| dc.contributor | 會計系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 俞洪昭 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2016 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 17-五月-2017 16:41:22 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 17-五月-2017 16:41:22 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 17-五月-2017 16:41:22 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/109741 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 美國國會於2010 年通過的 Dodd-Frank Act，其第952 節要求 SEC以及 NYSE 與 NASDAQ 訂定新的薪酬委員會獨立性規定。在2013 年1 月11 日， SEC 核准了NYSE以及NASDAQ 的上市公司薪酬委員會修正條文，明確要求所有上市公司之薪酬委員會成員必須完全獨立。本研究即在探討該2013年之薪酬委員會獨立性規定，是否會影響公司董事會層級之公司治理。依循過去文獻，本研究以 CEO 薪酬以及CEO turnover 來衡量董事會層級之公司治理水準。本研究對於相關文獻有以下四項貢獻：第一，雖然過去有研究亦試圖探討與薪酬委員會相關之立法事件是否影響CEO 之薪酬，但是這些立法事件與薪酬委員會獨立性之間的關係薄弱，導致實證結果並無顯著結論。由於本研究所採用之2013 年薪酬委員會獨立性立法事件係完全針對薪酬委員會獨立性設計，因此提供了一個絕佳的機會可以精準地探討薪酬委員會獨立性是否會影響董事會層級之公司治理。第二，過去研究所採用之樣本期間過於老舊，導致其實證結果可能無法提供有現代價值之政策性意涵。由於2002 年通過的Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 改變了公司的財務報導以及管制環境，採用SOX 通過之前的樣本所得到之實證結果，並不一定能適用於SOX 通過之後的環境。本研究採用2010~2014 年的樣本，試圖提供較新之實證結果供主管機關參考。第三，本研究控制影響薪酬委員會效率的三個因素：開會次數、產業專家知識以及薪酬委員會成員是否同時擔任審計委員會成員。最後，本研究採用difference-in-difference 的方法來控制薪酬委員會成員、CEO 薪酬與CEO turnover 的自我選擇偏誤問題。 | |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 directs the national securities exchanges to adopt new listing standards applicable to compensation committees. On January 11, 2013, the SEC approved the NYSE and the NASDAQ listing standards relating to the independence of compensation committees. In its approval orders, the SEC explicitly emphasized that all listed firms should comply with the NYSE’s and NASDAQ’s independence standards. This study examines whether these 2013 independence standards on compensation committees affect firms’ board-level governance. Following prior studies, this study adopts two measures of board-level governance: CEO compensation and turnover. This study contributes to the literature inthe following ways. First, even though some prior studiesalso examine whether independence-related legislation events affect CEO compensation, the association between these regulations and compensation committee independence is very weak, leading to insignificant results. The 2013 independence standards provide a much stronger association based on which I can better test whether independence of compensationcommittees affects board-level governance. Second, the sample periods selected by prior studies are too out-ofdated to draw useful policy implications in the post-SOX period. Because SOX has significantly changed the financial reporting and regulatory environment, including the roles of the boards and their committees, it is not clear whether findings based on pre-SOX era are applicable to the current era. I adopt a sample between 2010~2014 to test the effects of the 2013 independence standards on CEO compensation and turnover. Third, I control three compensation committeespecific characteristics: meeting times, industryexpertise, and overlapping between compensation committee and compensation committee. Finally, I use the differencesin-differences approach to control for any economic shocksthat occurred during the legislation event and that could have affected CEO compensation and turnover in all firms. | |
| dc.format.extent | 1643042 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | MOST 104-2410-H-004-022 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 董事會層級公司治理; 薪酬委員會; CEO 薪酬; CEO 流動性; 獨立性 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Board-level governance; Compensation committee; CEO compensation; CEO turnover; Independence | |
| dc.title (題名) | 薪酬委員會獨立性與董事會層級公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | |
