spencer (1985), “Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 83–100.Conrad, K. (1996), “Optimal Environmental Policy for Oligopolistic Industries under Intra-industry Trade,” In: Carraro, C., Katsoulacos, Y., Xepapadeas, A. (Eds.) Environmental Policy and Market Structure, KluwerAcademic Publishers, Netherlands, pp. 65–83Copeland, B.R. (2000), “Trade and Environment: Policy Linkages,” Environment and Development Economics, 5, 405–432.Eaton, J., and G.M. Grossman (1986), “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383–406.Kennedy, P.W. (1994), “Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 27, 49–63.Lai, Y-B, and C-H Hu (2008), “Trade Agreements, Domestic Environmental Regulation, and Transboundary Pollution,” Resource and Energy Economics, 30, 209–228.Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (2003), “Optimal Environmental Taxation, R&D Subsidization and the Role of Market Conduct,” Finnish Economic Papers, 16, 15–26.Tanguay, G.A. (2001), “Strategic Environmental Policies under International Duopolistic Competition,” International Tax and Public Finance, 8, 793–811. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
96255005資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255005 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 賴育邦 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) 張伊君 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Chang, Yi-Chun en_US dc.creator (作者) 張伊君 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chang, Yi-Chun en_US dc.date (日期) 2009 en_US dc.date.accessioned 9-五月-2016 15:15:49 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 9-五月-2016 15:15:49 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 9-五月-2016 15:15:49 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0096255005 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/95133 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 96255005 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文將貿易政策與環境政策做連結, 建構一雙邊貿易之架構, 設立一三階段之序列賽局,以之探討: 當具有跨國性質之消費性污染存在時, 在考量兩國政府皆有誘因在環境政策上採取非合作的態度下, 兩國政府應如何藉由貿易政策之協定, 訂定其最適之出口品補貼政策, 以矯正環境政策非合作下之不效率。本文研究發現: 在兩國政府僅能夠進行政策的部分合作時, 當需求參數愈大, 兩國政府之最適貿易政策是應將給予其各自國家出口品之單位補貼調升;但若伴隨消費財貨所排放之污染對環境具有較高之邊際污染, 或是其本身之外溢效果愈強, 兩國政府對出口品之最適補貼則應該調降。我們同時也發現, 此時即使各國政府之最適貿易政策是調降出口補貼, 會使得各國之污染稅稅率更低, 但卻不會使其更加偏離兩國政府在環境政策上合作下之最適稅率, 並且仍會為全球帶來更高之社會福利。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper constructs a reciprocal-market model, which contains a three-stage game to investigate how the two countries decide the optimal export subsidy agreement when they do not coordinate their environmental policy. We find that the level of optimal export subsidy should decrease with the strength of transboundary pollution, which is associated to consumption activities. In addition, the export subsidy agreement should increase with the demand parameter. We also find that even a reduction in the export subsidy will decrease the non-coordinated environmental tax rate, it will not deviate the tax rate away from the coordinated one and still enhance the social welfare. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章緒論......................................1第一節研究動機與目的..............................1第二節研究方法...................................3第三節本文章節架構................................4第二章文獻回顧...................................5第一節開放經濟體制下之策略性貿易政策................5第二節開放經濟體制下之策略性環境政策................6第三節開放經濟體制下之策略性貿易暨環境政策...........8第三章基本模型設定................................12第一節消費者的行為設定............................13第二節廠商的行為設定..............................15第三節各國政府的行為設定...........................18第四章最適之環境政策..............................20第一節環境政策非合作下之最適污染稅..................20第二節環境政策合作下之最適污染稅....................24第五章最適之貿易政策...............................28第一節完全合作之最適貿易政策分析....................29第二節部分合作之最適貿易政策分析....................30第三節綜合整理....................................35第六章結論........................................37參考文獻.........................................39 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255005 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 消費性污染 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 跨國性污染 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貿易協定 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 出口補貼 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 污染稅稅率 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Consumption externality en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Transboundary pollution en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Trade agreement en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Export subsidy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Environmental taxes en_US dc.title (題名) 策略性環境政策、跨國性污染與最適出口補貼協定 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Barnett, S. (1994), “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade,”Journal of Public Economics, 54, 325–338.Brander, J.A. (1981), “Intra-industry Trade in Identical Commodities,”Journal of International Economics, 11, 1–14.Brander, J.A., and B.J. Spencer (1984), “Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition,” In: Kierzkowski, H. (Ed.) Monopolistic Competition and Product Differentiation and International Trade, Oxford Economic Press, New York, pp. 194–206Brander, J.A., and B.J. Spencer (1985), “Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 83–100.Conrad, K. (1996), “Optimal Environmental Policy for Oligopolistic Industries under Intra-industry Trade,” In: Carraro, C., Katsoulacos, Y., Xepapadeas, A. (Eds.) Environmental Policy and Market Structure, KluwerAcademic Publishers, Netherlands, pp. 65–83Copeland, B.R. (2000), “Trade and Environment: Policy Linkages,” Environment and Development Economics, 5, 405–432.Eaton, J., and G.M. Grossman (1986), “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383–406.Kennedy, P.W. (1994), “Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 27, 49–63.Lai, Y-B, and C-H Hu (2008), “Trade Agreements, Domestic Environmental Regulation, and Transboundary Pollution,” Resource and Energy Economics, 30, 209–228.Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (2003), “Optimal Environmental Taxation, R&D Subsidization and the Role of Market Conduct,” Finnish Economic Papers, 16, 15–26.Tanguay, G.A. (2001), “Strategic Environmental Policies under International Duopolistic Competition,” International Tax and Public Finance, 8, 793–811. zh_TW
