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題名 黨國體制下的中國軍事指揮權
Military Command Power in Party-State China作者 徐肇松
Xu, Zhaosong貢獻者 陳起行
Chen, Chi-Shing
徐肇松
Xu, Zhaosong關鍵詞 軍事指揮權
中央軍事委員會
行政權
文官控制軍隊
中華人民共和國憲法（1982）
黨國體制
Military command power
Central Military Commission
Executive power
Civilian control of military
Constitution of the People`s Republic of China (1982)
Party-state regime日期 2018 上傳時間 23-Jul-2018 16:51:53 (UTC+8) 摘要 在中國憲法中，軍事指揮權的歸屬是一個尚未解決的問題。中華人民共和國憲法（1982）將軍隊指揮體系排除在行政機關之外。中央軍事委員會（中央軍委）指揮全國武裝力量（第93條），而作為行政機關的國務院“領導和管理國防建設事業”（第89條第10款）。對憲法文本的解釋，不能支持政府擁有軍隊指揮權的論點。相反，中央軍委獨佔軍事指揮權。 比較研究發現，從軍事指揮權的憲法安排大致可以分為三類：行政機關控制型、軍令權獨立型，以及折中型。中國大陸的設計屬於軍令權獨立型，因為它將軍事指揮完全賦予一個行政機關外的憲法機關。 從憲政主義的精神來看，行政機關控制型在追求民主正當性、效率以及自由人權保護上表現最佳，而軍令權獨立型則表現最差。相應的，軍令權獨立型所具有的問題也反應在中國大陸的實務之中。此外，在社會變遷，政治現實以及憲法學說演進的情況下，當初建立中央軍委的憲法目的不能實現。所以，大陸的憲法改革勢在必行。 大陸的憲法改革者應該引入行政機關控制模式，以促進治理效率以及軍事行動的政治責任。首先，把軍事指揮權分配給國務院，並且確立從總理經由國防部長到聯合參謀部參謀長的指揮鏈條。其次，增強國會對軍事行動的監督，以防止行政機關濫用軍事權力。
The allocation of military command power in Chinese constitutional law is an unsolved question. The Constitution of P. R. China (1982) segregates the military command system from the executive. The Central Military Commission (CMC) commands the armed forces of China (Article 93), while the executive branch, the State Council retains the authority “to direct and administer the building of national defence” (Article 89 (10)). An interpretation of the constitutional text cannot support the thesis that the government can command the military. Instead, the CMC has the exclusive authority over military command. From a comparative perspective, the constitutional arrangement of military command power can be subsumed into three types: the executive control model, the independence of military command model and the middle model. The Chinese design is the model of independence of military command, because it allocates military command completely to a constitutional institution other than the executive. In the lens of constitutional interests, the executive control model performs best to pursue values of democratic legitimacy, effectiveness and protection of liberty and human rights, while independence model performs worse. Accordingly, these shortcomings of independence model are also reflected in Chinese practice. Furthermore, the constitutional purposes for setting up the CMC fails by virtue of social changes, political reality and evolution of constitutional theory. Therefore, a constitutional reform for China is imperative. Chinese constitutional reformers should introduce the executive control model to facilitate effectiveness and political accountability of military actions. The first step is to allocate military command power to the State Council and set up a chain of command from the Premier through the Defence Minister to the Chief of Joint Staff. The second step is to enhance parliamentary oversight on executive deployment of military, in order to prevent the executive from abuse of military power.參考文獻 English Literature Ackerman, Bruce, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000). Ackerman, Bruce, Good-bye, Montesquieu, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 128 (Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth eds. 2010) Barber, Nicholas W., Prelude to the Separation of Powers, 60 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 59 (2001). Barron, David J. and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008). Cheung, Tai Ming, The Riddle in the Middle : China`s Central Military Commission in the 21st Century, in PLA INFLUENCE ON CHINA`S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY-MAKING 84 (Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell eds., 2015). Choudhry, Sujit and Richard Stacey, Semi-Presidentialism as Power-Sharing: Constitutional Reform after The Arab Spring, THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS AT NYU LAW & INTERNATIONAL IDEA REPORTS: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 124 (2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3025968. Craig, Paul and Adam Tomkins, Introduction, in THE EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC LAW: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Paul Craig and Adam Tomkins eds., 2006). Ginsburg, Tom and Alberto Simpser, Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1 (Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser eds., 2014). House of Lords Constitution Committee, WAGING WAR: PARLIAMENT’S ROLE AND RESPONSIBILTY (15th Report Session 2005–2006), Volume I: Report (2006) House of Lords Constitution Committee, WAGING WAR: PARLIAMENT’S ROLE AND RESPONSIBILTY (15th Report Session 2005–2006), Volume II: Evidence (2006) Ji, You, The PLA and Diplomacy: Unravelling Myths about the Military Role in Foreign Policy Making, 23 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 236 (2014). Knapp, Andrew and Vincent Wright, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE (5th ed, 2006). Kou, Chien-wen, Xin Jinping in Command: Solving the Principal-Agent Problem in CCP-PLA Relations?, 232 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 866 (2017). Law, David S. and Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863 (2013). Li, Nan, Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era, 4 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES 1, 28 (2010). Lin, Yan and Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Interpretation in Lawmaking: China`s Invisible Constitutional Enforcement Mechanism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 467, 472 (2015). Liu, Chenglin, The Development of Chinese Constitutionalism, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 199 (2016) Luban, David, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (2008) Martinez, Jenny S., Horizontal Structuring, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó eds., 2012). Miyake, Masaki, Theories of Civil-Military Relations as Related to Japan and a Comparison with Germany`s Case, 59 SEIKEI RONSŌ 184 (1990). Available at https://m-repo.lib.meiji.