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題名 建構有效能之競爭法損害賠償制度： 比較法與經濟分析的啟示
Establishing an Effective System of Private Competition Enforcement: Inspirations from Comparative Aspects and Economic Analyses
作者 蘇弘綸
Su, Hung-Lun
貢獻者 吳秀明<br>王立達
Wu, Shiow-Ming<br>Wang, Li-Dar
蘇弘綸
Su, Hung-Lun
關鍵詞 競爭法
公平交易法
反托拉斯
損害
賠償
民事
經濟分析
限制競爭防止法
Competition law
Fair Trade Act
Antitrust
Damages
Civil
Economic analysis
Damages directive
2014/104/EU
9. Novelle
GWB
日期 2018
上傳時間 17-十月-2018 11:37:26 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究的目的在於找出我國競爭法損害賠償訴訟的困境並嘗試提出可能的解決方案。首先本研究介紹損害賠償在競爭法中的功能與重要性，並介紹美國、歐盟、我國的現行競爭法損害賠償制度。接著，我國判決的量化描述與實務工作者的訪談分析將呈現我國競爭法損害賠償訴訟所面臨的可能困境；本研究並將討論這些困境的可能解決方式。最後，本研究將討論在競爭法損害賠償訴訟數量開始增加後實務上所可能遇到的問題。
本研究的貢獻至少存在於兩方面。其一，本研究在現有損害賠償功能的理論外，闡釋損害賠償如何貢獻於嚇阻，以及損害填補的功能有和效率意義。其二，本研究以質化與量化的方式指出現行實務上希望請求損害賠償的反競爭行為受害者所可能面對的問題。
理論方面，筆者主張損害賠償對維持競爭秩序的貢獻在於（1）以更低的成本對行為人施加反競爭行為的最適法律效果；與（2）透過損害填補促進反競爭行為前資源分配的效率，並在反競爭行為後使競爭者的競爭能力趨向反競爭行為前的狀態。
實證方面，筆者根據國內案件的量化調查結果與訪談實務工作者的訪談，認為現行制度的主要問題之一在於公平會行政程序開啟不影響損害賠償請求權消滅時效進行。此一制度迫使欲請求損害賠償的反競爭行為被害人縱無證明反競爭行為存在的能力，也必須在欠缺確定處分的情形下提起損害賠償訴訟；而案件調查結果顯示，民事法院在欠缺公平會確定處分的案件中，認定反競爭行為存在的比例明顯偏低。此外，實務上證據揭露制度對請求揭露方特定揭露標的的要求常使原告難以舉證，也是反競爭行為被害人請求賠償時所面臨的重要困境。有趣的是，文獻雖指出選擇退出（opt-out）集體救濟制度的欠缺可能是當事人起訴意願低落的原因之一，但選擇退出集體救濟制度未必值得採行，因為其功能透過公平會執法能夠更以更低成本達成。
本文也討論當損害賠償訴訟的數量開始增加，實務上將面臨的進一步問題。這些問題包含公執法（public enforcement）與私執法（private enforcement）的配合方式、轉嫁抗辯（與間接交易人請求權）的許可性、是否准許請求保護傘損害、因果關係與損害數額的判斷、與懲罰性賠償的角色。
損害賠償是深刻的議題。效率分析本身就已深具挑戰性，遑論尚須考量諸如矯正正義等難以量化的價值。筆者希望未來理論與實證研究能強化此一議題的分析，尋求最適合我國的損害賠償體制，以強化競爭法的功能，穩固自由經濟的基礎。
The purpose of the present study is to identify and address the obstacles faced by the Taiwanese regime of private enforcement of competition law. This study starts by establishing the theoretical functions and importance of private enforcement and introducing the current U.S., EU and Taiwanese regimes of private enforcement. Next, a quantitative survey of damages cases filed in Taiwanese courts and the qualitative results obtained through interviews of practitioners will serve as the bases for the ensuing analyses that identify, and thereafter address, the possible obstacles hindering the effective operation of the Taiwanese regime of competition damages. Finally, this study discusses the problems that might emerge following the removal of the obstacles to private enforcement.
This study contributes to the current literature in at least two dimensions. First, it adds to the current theories of the function of private enforcement by elaborating on how private enforcement achieves deterrence and enhancing the efficiency argument for the compensation function. Second, it identifies, quantitatively and qualitatively, the possible problems vis-à-vis undertakings and practitioners that (potentially) wish to pursue damages claims in Taiwan.
