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題名 非營利組織治理機制與財務保管課責: 以文化藝術財團法人為例
作者 張浩銘
貢獻者 羅德城<br>郭振雄
張浩銘
關鍵詞 非營利組織
治理機制
governance
non-profit organization
日期 2009
上傳時間 9-五月-2016 15:15:52 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究探討非營利組織設立基金保管與治理機制之關聯性。非營利組織接受社會捐贈成立，以達成設立宗旨為目標，對財產的保管與運用效率負有責任。在文化藝術財團法人的財務資源保管方面，行政院文化建設委員會在藝術財團法人設立許可及監督要點，規範基金會需要將設立基金以定存等相關方式保管，並接受主管機關的監督。

研究採用隸屬於文建會之財團法人組織為樣本，探討與董事會組成結構之關聯性。本研究以民國97年訪視文化藝術財團法人，是否採用與營運資金分離的定期存款帳戶保管設立基金，衡量財團法人是否妥善保管設立基金。在董事會組成結構方面，採用董事會規模、內部董事、執行長是否兼任董事、發起人是否亦為董事及監察人之人數衡量。

實證結果顯示：首先，董事規模與是否善盡財務保管之責為負向顯著關係；其次，執行長是否兼任董事與是否善盡財務保管之責為負向關係；第三，發起人亦為董事與是否善盡財務保管之責為正向顯著關係；最後，當發起人亦為董事情況下，董事規模越大將減低管理者不善盡財務保管之責。本研究發現董事會組成結構與財團法人是否採用定期存款方式保管設立基金間存有關聯性。
參考文獻 郭振雄與何怡澄(2007)，非營利醫院之董事會結構與社區公益活動，台灣衛誌，第26卷第二期: 128-139。
許崇源(2000)我國非營利組織責任及透明度提升之研究—德爾菲法之應用，中山管理評論，第九卷第四期: 541-566。
張瑞當、方俊儒與曾玉琦(2007)核心代理問題與盈餘管理：董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討，管理學報，第24卷第二期(二月): 17-39。
Bacon, J., & Brown, J. F. (1973) Corporate directorship practices: Membership and committees of the board. New York: The Conference Board.
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, Vol. 71(Iss. 4), 443-465.
Berle, A. A., & Means, G.. C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: Macmillan Company.
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & and Terry, R. L. (1994). Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 35(Iss. 3), p. 371-390.
Callen, J. L., Klein, A., & Tinkelman, D. (2003). Board composition, committees, and organizational efficiency: The case of nonprofits. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 32(Iss. 4), 493-520.
Carcello, J. V., & Nagy, A. L. (2004). Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 23(Iss. 2).
Dyl, E. A., Frant, H. L., & Stephenson, C. A. (2000). Governance and funds allocation in united states medical research charities. Financial Accountability and Management, Vol. 16, 335-352.
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88(Iss. 2), 288-307.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 26(Iss. 2), 327-349.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 26(Iss. 2), 301-325.
Fremont-smith, M. R. (2004). Pillaging of charitable assets: embezzlement and Fraud. Exempt Organization Tax Review, Vol. 46(Iss. 33), 333-346.
Fremont-smith, M. R., & Kosaras, A. (2003). Wrongdoing by officers and directors of charities: A survey of press reports 1995-2002. Exempt Organization Tax Review, Vol. 42(Iss. 25).
Gibelman, M., & Gelman, S. R. (2001). Very public scandals: Nongovernmental organizations in trouble. Volutas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 12(Iss. 1), 49-66.
Gordon, T. P., Greenleem, J. S., & Nitterhouse, D. (1999). Tax-exempt organization financial data: availability and limitations. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13(Iss. 2), 113-128.
Greenlee, J. (2000). Accountability in the information age. New Directions for Philanthropic Fundraising, Vol. 27, 33-50.
Greenlee, J., Fischer, M., & Gordon, T. (2007). An investigation of fraud in nonprofit organizations: occurrences and deterrents. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 36(Iss. 4), 676-694.
Hansmann, H. B. (1980). The role of nonprofit enterprise. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 89(Iss. 5), 835-901.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1988). The determinants of board composition. RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 19(Iss. 4), 589-606.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3(Iss. 4), 305-360.
Jensen, M. C. (1993), The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 48(Iss. 3), p. 831-880.
Jones, C. L., & Roberts, A. A. (2006). Management of financial information in charitable organizations: The case of joint-cost allocations. The Accounting Review, Vol. 81(Iss. 1), 159-178.
