| dc.contributor | 財政學系 | zh_Tw |
| dc.creator (作者) | 賴景昌 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hsieh, Hui-ting | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lai, Ching-chong | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chen, Kuan-jen | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2015-10 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 10-八月-2017 17:03:20 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 10-八月-2017 17:03:20 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 10-八月-2017 17:03:20 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/111922 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper sets up an imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model that features the strategic interaction between the patent-holding firm and licensees, and uses it to analyze the relevant macro-variables under various licensing arrangements. Some main findings emerge from the analysis. First, the equilibrium aggregate output and aggregate consumption under fixed-fee and royalty licensing regimes are always greater than those under the no licensing regime. Moreover, the equilibrium aggregate output and consumption under the fixed-fee licensing regime are always greater than those under the royalty licensing regime. Second, with the higher (lower) technology level the patent holder prefers the fixed-fee (royalty) contract. Third, welfare could be improved through technology transfer, and the level of welfare under the fixed-fee licensing regime is higher than that under the royalty licensing regime. Lastly, this paper discusses some extensions of the baseline model. © 2015 by De Gruyter. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 107 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 15(4), 1579-1618 | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | A Macroeconomic Model of Imperfect Competition with Patent Licensing | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1515/bejeap-2013-0144 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2013-0144 | |
