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題名 負債契約與代理問題之研究
作者 黃德舜
貢獻者 李庸三<br>陳隆麒
黃德舜
日期 1993
上傳時間 10-五月-2016 18:52:13 (UTC+8)
摘要 論文提要
參考文獻 參考文獻
一、中文部份
[ 1] 于建新　雙元金融體系下利率自由化效果的研究　中興大學經濟學研究所碩士論文民國80 年1月
[ 2 ] 王世一　台灣股票上市公司董監事持股成數與經營績效之實證一一動態與靜態　分析東吳大學會計學研究所碩士論文民國80年6月
[ 3 ] 中央銀行經濟研究處編　金融統計月報民國8 1年1月
[ 4] 中央銀行經濟研究處　中華民國台灣地區公民營企業資金狀況調查結果報告民國7 9年12月
[ 5 ] 伍忠賢　貸款與債券契約條款　台灣經濟金融月刊　第28 卷第3期民國81 年3月
[ 6] 李庸三　經濟計量方法　台北　民國68年8月
[ 7] 李模　民法總則之.理論與實用　自印　民國78 年1 2 月修訂
[ 8] 呂永正　由代理成本的觀點驗證台灣上市公司所有權變動與融資決策之關係東海大學企業管理研究所碩士論文民國77 年6月
[ 9 ] 林維鵬　企業所有與經營分離一一台灣地區上市公司之實證研究中興大學企業管理研究所碩士論文民國7 9年6月
[ 10] 林震岩　「終端使用者應用」管理策略之研究　政治大學企業管理研究所博士論文民國8 0年1月
[11] 姜堯民　不對稱資訊下銀行放款契約訂定之研究　政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文民國7 9年6月
[ 12 ] 俞海琴　資訊不對稱下本國銀行放款市場之研究　政治大學企業管理研究所博士論文民國8 1 年1 月
[ 13 ] 財政部金融人員研究訓練中心編　銀行法令彙編　台北:財團法人金融人員研究訓練中心　民國80 年6 月
[ 14 ] 陳隆麒　現代財務管理: 理論與應用　台北:華泰書局　民國8 1年2月
[ 15 ] 黃英陶　代理問題對公司資本結構影響之研究　成功大學工業管理研究所碩士論文　民國77年6月
[16 ] 黃榮吉　中小企業融資之研究　中國文化大學企業管理研究所碩士論文　民國8 0年6月
[ 17 ] 黃明智　我國中小企業銀行經營行為之研究　台灣大學經濟學研究所碩士論文　民國7 2年7月
[ 18 ] 黃俊英　行銷研究一一管理與技術　台北華泰書局　民國8 0年8月
[19] 黃德舜　國際化企業長期融資決策之研究　產業金融民國7 8年12月
[ 20] 張明峰　股權結構對公司績效影響之研究　政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文民國80 年6月
[ 21 ] 張訓華股權結構、董事會組成與企業當年財務績效一一一以77 年會計報酬率為準　東吳大學管理學研究所碩士論文　民國8 0年6月
[ 22] 楊蕉霙　所有權結構與公司價值間關係之研究　中山大學企業管理研究所碩士論文　民國7 9年6月
[ 23] 葉國興主編　銀行授信約定書之研究　台北:財團法人金融人員研究訓練中心　民國75年11月
[ 24] 經濟部中小企業處　中華民國台灣地區中小企業經濟活動報告民國79年
[ 25 ] 戴淵明　公司控制型態與其經營績效關係之研究　中興大學企業管理研究所碩士論文民國　75 年6月
[ 26] 謝安田　企業研究方法　台北:水牛出版社　民國69 年
[ 27] 羅容恆　銀行在新環境中的新契機一一先進國家金融自由化之經驗　基層金磁　第22期民國8 0年3月

二、英文部份
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[39] Gavish, Bezalel and Avner. Kalay, "on the Asset Substitution Problem." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 18, 1983, pp.21～30.
