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題名 Domestic Political Competition and Triangular Interaction among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: The U.S. China Policy
作者 吳玉山
Wu, Yu-Shan
關鍵詞 U.S. China policy;cross-Strait relations;strategic triangle;domestic politics;foreign policy
日期 2006-03
上傳時間 25-十月-2016 16:01:24 (UTC+8)
摘要 Empirical evidence has shown that domestic political competition has a great impact on triangular interaction among Washington, Being, and Taipei. How do policymakers play the domestic game and the international triangular game concurrently and expect to maximize their payoffs? This paper examines the relevant literature and proposes a refined sequential model to analyze the China policy of the United States since 1980. The hypothesis is that domestic political competition determines external policy during election periods. In between elections, triangular strategic calculation dominates. Specifically, the quadrennial presidential elections provide opportunities for challengers to attack the incumbent president`s realist China policy, thus bringing pressure for a change of the existing policy. Whether such an attack takes place hinges on the combinations of the idealist and realist images of the PRC in the United States. Attack will occur only when the two images diverge and the president does not preempt the issue. Seven presidential elections since 1980 are examined to test this refined model. The findings will be integrated into a composite framework to analyze interaction among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.
關聯 Issues & Studies,42(1),1-46
資料類型 article
dc.creator (作者) 吳玉山zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Wu, Yu-Shan
dc.date (日期) 2006-03
dc.date.accessioned 25-十月-2016 16:01:24 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 25-十月-2016 16:01:24 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 25-十月-2016 16:01:24 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=118109-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Empirical evidence has shown that domestic political competition has a great impact on triangular interaction among Washington, Being, and Taipei. How do policymakers play the domestic game and the international triangular game concurrently and expect to maximize their payoffs? This paper examines the relevant literature and proposes a refined sequential model to analyze the China policy of the United States since 1980. The hypothesis is that domestic political competition determines external policy during election periods. In between elections, triangular strategic calculation dominates. Specifically, the quadrennial presidential elections provide opportunities for challengers to attack the incumbent president`s realist China policy, thus bringing pressure for a change of the existing policy. Whether such an attack takes place hinges on the combinations of the idealist and realist images of the PRC in the United States. Attack will occur only when the two images diverge and the president does not preempt the issue. Seven presidential elections since 1980 are examined to test this refined model. The findings will be integrated into a composite framework to analyze interaction among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.
dc.format.extent 2238035 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Issues & Studies,42(1),1-46
dc.subject (關鍵詞) U.S. China policy;cross-Strait relations;strategic triangle;domestic politics;foreign policy
dc.title (題名) Domestic Political Competition and Triangular Interaction among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: The U.S. China Policy
dc.type (資料類型) article