| dc.contributor | 經濟系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 王國樑 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Wang, Kuo-Liang | |
| dc.date (日期) | 1989-05 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 5-十二月-2016 15:04:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 5-十二月-2016 15:04:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 5-十二月-2016 15:04:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/104493 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 此文試圖建立一個同時能解釋管制與解除管制的競局理論模型。假設政策變動需要此一競局裏全部參與者的同意，透過對核心解存在與否的檢定，我們發現對於解除管制的形成與否，需求的成長既不是充分，也不是必要條件；技術的進步是必要條件；但，唯有很顯著的技術進步才是充分必要條件。 | |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper presents a game-theoretical model which seeks to account for both regulation and deregulation in a single model. By assuming that a policy change requires the unanimous consent of all players in the game and through checking the existence of the core, we conclude that an increase in demand is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for deregulation; an improvement in technology condition is a necessary condition for deregulation; however, only a significant improvement in technology condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for deregulation. | |
| dc.format.extent | 1717326 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 國立政治大學學報, 59,75-98 | |
| dc.title (題名) | Deregulation and the Theory of Regulation: An Application of the Core in the Game Theory | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