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10291/13255/1/seikeironso_59_1-2_(1).pdf. Möllers, Christoph, THE THREE BRANCH: A COMPARATIVE MODEL OF SEPARATION OF POWERS (2013). Paltiel, Jeremy T., Civil-Military Relations in China: An Obstacle to Constitutionalism?, 9 J. CHINESE L. 35 (1995). Prakash, Saikrishna Bangalore, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 352 (2008). Saunders, Phillip C. and Andrew Scobell, Introduction: PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, in PLA INFLUENCE ON CHINA`S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY-MAKING 1 (Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell eds., 2015). Shambaugh, David, Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or National Military?, 16 THE COPENHAGEN JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES 10 (2002). Skach, Cindy, The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism, 5 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93, 97 (2007). Turpin, Colin and Adam Tomkins, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION (6th ed, 2007). White, Nigel, DEMOCRACY GOES TO WAR: BRITISH MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009). Wurman, Ilan, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359 Zhang, Qianfan, A Constitution without Constitutionalism? The Paths of Constitutional Development in China, 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 950 (2010). Zickel, Raymond E., ed., SOVIET UNION: A COUNTRY STUDY (2nd ed, 1991). 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國立政治大學
法律科際整合研究所
104652032資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104652032 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 陳起行 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Chen, Chi-Shing en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 徐肇松 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Xu, Zhaosong en_US dc.creator (作者) 徐肇松 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Xu, Zhaosong en_US dc.date (日期) 2018 en_US dc.date.accessioned 23-Jul-2018 16:51:53 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 23-Jul-2018 16:51:53 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 23-Jul-2018 16:51:53 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0104652032 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/118810 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 法律科際整合研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 104652032 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在中國憲法中，軍事指揮權的歸屬是一個尚未解決的問題。中華人民共和國憲法（1982）將軍隊指揮體系排除在行政機關之外。中央軍事委員會（中央軍委）指揮全國武裝力量（第93條），而作為行政機關的國務院“領導和管理國防建設事業”（第89條第10款）。對憲法文本的解釋，不能支持政府擁有軍隊指揮權的論點。相反，中央軍委獨佔軍事指揮權。 比較研究發現，從軍事指揮權的憲法安排大致可以分為三類：行政機關控制型、軍令權獨立型，以及折中型。中國大陸的設計屬於軍令權獨立型，因為它將軍事指揮完全賦予一個行政機關外的憲法機關。 從憲政主義的精神來看，行政機關控制型在追求民主正當性、效率以及自由人權保護上表現最佳，而軍令權獨立型則表現最差。相應的，軍令權獨立型所具有的問題也反應在中國大陸的實務之中。此外，在社會變遷，政治現實以及憲法學說演進的情況下，當初建立中央軍委的憲法目的不能實現。所以，大陸的憲法改革勢在必行。 大陸的憲法改革者應該引入行政機關控制模式，以促進治理效率以及軍事行動的政治責任。首先，把軍事指揮權分配給國務院，並且確立從總理經由國防部長到聯合參謀部參謀長的指揮鏈條。其次，增強國會對軍事行動的監督，以防止行政機關濫用軍事權力。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The allocation of military command power in Chinese constitutional law is an unsolved question. The Constitution of P. R. China (1982) segregates the military command system from the executive. The Central Military Commission (CMC) commands the armed forces of China (Article 93), while the executive branch, the State Council retains the authority “to direct and administer the building of national defence” (Article 89 (10)). An interpretation of the constitutional text cannot support the thesis that the government can command the military. Instead, the CMC has the exclusive authority over military command. From a comparative perspective, the constitutional arrangement of military command power can be subsumed into three types: the executive control model, the independence of military command model and the middle model. The Chinese design is the model of independence of military command, because it allocates military command completely to a constitutional institution other than the executive. In the lens of constitutional interests, the executive control model performs best to pursue values of democratic legitimacy, effectiveness and protection of liberty and human rights, while independence model performs worse. Accordingly, these shortcomings of independence model are also reflected in Chinese practice. Furthermore, the constitutional purposes for setting up the CMC fails by virtue of social changes, political reality and evolution of constitutional theory. Therefore, a constitutional reform for China is imperative. Chinese constitutional reformers should introduce the executive control model to facilitate effectiveness and political accountability of military actions. The first step is to allocate military command power to the State Council and set up a chain of command from the Premier through the Defence Minister to the Chief of Joint Staff. The second step is to enhance parliamentary oversight on executive deployment of military, in order to prevent the executive from abuse of military power. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Why a Research on Chinese Military Command Power? 2 1.2 Literature Review 3 1.3 Main Thesis 5 2. MILITARY COMMAND POWER IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1982 7 2.1 The Central Military Commission (CMC) in Chinese Constitutional System 8 A. The Historical Evolution of Military Command Power in PRC 8 B. The Constitutional Status of the CMC 11 C. The Function of the CMC 13 2.2 Can the State Council Command the Military? 14 A. The Textual Meanings of Art. 89 (10) 14 B. A Structural and Historical Understanding of the Constitution 17 3. THE CONSTITUTITIONAL POSITION OF MILITARY COMMAND POWER: A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 20 3.1 The Executive Control Model 21 A. The Commander in Chief Clause in the U.S. Constitution 21 B. Taming the British Royal Prerogative over Military 24 C. The Power of Command in the Basic Law of Germany 24 3.2 The Independence of Military Command Model 25 A. The Prussian-German Origin 26 B. The Constitutional Doctrine and Practice in Meiji Japan 28 C. Division of Military Command and Military Administration in Taiwan 29 3.3 The Middle Model 31 A. France 31 B. Current Taiwanese Chain of Command 32 3.4 China: Independence Model 34 4. AN ASSESSMENT OF THREE MODELS AND CHINESE DESIGN 36 4.1 The Three Models 36 A. Democratic Legitimacy 36 B. Effectiveness 37 C. The Protection of Liberty and Human Rights 40 4.2 An Assessment of the Chinese Design 41 A. Effectiveness 41 The Weak Civil-Military Collaboration 41 The Situation of the Ministry of National Defence 43 B. Accountability of the CMC and the Military 44 Accountability of the CMC 44 The Pressure of Civilian Control: CMC Chairman Responsibility System 46 C. The Failure of Constitutional Promises of 1982 47 4.3 Conclusion 48 5. A PROPOSAL FOR NEW RULES 49 5.1 Why Existing Answers Fail? 49 5.2 Merging the Military Command into the Executive 50 5.3 Accountability 53 6. CONCLUSION 56 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104652032 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 軍事指揮權 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中央軍事委員會 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 行政權 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 文官控制軍隊 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中華人民共和國憲法（1982） zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 黨國體制 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Military command power en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Central Military Commission en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Executive power en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Civilian control of military en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Constitution of the People`s Republic of China (1982) en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Party-state regime en_US dc.title (題名) 黨國體制下的中國軍事指揮權 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Military Command Power in Party-State China en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) English Literature Ackerman, Bruce, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000). Ackerman, Bruce, Good-bye, Montesquieu, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 128 (Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth eds. 2010) Barber, Nicholas W., Prelude to the Separation of Powers, 60 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 59 (2001). Barron, David J. and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008). Cheung, Tai Ming, The Riddle in the Middle : China`s Central Military Commission in the 21st Century, in PLA INFLUENCE ON CHINA`S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY-MAKING 84 (Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell eds., 2015). Choudhry, Sujit and Richard Stacey, Semi-Presidentialism as Power-Sharing: Constitutional Reform after The Arab Spring, THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS AT NYU LAW & INTERNATIONAL IDEA REPORTS: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 124 (2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3025968. Craig, Paul and Adam Tomkins, Introduction, in THE EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC LAW: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Paul Craig and Adam Tomkins eds., 2006). Ginsburg, Tom and Alberto Simpser, Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1 (Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser eds., 2014). House of Lords Constitution Committee, WAGING WAR: PARLIAMENT’S ROLE AND RESPONSIBILTY (15th Report Session 2005–2006), Volume I: Report (2006) House of Lords Constitution Committee, WAGING WAR: PARLIAMENT’S ROLE AND RESPONSIBILTY (15th Report Session 2005–2006), Volume II: Evidence (2006) Ji, You, The PLA and Diplomacy: Unravelling Myths about the Military Role in Foreign Policy Making, 23 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 236 (2014). Knapp, Andrew and Vincent Wright, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE (5th ed, 2006). 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