Klein, A. (2000). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, 375-400.
Krishnan, R., Yetman M., & Yetman R. (2005). Expense misreporting in nonprofit organizations. The Accounting Review, Vol. 81(Iss. 2), 399-420
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer, Vol. 48(Iss. 1), 59-77.
Olson, D. E. (2000). Agency theory in the not-for-profit sector: it`s role at independent colleges. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 30(Iss. 2), 280-296.
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 26(Iss. 2), 175-191.
Salamon, L. M. (1999). America`s nonprofit sector: a primer. New York: Fundation Center.
Sharma, V. (2004). Board of director characteristics, institutional ownership, and fraud: evidence from Australia. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Vol. 23(Iss. 2), 105-117.
Tinkelman, D. (1999). Factors affecting the relation between donations to not-for profit organizations and an efficiency ration. Research in Government and Nonprofit Accounting, Vo. 10, 135-161.
Tinkelman, D. P. (1996). An empirical study of the effect of accounting disclosures upon donations to nonprofit organizations.
Tinkelman, D. P. (1998). Differences in sensitivity of financial statement users to joint cost allocations: The case of nonprofit organizations. Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, Vol. 377-394, 377-394.
Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 31(Iss. 1), 431-460.
Weisbrod, B. A. (1998). To profit or not to profit: the commercial transformation of the nonprofit sector.
Weisbrod, B. A., & Dominguez, N. D. (1986). Demand for collective goods in private nonprofit market, Can fund-raising expenditures help overcome free-rider behavior? Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 30, 83-96.
Wells, J. T. (2005). Principles of fraud examination.: New Jersey: John Wily & Sons, Inc.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 40, 185-212.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
96255008
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255008
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 羅德城<br>郭振雄zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) 張浩銘zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 張浩銘zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2009en_US
dc.date.accessioned 9-五月-2016 15:15:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 9-五月-2016 15:15:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 9-五月-2016 15:15:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0096255008en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/95134-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 96255008zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究探討非營利組織設立基金保管與治理機制之關聯性。非營利組織接受社會捐贈成立，以達成設立宗旨為目標，對財產的保管與運用效率負有責任。在文化藝術財團法人的財務資源保管方面，行政院文化建設委員會在藝術財團法人設立許可及監督要點，規範基金會需要將設立基金以定存等相關方式保管，並接受主管機關的監督。

研究採用隸屬於文建會之財團法人組織為樣本，探討與董事會組成結構之關聯性。本研究以民國97年訪視文化藝術財團法人，是否採用與營運資金分離的定期存款帳戶保管設立基金，衡量財團法人是否妥善保管設立基金。在董事會組成結構方面，採用董事會規模、內部董事、執行長是否兼任董事、發起人是否亦為董事及監察人之人數衡量。

實證結果顯示：首先，董事規模與是否善盡財務保管之責為負向顯著關係；其次，執行長是否兼任董事與是否善盡財務保管之責為負向關係；第三，發起人亦為董事與是否善盡財務保管之責為正向顯著關係；最後，當發起人亦為董事情況下，董事規模越大將減低管理者不善盡財務保管之責。本研究發現董事會組成結構與財團法人是否採用定期存款方式保管設立基金間存有關聯性。		zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論.................................................1
第一節 前言...........................................1
第二節 研究動機.......................................2
第三節 研究目的.......................................2
第四節 研究架構.......................................2
第二章 文獻整理.............................................5
第一節 非營利組織特性..................................5
第二節 財務保管與舞弊行為...............................7
第三節 治理機制.......................................9
第四節 文化、藝術財團法人治理機制及財務保管之相關規定.....13
第五節 文獻小結......................................15
第三章 研究方法............................................16
第一節 樣本來源與資料結構.............................16
第二節 變數選取及定義.................................17
第三節 統計概況......................................21
第四節 實證模型......................................22
第四章 實證分析............................................26
第一節 基本資料分析..................................26
第二節 單變數分析....................................31
第三節 共線性檢定....................................32
第四節 實證分析......................................34
第五節 實證結果......................................41
第六節 敏感度分析....................................41
第五章 結 論...............................................43
第一節 研究結論......................................43
第二節 政策意涵......................................43
第三節 研究限制......................................44
參考文獻..................................................45
附錄......................................................49		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255008en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 非營利組織zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 治理機制zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) governanceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) non-profit organizationen_US
dc.title (題名) 非營利組織治理機制與財務保管課責: 以文化藝術財團法人為例zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 郭振雄與何怡澄(2007)，非營利醫院之董事會結構與社區公益活動，台灣衛誌，第26卷第二期: 128-139。
許崇源(2000)我國非營利組織責任及透明度提升之研究—德爾菲法之應用，中山管理評論，第九卷第四期: 541-566。
張瑞當、方俊儒與曾玉琦(2007)核心代理問題與盈餘管理：董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討，管理學報，第24卷第二期(二月): 17-39。
Bacon, J., & Brown, J. F. (1973) Corporate directorship practices: Membership and committees of the board. New York: The Conference Board.
