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題名 最後通牒賽局提議者因策略而提議公平分錢:功能性磁振造影研究
其他題名 Strategic motives drive proposers to offer fairly in ultimatum games: An fMRI study
作者 陳尹華;陳盈君;郭文瑞;簡錦漢;楊建成;顏乃欣
貢獻者 國立政治大學邁向頂尖大學計畫創新研究團隊
日期 2016
上傳時間 19-Jun-2017 17:32:03 (UTC+8)
摘要 Researchers have used the ultimatum game to investigate how people make social decisions (Güth et al., 1982) by exploring the interactions between proposers and responders. In each trial, the proposer decides the ratio of the offer (how to split the amount of money), and then the responder either accepts or rejects the offer. If the responder accepts the offer, then both the proposer and the responder receive the proposed monetary amount. However, if the responder rejects the offer, then both the proposer and the responder receive nothing. According to the standard economic theory of self-interest, the proposer would offer the lowest amount possible and the recipient would accept any offer that is greater than zero (Rubenstein 1982).
關聯 2016創新研究國際學術研討會: 以人為本的在地創新之跨領域與跨界的對話 2016 International conference on innovation studies- human-centered indigenous innovation: trans-disciplinary dialogue
會議日期:2016.11.12-13
資料類型 conference
dc.contributor 國立政治大學邁向頂尖大學計畫創新研究團隊
dc.creator (作者) 陳尹華;陳盈君;郭文瑞;簡錦漢;楊建成;顏乃欣zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2016
dc.date.accessioned 19-Jun-2017 17:32:03 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 19-Jun-2017 17:32:03 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 19-Jun-2017 17:32:03 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/110405-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Researchers have used the ultimatum game to investigate how people make social decisions (Güth et al., 1982) by exploring the interactions between proposers and responders. In each trial, the proposer decides the ratio of the offer (how to split the amount of money), and then the responder either accepts or rejects the offer. If the responder accepts the offer, then both the proposer and the responder receive the proposed monetary amount. However, if the responder rejects the offer, then both the proposer and the responder receive nothing. According to the standard economic theory of self-interest, the proposer would offer the lowest amount possible and the recipient would accept any offer that is greater than zero (Rubenstein 1982).
dc.format.extent 112 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) 2016創新研究國際學術研討會: 以人為本的在地創新之跨領域與跨界的對話 2016 International conference on innovation studies- human-centered indigenous innovation: trans-disciplinary dialogue
dc.relation (關聯) 會議日期:2016.11.12-13
dc.title (題名) 最後通牒賽局提議者因策略而提議公平分錢:功能性磁振造影研究zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Strategic motives drive proposers to offer fairly in ultimatum games: An fMRI study
dc.type (資料類型) conference