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題名 現金逐出合併時少數股東的股份收買請求權
作者 游啟璋
Yu, Chi-Chang
關鍵詞 控制股東; 少數股東; 現金逐出合併; 驅逐合併; 私有化; 下市; 股份收買請求權; 控制私利; 公平價格; 公平價值
Controlling Shareholder; Minority Shareholder; Cash-out Merger; Freeze-out Merger; Go Private; Delisted; Private Benefit of Control; Appraisal Remedy; Fair Price; Fair Value
日期 2014-03
上傳時間 20-六月-2016 11:02:07 (UTC+8)
摘要 現金逐出合併,為控制股東逐出少數股東最直接的方法。控制股東可以透過不當的逐出合併,剝削少數股東。但是,逐出合併也可能是公司私有化、降低營運或代理成本的重要方法。美國法上,為控制控制股東不當逐出少數股東,課以私有化交易強制揭露的義務,就合併交易為嚴格的司法審查,或給予少數股東股份收買請求權。然而,在我國,現行法上,對於公開公司私有化或逐出交易並無強制揭露的規定,而控制股東對於少數股東是否負有受託人義務,亦有可疑。因此在現行制度下,唯一可以控制控制股東不當逐出少數股東的工具,就是異議股東的股份收買請求權。少數股東不同意現金合併的價格時,可以請求法院核定公平價格。如果核定價格過低,損害少數股東的權益,鼓勵無效率的逐出合併,核定價格過高,降低控制股東進行有效率的逐出合併的誘因。正確的核定公平價格應考量價值是否在合併前已經存在,而不單以是否發生在合併交易後,如果合併交易前已經存在的再投資計畫或機會,儘管在合併後才實施、才產生的效益,仍應與少數股東分享。
A cash-out merger is a direct method for controlling shareholders in a public corporation to freeze out minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders may exploit minority shareholders through an inappropriate cash-out merger. On the other hand, the cash-out merger provides an efficient way for a public corporation to go private in order to decrease its management and agency costs. In the United States of America, a freeze-out merger is subjected to disclosure obligation set by federal securities regulations and is usually strictly scrutinized by judicial review. US legislation also provides an appraisal remedy to minority shareholders who oppose the merger. Taiwan, however, does not require mandatory disclosure on freeze-out transactions. In fact, under current Taiwanese law whether controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duty to minority shareholders is still undecided. Therefore, the only mechanism to mitigate controlling shareholders’ egregious private benefit of control would be the minority’s ap-appraisal remedy. The minority who disagreed with the buyout price may appeal to the judicial system to determine the fair price of the minority’s shares. Determining such a fair price is extremely important. On one hand, setting a price that is too low damages minority shareholders’ interests and increases inefficient transactions; on the other hand, setting too high a price discourages controlling shareholders from undertaking efficient freeze-out mergers. The most important issues in a price estimate are to identify and properly include the values prior to the merger. Such values include the reinvestment plan and opportunities that already exist, even if these plans and opportunities are not realized until after the merger.
關聯 法學評論, 136,209-279頁
Chengchi law review
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.3966%2f102398202014030136004
dc.creator (作者) 游啟璋zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Yu, Chi-Chang
dc.date (日期) 2014-03
dc.date.accessioned 20-六月-2016 11:02:07 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 20-六月-2016 11:02:07 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 20-六月-2016 11:02:07 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/98040-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 現金逐出合併,為控制股東逐出少數股東最直接的方法。控制股東可以透過不當的逐出合併,剝削少數股東。但是,逐出合併也可能是公司私有化、降低營運或代理成本的重要方法。美國法上,為控制控制股東不當逐出少數股東,課以私有化交易強制揭露的義務,就合併交易為嚴格的司法審查,或給予少數股東股份收買請求權。然而,在我國,現行法上,對於公開公司私有化或逐出交易並無強制揭露的規定,而控制股東對於少數股東是否負有受託人義務,亦有可疑。因此在現行制度下,唯一可以控制控制股東不當逐出少數股東的工具,就是異議股東的股份收買請求權。少數股東不同意現金合併的價格時,可以請求法院核定公平價格。如果核定價格過低,損害少數股東的權益,鼓勵無效率的逐出合併,核定價格過高,降低控制股東進行有效率的逐出合併的誘因。正確的核定公平價格應考量價值是否在合併前已經存在,而不單以是否發生在合併交易後,如果合併交易前已經存在的再投資計畫或機會,儘管在合併後才實施、才產生的效益,仍應與少數股東分享。
dc.description.abstract (摘要) A cash-out merger is a direct method for controlling shareholders in a public corporation to freeze out minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders may exploit minority shareholders through an inappropriate cash-out merger. On the other hand, the cash-out merger provides an efficient way for a public corporation to go private in order to decrease its management and agency costs. In the United States of America, a freeze-out merger is subjected to disclosure obligation set by federal securities regulations and is usually strictly scrutinized by judicial review. US legislation also provides an appraisal remedy to minority shareholders who oppose the merger. Taiwan, however, does not require mandatory disclosure on freeze-out transactions. In fact, under current Taiwanese law whether controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duty to minority shareholders is still undecided. Therefore, the only mechanism to mitigate controlling shareholders’ egregious private benefit of control would be the minority’s ap-appraisal remedy. The minority who disagreed with the buyout price may appeal to the judicial system to determine the fair price of the minority’s shares. Determining such a fair price is extremely important. On one hand, setting a price that is too low damages minority shareholders’ interests and increases inefficient transactions; on the other hand, setting too high a price discourages controlling shareholders from undertaking efficient freeze-out mergers. The most important issues in a price estimate are to identify and properly include the values prior to the merger. Such values include the reinvestment plan and opportunities that already exist, even if these plans and opportunities are not realized until after the merger.
dc.format.extent 1117784 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) 法學評論, 136,209-279頁
dc.relation (關聯) Chengchi law review
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 控制股東; 少數股東; 現金逐出合併; 驅逐合併; 私有化; 下市; 股份收買請求權; 控制私利; 公平價格; 公平價值
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Controlling Shareholder; Minority Shareholder; Cash-out Merger; Freeze-out Merger; Go Private; Delisted; Private Benefit of Control; Appraisal Remedy; Fair Price; Fair Value
dc.title (題名) 現金逐出合併時少數股東的股份收買請求權zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.3966/102398202014030136004
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.3966%2f102398202014030136004