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, Vol. 71(Iss. 4), 443-465.
Berle, A. A., & Means, G.. C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: Macmillan Company.
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & and Terry, R. L. (1994). Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 35(Iss. 3), p. 371-390.
Callen, J. L., Klein, A., & Tinkelman, D. (2003). Board composition, committees, and organizational efficiency: The case of nonprofits. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 32(Iss. 4), 493-520.
Carcello, J. V., & Nagy, A. L. (2004). Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 23(Iss. 2).
Dyl, E. A., Frant, H. L., & Stephenson, C. A. (2000). Governance and funds allocation in united states medical research charities. Financial Accountability and Management, Vol. 16, 335-352.
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88(Iss. 2), 288-307.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 26(Iss. 2), 327-349.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 26(Iss. 2), 301-325.
Fremont-smith, M. R. (2004). Pillaging of charitable assets: embezzlement and Fraud. Exempt Organization Tax Review, Vol. 46(Iss. 33), 333-346.
Fremont-smith, M. R., & Kosaras, A. (2003). Wrongdoing by officers and directors of charities: A survey of press reports 1995-2002. Exempt Organization Tax Review, Vol. 42(Iss. 25).
Gibelman, M., & Gelman, S. R. (2001). Very public scandals: Nongovernmental organizations in trouble. Volutas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 12(Iss. 1), 49-66.
Gordon, T. P., Greenleem, J. S., & Nitterhouse, D. (1999). Tax-exempt organization financial data: availability and limitations. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13(Iss. 2), 113-128.
Greenlee, J. (2000). Accountability in the information age. New Directions for Philanthropic Fundraising, Vol. 27, 33-50.
Greenlee, J., Fischer, M., & Gordon, T. (2007). An investigation of fraud in nonprofit organizations: occurrences and deterrents. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 36(Iss. 4), 676-694.
Hansmann, H. B. (1980). The role of nonprofit enterprise. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 89(Iss. 5), 835-901.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1988). The determinants of board composition. RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 19(Iss. 4), 589-606.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3(Iss. 4), 305-360.
Jensen, M. C. (1993), The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 48(Iss. 3), p. 831-880.
Jones, C. L., & Roberts, A. A. (2006). Management of financial information in charitable organizations: The case of joint-cost allocations. The Accounting Review, Vol. 81(Iss. 1), 159-178.
Klein, A. (2000). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, 375-400.
Krishnan, R., Yetman M., & Yetman R. (2005). Expense misreporting in nonprofit organizations. The Accounting Review, Vol. 81(Iss. 2), 399-420
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer, Vol. 48(Iss. 1), 59-77.
Olson, D. E. (2000). Agency theory in the not-for-profit sector: it`s role at independent colleges. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 30(Iss. 2), 280-296.
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 26(Iss. 2), 175-191.
Salamon, L. M. (1999). America`s nonprofit sector: a primer. New York: Fundation Center.
Sharma, V. (2004). Board of director characteristics, institutional ownership, and fraud: evidence from Australia. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Vol. 23(Iss. 2), 105-117.
Tinkelman, D. (1999). Factors affecting the relation between donations to not-for profit organizations and an efficiency ration. Research in Government and Nonprofit Accounting, Vo. 10, 135-161.
Tinkelman, D. P. (1996). An empirical study of the effect of accounting disclosures upon donations to nonprofit organizations.
Tinkelman, D. P. (1998). Differences in sensitivity of financial statement users to joint cost allocations: The case of nonprofit organizations. Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, Vol. 377-394, 377-394.
Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 31(Iss. 1), 431-460.
Weisbrod, B. A. (1998). To profit or not to profit: the commercial transformation of the nonprofit sector.
Weisbrod, B. A., & Dominguez, N. D. (1986). Demand for collective goods in private nonprofit market, Can fund-raising expenditures help overcome free-rider behavior? Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 30, 83-96.
Wells, J. T. (2005). Principles of fraud examination.: New Jersey: John Wily & Sons, Inc.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 40, 185-212.		zh_TW