In the theoretical dimension, I argue that private enforcement benefits the maintainence of competition orders in that (1) it achieves deterrence, by allowing legal consequences against infringers to approach the optimal level in a cost-minimising fashion; and that (2) it achieves compensation, thus promoting ex ante efficiency in resource allocation by potential victims, and enhancing competition ex post by restoring victimised rivals toward the competitiveness but for the anticompetitive behaviour.
In the empirical dimension, I find that one of the major obstacles to the present regime rests with the rule that public enforcement does not interrupt limitation periods for damages claims. Such a rule forces victims to commence damages actions before a final public-enforcement decision is rendered, the majority of whom, as the quantitative results show, failed to establish the existence of infringements before civil courts. Another obstacle is related to the current court practice in applying the rules of disclosure of evidence under the Civil Procedure Code, which requires the party requesting disclosure to specify the object of disclosure. Interestingly, the absence of opt-out collective redress mechanisms, which, according to the literature, may have also discouraged damages actions is concluded to be unadvisable, as the role assigned thereto can be performed by public enforcement at a lower cost.
In addition, I identify and discuss further issues that can reasonably be expected to emerge in a regime where private enforcement is no longer barred de facto, including the proper interaction between public and private enforcement, the permissibility of the passing-on defence (and thus indirect purchaser standing) and umbrella claims, the assessment of causation and amount of damages, and the role of punitive damages.
The issue of private enforcement is a profound and somewhat troubling one. The efficiency analysis is itself a challenging task, let alone the weighing of numerous values that can hardly be quantified, e.g. corrective justice. Future studies, both theoretical and empirical, are undoubtedly needed to establish the optimal private enforcement regime for Taiwan, which will strengthen the role of competition law to secure the foundation of a free economy.
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Montag, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz in Europa und der Gesetzentwurf zur Einführung von Gruppenklagen, ZRP 2013, S. 172ff.
Podszun, Rupprecht/ Kreifels, Stephan, Kommt der Ausforschungsanspruch? – Anmerkungen zum geplanten § 33g GWB 2017, GWR 2017, S. 67ff.
Schreiber, Kristina, Nach der „ORWI“-Entscheidung des BGH: Was müssen indirekte Abnehmer bei der Geltendmachung von Schadensersatz beachten? GRUR-Prax 2012, S. 78ff.
Seegers, Martin, Einwand der Schadensabwälzung nach dem neuen § 33c GWB 2017, WuW 2017, S. 236ff.
3. 註釋書
Emmerich, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker, Wettbewerbsrecht, 5. Aufl. 2014.
Hoffmann, in: Dauses/Ludwigs, Handbuch des EU-Wirtschaftsrechts 2017.
Ollerdißen, in: Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 3. Aufl. 2016.
Rehbinder, in: Loewenheim/ Meessen/ Riesenkampff/ Kersting/ Meyer-Lindemann, Kartellrecht, 3. Aufl. 2016.
4. 其他
Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/10207.
Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/3640.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
法律學系
105651006
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105651006
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 吳秀明<br>王立達zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Wu, Shiow-Ming<br>Wang, Li-Daren_US
dc.contributor.author (作者) 蘇弘綸zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) Su, Hung-Lunen_US
dc.creator (作者) 蘇弘綸zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Su, Hung-Lunen_US
dc.date (日期) 2018en_US
dc.date.accessioned 17-十月-2018 11:37:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 17-十月-2018 11:37:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 17-十月-2018 11:37:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0105651006en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120585-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 法律學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 105651006zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究的目的在於找出我國競爭法損害賠償訴訟的困境並嘗試提出可能的解決方案。首先本研究介紹損害賠償在競爭法中的功能與重要性，並介紹美國、歐盟、我國的現行競爭法損害賠償制度。接著，我國判決的量化描述與實務工作者的訪談分析將呈現我國競爭法損害賠償訴訟所面臨的可能困境；本研究並將討論這些困境的可能解決方式。最後，本研究將討論在競爭法損害賠償訴訟數量開始增加後實務上所可能遇到的問題。
