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題名 Rejuvenation of the Party-State: The Virtues and Limits of an Age-Based Political System 作者 Wu, Yu-Shan 關鍵詞 political succession;rejuvenation;Bo Xilai;18th Party Congress;tuanpai 日期 2015-03 上傳時間 21-十二月-2016 15:59:45 (UTC+8) 摘要 It is widely recognized that the political system in the PRC is more institutionalized and predictable than in the past, and that its regular rejuvenation is a source of strength. While not denying the virtues of the age-based system, this paper argues that there are limits on the forced rejuvenation scheme. It looks at how cadres on the CCP 50 Central Committee are excludedfrom competing for the top leadership positions because of their age. Four groups of elite are identified. T2 (zongshuji, zongli), SCP-T2 (changwei), PB-SCP (juwei), and CC-PB (zhongwei), and their frustration over exclusion from competing for the T2 positions in the next major leadership turnover (next even-numbered Party Congres s) measured (Exclusion and Frustration Rate, EFR). An overall score is also calculated to measure the total frustration with the system (Total Exclusion and Frustration, TEF). It is shown that the EFR and TEF are extremely high, and tension is bound to accumulate in the system. Finally, the Bo Xilai (薄熙來) case is explored to demonstrate how aspiring cadres may be discriminated against by the system and thus inclined to rebel against it. It is advised that instead of simply accepting the system as it stands and calculating how personnel decisions will be churned out, more attention should be given to its limits and sustainability in the long term. 關聯 Issues & Studies,51(1),99-128 資料類型 article dc.creator (作者) Wu, Yu-Shan dc.date (日期) 2015-03 dc.date.accessioned 21-十二月-2016 15:59:45 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 21-十二月-2016 15:59:45 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 21-十二月-2016 15:59:45 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/105266 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) It is widely recognized that the political system in the PRC is more institutionalized and predictable than in the past, and that its regular rejuvenation is a source of strength. While not denying the virtues of the age-based system, this paper argues that there are limits on the forced rejuvenation scheme. It looks at how cadres on the CCP 50 Central Committee are excludedfrom competing for the top leadership positions because of their age. Four groups of elite are identified. T2 (zongshuji, zongli), SCP-T2 (changwei), PB-SCP (juwei), and CC-PB (zhongwei), and their frustration over exclusion from competing for the T2 positions in the next major leadership turnover (next even-numbered Party Congres s) measured (Exclusion and Frustration Rate, EFR). An overall score is also calculated to measure the total frustration with the system (Total Exclusion and Frustration, TEF). It is shown that the EFR and TEF are extremely high, and tension is bound to accumulate in the system. Finally, the Bo Xilai (薄熙來) case is explored to demonstrate how aspiring cadres may be discriminated against by the system and thus inclined to rebel against it. It is advised that instead of simply accepting the system as it stands and calculating how personnel decisions will be churned out, more attention should be given to its limits and sustainability in the long term. dc.format.extent 174 bytes - dc.format.mimetype text/html - dc.relation (關聯) Issues & Studies,51(1),99-128 dc.subject (關鍵詞) political succession;rejuvenation;Bo Xilai;18th Party Congress;tuanpai dc.title (題名) Rejuvenation of the Party-State: The Virtues and Limits of an Age-Based Political System dc.type (資料類型) article
