| dc.contributor | 金融學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 廖四郎 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hsiao, Hsiao-Fen | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Liao, Szu-Lang | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Su, Chi-Wei | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Sung, Hao-Chang | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2017 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 30-八月-2017 15:40:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 30-八月-2017 15:40:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 30-八月-2017 15:40:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112308 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Purpose Recent studies in the accounting literature have investigated the economic consequences of R&D capitalization. Discretionary R&D capitalization for target beating can be characterized as a firm signaling private information on its future economic benefits or as opportunistic earnings management. R&D capitalization also has an impact on a firm’s marginal costs and product market competition. The purpose of this paper is to address how firms choose R&D levels for the purpose of meeting or beating their earnings targets and how this influences sequential product market competition.Design/methodology/approach The authors study this issue in a stylized game-theoretic model where R&D choices of a firm are not only strategically made but also used to convey proprietary information to its rival. The model provides a rationale for a firm distorting its R&D level to earn more profits and meet its earnings target.Findings The equilibrium result indicates that before the realization of common cost shock, a firm can influence the output of its accounting system (i.e. meeting an earnings target) through adjusting its R&D choices. This firm will overinvest in R&D, and this will give an opportunity to create some reserves to be used later to earn a higher profit and reach the earnings target.Originality/value This paper contributes to the research on real earnings management in terms of how R&D capitalization affects a firm’s R&D choices by influencing the output of its accounting system through adjusting its R&D choices and the strategic impact of those choices. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 227924 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | International Journal of Accounting & Information Management, Vol. 25 Issue 3, p296-312 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Earnings target; Oligopoly Competition; One-sided incomplete information; R&D investment; Real earnings management | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Product market competition, R&D investment choice, and real earnings management | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1108/IJAIM-06-2016-0067 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-06-2016-0067 | |