本研究的貢獻至少存在於兩方面。其一，本研究在現有損害賠償功能的理論外，闡釋損害賠償如何貢獻於嚇阻，以及損害填補的功能有和效率意義。其二，本研究以質化與量化的方式指出現行實務上希望請求損害賠償的反競爭行為受害者所可能面對的問題。
理論方面，筆者主張損害賠償對維持競爭秩序的貢獻在於（1）以更低的成本對行為人施加反競爭行為的最適法律效果；與（2）透過損害填補促進反競爭行為前資源分配的效率，並在反競爭行為後使競爭者的競爭能力趨向反競爭行為前的狀態。
實證方面，筆者根據國內案件的量化調查結果與訪談實務工作者的訪談，認為現行制度的主要問題之一在於公平會行政程序開啟不影響損害賠償請求權消滅時效進行。此一制度迫使欲請求損害賠償的反競爭行為被害人縱無證明反競爭行為存在的能力，也必須在欠缺確定處分的情形下提起損害賠償訴訟；而案件調查結果顯示，民事法院在欠缺公平會確定處分的案件中，認定反競爭行為存在的比例明顯偏低。此外，實務上證據揭露制度對請求揭露方特定揭露標的的要求常使原告難以舉證，也是反競爭行為被害人請求賠償時所面臨的重要困境。有趣的是，文獻雖指出選擇退出（opt-out）集體救濟制度的欠缺可能是當事人起訴意願低落的原因之一，但選擇退出集體救濟制度未必值得採行，因為其功能透過公平會執法能夠更以更低成本達成。
本文也討論當損害賠償訴訟的數量開始增加，實務上將面臨的進一步問題。這些問題包含公執法（public enforcement）與私執法（private enforcement）的配合方式、轉嫁抗辯（與間接交易人請求權）的許可性、是否准許請求保護傘損害、因果關係與損害數額的判斷、與懲罰性賠償的角色。
損害賠償是深刻的議題。效率分析本身就已深具挑戰性，遑論尚須考量諸如矯正正義等難以量化的價值。筆者希望未來理論與實證研究能強化此一議題的分析，尋求最適合我國的損害賠償體制，以強化競爭法的功能，穩固自由經濟的基礎。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The purpose of the present study is to identify and address the obstacles faced by the Taiwanese regime of private enforcement of competition law. This study starts by establishing the theoretical functions and importance of private enforcement and introducing the current U.S., EU and Taiwanese regimes of private enforcement. Next, a quantitative survey of damages cases filed in Taiwanese courts and the qualitative results obtained through interviews of practitioners will serve as the bases for the ensuing analyses that identify, and thereafter address, the possible obstacles hindering the effective operation of the Taiwanese regime of competition damages. Finally, this study discusses the problems that might emerge following the removal of the obstacles to private enforcement.
This study contributes to the current literature in at least two dimensions. First, it adds to the current theories of the function of private enforcement by elaborating on how private enforcement achieves deterrence and enhancing the efficiency argument for the compensation function. Second, it identifies, quantitatively and qualitatively, the possible problems vis-à-vis undertakings and practitioners that (potentially) wish to pursue damages claims in Taiwan.
In the theoretical dimension, I argue that private enforcement benefits the maintainence of competition orders in that (1) it achieves deterrence, by allowing legal consequences against infringers to approach the optimal level in a cost-minimising fashion; and that (2) it achieves compensation, thus promoting ex ante efficiency in resource allocation by potential victims, and enhancing competition ex post by restoring victimised rivals toward the competitiveness but for the anticompetitive behaviour.
In the empirical dimension, I find that one of the major obstacles to the present regime rests with the rule that public enforcement does not interrupt limitation periods for damages claims. Such a rule forces victims to commence damages actions before a final public-enforcement decision is rendered, the majority of whom, as the quantitative results show, failed to establish the existence of infringements before civil courts. Another obstacle is related to the current court practice in applying the rules of disclosure of evidence under the Civil Procedure Code, which requires the party requesting disclosure to specify the object of disclosure. Interestingly, the absence of opt-out collective redress mechanisms, which, according to the literature, may have also discouraged damages actions is concluded to be unadvisable, as the role assigned thereto can be performed by public enforcement at a lower cost.
In addition, I identify and discuss further issues that can reasonably be expected to emerge in a regime where private enforcement is no longer barred de facto, including the proper interaction between public and private enforcement, the permissibility of the passing-on defence (and thus indirect purchaser standing) and umbrella claims, the assessment of causation and amount of damages, and the role of punitive damages.