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描述 博士
國立政治大學
企業管理學系
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCW0222012
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 李庸三<br>陳隆麒zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) 黃德舜zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 黃德舜zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 1993en_US
dc.date.accessioned 10-五月-2016 18:52:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 10-五月-2016 18:52:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 10-五月-2016 18:52:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G91NCCW0222012en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/96257-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 企業管理學系zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 論文提要zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄．．．．．．．．．．I
圖表目錄．．．．．．．．．．III
第一章緒論．．．．．．．．．．1
第一節研究背景．．．．．．．．．．1
第二節研究動機與目的．．．．．．．．．．3
第三節研究範圍．．．．．．．．．．6
第四節研究方法及流程．．．．．．．．．．8
第五節論文結構．．．．．．．．．．11
第二章文獻探討．．．．．．．．．．14
第一節代理理論．．．．．．．．．．14
第二節企業舉債與資本結構．．．．．．．．．．21
第三節代理問題．．．．．．．．．．26
第四節負債代理成本．．．．．．．．．．34
第五負債契約．．．．．．．．．．38
第六節銀行放款與風險．．．．．．．．．．45
第七節實證文獻．．．．．．．．．．49
第八節國內銀行放款契約內容分析．．．．．．．．．．59
第三章研究設計．．．．．．．．．．66
第一節理論架構．．．．．．．．．．66
第二節研究假說．．．．．．．．．．69
第三節研究變數及操作性定義．．．．．．．．．．73
第四節研究對象與抽樣設計．．．．．．．．．．77
第五節問卷設計．．．．．．．．．．79
第六節資料分析方法．．．．．．．．．．81
第七節問卷回收分析．．．．．．．．．．83
第八節信度與效度．．．．．．．．．．85
第四章銀行與企業間借貸關係狀況分析．．．．．．．．．．88
第一節銀行放款重視的企業條件分析．．．．．．．．．．88
第二節企業股權因素與負債結構的關係．．．．．．．．．．94
第三節企業負債結構與負債代理成本的關係．．．．．．．．．．102
第五章企業負債契約與負債代理成本關係實証分析．．．．．．．．．．106
第一節企業負債契約限制條款使用狀況分析．．．．．．．．．．106
第二節隱含負債代理成本與負債契約內容的關係．．．．．．．．．．117
第三節契約內容要素與外顯負債代理成本的關係．．．．．．．．．．127
第四節減少銀行與企業間代理問題發生的溝通方法．．．．．．．．．．133
第六章結論與建議．．．．．．．．．．137
第一節結論．．．．．．．．．．137
第二節建議．．．．．．．．．．150
參考文獻．．．．．．．．．．155
附錄1銀行放款契約範例．．．．．．．．．．172
附錄2問卷．．．．．．．．．．188
附錄3個案分析．．．．．．．．．．201
附錄4作者簡歷．．．．．．．．．．215		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCW0222012en_US
dc.title (題名) 負債契約與代理問題之研究zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參考文獻
一、中文部份
[ 1] 于建新　雙元金融體系下利率自由化效果的研究　中興大學經濟學研究所碩士論文民國80 年1月
[ 2 ] 王世一　台灣股票上市公司董監事持股成數與經營績效之實證一一動態與靜態　分析東吳大學會計學研究所碩士論文民國80年6月
[ 3 ] 中央銀行經濟研究處編　金融統計月報民國8 1年1月
[ 4] 中央銀行經濟研究處　中華民國台灣地區公民營企業資金狀況調查結果報告民國7 9年12月
[ 5 ] 伍忠賢　貸款與債券契約條款　台灣經濟金融月刊　第28 卷第3期民國81 年3月
[ 6] 李庸三　經濟計量方法　台北　民國68年8月
[ 7] 李模　民法總則之.理論與實用　自印　民國78 年1 2 月修訂
[ 8] 呂永正　由代理成本的觀點驗證台灣上市公司所有權變動與融資決策之關係東海大學企業管理研究所碩士論文民國77 年6月
[ 9 ] 林維鵬　企業所有與經營分離一一台灣地區上市公司之實證研究中興大學企業管理研究所碩士論文民國7 9年6月
[ 10] 林震岩　「終端使用者應用」管理策略之研究　政治大學企業管理研究所博士論文民國8 0年1月
[11] 姜堯民　不對稱資訊下銀行放款契約訂定之研究　政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文民國7 9年6月
[ 12 ] 俞海琴　資訊不對稱下本國銀行放款市場之研究　政治大學企業管理研究所博士論文民國8 1 年1 月
[ 13 ] 財政部金融人員研究訓練中心編　銀行法令彙編　台北:財團法人金融人員研究訓練中心　民國80 年6 月
[ 14 ] 陳隆麒　現代財務管理: 理論與應用　台北:華泰書局　民國8 1年2月
[ 15 ] 黃英陶　代理問題對公司資本結構影響之研究　成功大學工業管理研究所碩士論文　民國77年6月
[16 ] 黃榮吉　中小企業融資之研究　中國文化大學企業管理研究所碩士論文　民國8 0年6月
[ 17 ] 黃明智　我國中小企業銀行經營行為之研究　台灣大學經濟學研究所碩士論文　民國7 2年7月
[ 18 ] 黃俊英　行銷研究一一管理與技術　台北華泰書局　民國8 0年8月
[19] 黃德舜　國際化企業長期融資決策之研究　產業金融民國7 8年12月
[ 20] 張明峰　股權結構對公司績效影響之研究　政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文民國80 年6月
[ 21 ] 張訓華股權結構、董事會組成與企業當年財務績效一一一以77 年會計報酬率為準　東吳大學管理學研究所碩士論文　民國8 0年6月
[ 22] 楊蕉霙　所有權結構與公司價值間關係之研究　中山大學企業管理研究所碩士論文　民國7 9年6月
[ 23] 葉國興主編　銀行授信約定書之研究　台北:財團法人金融人員研究訓練中心　民國75年11月
[ 24] 經濟部中小企業處　中華民國台灣地區中小企業經濟活動報告民國79年
[ 25 ] 戴淵明　公司控制型態與其經營績效關係之研究　中興大學企業管理研究所碩士論文民國　75 年6月
[ 26] 謝安田　企業研究方法　台北:水牛出版社　民國69 年
[ 27] 羅容恆　銀行在新環境中的新契機一一先進國家金融自由化之經驗　基層金磁　第22期民國8 0年3月

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