The issue of private enforcement is a profound and somewhat troubling one. The efficiency analysis is itself a challenging task, let alone the weighing of numerous values that can hardly be quantified, e.g. corrective justice. Future studies, both theoretical and empirical, are undoubtedly needed to establish the optimal private enforcement regime for Taiwan, which will strengthen the role of competition law to secure the foundation of a free economy.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 目次
 縮寫與代號 10
1. 緒論 12
1.1 研究動機 12
1.2 研究目的與問題意識 14
1.3 研究範圍 15
1.4 研究方法與論文架構 15
1.4.1 研究方法 15
1.4.2 論文架構 15
2. 競爭法損害賠償制度的功能 17
2.1 嚇阻 17
2.1.1 榨取行為的最適法律效果 18
2.1.2 阻礙行為的最適法律效果 19
2.1.3 過度嚇阻與嚇阻不足 20
2.1.4 損害賠償訴訟對嚇阻的貢獻 21
2.2 損害填補 22
2.3 早期預警？ 23
2.4 請求救濟的動機 25
2.5 不同功能間的取捨 25
3. 美國的競爭法損害賠償制度 26
3.1 實體法層面 26
3.1.1 損害賠償請求權發生要件 26
3.1.2 損害賠償範圍 27
3.1.3 消滅時效 28
3.1.4 寬恕政策被豁免人的民事責任 29
3.2 程序法層面 29
3.2.1 原告資格（Standing） 29
3.2.2 集體訴訟 31
3.2.3 父權訴訟（parens patriae suits） 36
3.2.4 證據 37
4 歐盟的競爭法損害賠償制度－以德國實踐為例 42
4.1 實體法層面 42
4.1.1 請求權人 42
4.1.2 損害賠償請求權發生要件 44
4.1.3 損害賠償範圍 45
4.1.4 消滅時效 47
4.1.5 寬恕政策被豁免人的民事責任 48
4.2 程序法層面 48
4.2.1 原告適格 48
4.2.2 證據 49
5 我國的競爭法損害賠償制度 55
5.1 實體法層面 55
5.1.1 請求權人 55
5.1.2 損害賠償請求權發生要件 56
5.1.3 損害賠償範圍 58
5.1.4 消滅時效 59
5.2 程序法層面 60
5.2.1 原告適格 60
5.2.2 選定當事人 61
5.2.3 證據 61
5.3 制度比較 67
6 我國競爭法損害賠償案件量化調查 68
6.1 實證研究的背景 68
6.2 目標案件類型 68
6.3 搜尋過程 68
6.4 統計調查結果 68
6.4.1 歷年起訴件數 68
6.4.2 原告組成 70
6.4.3 原告主張行為類型（一案件可能不只一主張） 71
6.4.4 查詢資料時（2017/10/20）最終審判決結果 73
7 我國競爭法損害賠償實務與成因之質性探討 75
7.1 限制競爭損害賠償訴訟原告所面臨的主要困難 75
7.1.1 違法行為證據 75
7.1.2 損害證據 76
7.2 現行民事訴訟法下原告可能利用的制度 76
7.3 反競爭行為被害人不願起訴的原因 77
7.3.1 損害金額 78
7.3.2 律師收費方式 79
7.3.3 律師費用 79
7.3.4 國人的權利意識 80
7.3.5 爭端的跨國性質 80
8 量化與質性調查結果之綜合分析 82
8.1 收益面：訴訟的預期收益過低 82
8.1.1 事實層次 82
8.1.2 法律層次：時效制度 83
8.2 成本面 84
8.2.1 訴訟的固定成本過高 84
8.2.2 在我國起訴的機會成本較高 85
8.3 國人的權利意識？ 85
9 制度建議一：除去現行制度下被害人起訴求償的不利誘因 86
9.1 增加預期收益 86
9.1.1 增加原告手中的證據：時效制度 87
9.1.2 增加原告手中的證據：證據揭露 88
9.1.3 降低原告的舉證負擔 90
9.1.4 提升原告得請求的金額？ 92
9.2 降低成本：請求權集中 92
9.2.1 集體救濟 93
9.2.2 否定間接交易相對人的請求權基礎 96
10 制度建議二：損害賠償制度的進一步最適化 98
10.1 損害賠償與公執法的互動 98
10.1.1 公私執法的配合 98
10.1.2 損害賠償與寬恕政策 100
10.1.2.1 責任限制 101
10.1.3 寬恕政策文件的保護 103
10.2 因果關係的判斷 104
10.3 損害計算 105
10.3.1 市場比較 105
10.3.2 成本法 109
10.3.3 利潤損失的計算 109
10.4 轉嫁抗辯與間接交易相對人請求權 110
10.4.1 否定間接交易相對人請求權 110
10.4.2 承認間接交易相對人請求權 111
10.4.3 舉證責任分配：中庸之道？ 112
10.5 保護傘損害 113
10.6 懲罰性賠償 113
11 未來研究方向 114
11.1 最適罰鍰 114
11.2 損害賠償與檢舉獎金 114
11.3 主管機關參與 114
11.4 連帶責任 114
11.5 替代性爭端解決機制 115
12 結論 116
13 附錄－經濟模型細節說明 117
13.1 Cournot競爭下邊際成本上升的效果 117
13.2 轉嫁抗辯的一般模型 118
13.2.1 理論模型 118
13.2.2 與實證模型的關聯 119
13.3 迴歸分析中忽略相關變數的後果 122
參考文獻 124
訪問紀錄 134
受訪人A1訪問逐字稿 134
受訪人A2訪問紀錄 140
受訪人A3訪問逐字稿 141
受訪人A4訪問逐字稿 148

表目錄
表 1每百萬人起訴件數比較表 12
表 2每百億美元GDP起訴件數比較表 13
表 3美國、歐盟、德國、我國制度比較表 67
表 4訴訟的跟隨/單獨性質與民事法院認定違法行為存否的關係 82
圖目錄
圖 1每百萬人起訴件數比較折線圖 13
圖 2每百億美元GDP起訴件數比較折線圖 14
圖 3歷年損害賠償訴訟起訴件數 69
圖 4歷年損害賠償案件起訴件數與公平會處分件數比較 69
圖 5 歷年損害賠償案件起訴件數與公平會受理檢舉件數比較 70
圖 6原告組成－依性質 70
圖 7原告組成－依產業中關係 71
圖 8原告主張之違法行為 71
圖 9 公平會81年至106年9月限制競爭案件處分數－以違法行為類型分 72
圖 10原告主張之違法行為－舊法§19細項 72
圖 11原告主張之違法行為－補充條款細項 73
圖 12原告勝訴程度分布 73
圖 13原告敗訴原因 74
圖 14前後法－簡化操作 106
圖 15前後法－內插 107
圖 16漲價的轉嫁 118
圖 17轉嫁漲價的效果 119		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1746060 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105651006en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 競爭法zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公平交易法zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 反托拉斯zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 損害zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 賠償zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 民事zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟分析zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 限制競爭防止法zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Competition lawen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Fair Trade Acten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Antitrusten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Damagesen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Civilen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Economic analysisen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Damages directiveen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 2014/104/EUen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 9. Novelleen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) GWBen_US
dc.title (題名) 建構有效能之競爭法損害賠償制度： 比較法與經濟分析的啟示zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Establishing an Effective System of Private Competition Enforcement: Inspirations from Comparative Aspects and Economic Analysesen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分
1. 專書論文
吳秀明，第三十一條：損害賠償責任，載：公平會，公平交易法之註釋研究系列（三）：第二十五條至第四十九條，頁171-200，2005年12月。
吳秀明，第三十三條：消滅時效，載：公平會，公平交易法之註釋研究系列（三）：第二十五條至第四十九條，頁221-226，2005年12月。
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陳志民，第三十二條第二項：以侵害所得利益計算損害額，載：公平會，公平交易法之註釋研究系列（三）：第二十五條至第四十九條，頁213-220，2005年12月。
黃銘傑，公平交易法損害賠償制度之功能與詮釋，載：氏著，公平交易法之理論與實際－不同意見書，頁559-596，2002年8月。
2. 學位論文
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鄭歆儒，美國反托拉斯法損害賠償運作機制對我國公平交易法之啟示，國立臺灣大學法律學研究所碩士論文，2015年。
3. 期刊論文
林誠二，消滅時效進行之障礙事由，台灣法學雜誌第264期，頁115-123，2015年。
陳志民，「嚇阻」（deterrence）概念下之反托拉斯法私人訴訟－「最適損害賠償」理論之政策啟示，人文及社會科學集刊，14卷1期，頁55-109，2002年3月。
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陳榮宗，選定當事人制度之時代意義，國立臺灣大學法學論叢，第17卷第1期，頁159-169。
曾世雄，違反公平交易法之損害賠償，政大法學評論第44期，頁351-360，1991年。
曾品傑，從民法到公平交易法－以損害賠償為中心，公平交易季刊第6卷第1期，頁91-124，1998年。
英文部分
1. 專書
CUMMING, GEORGE, BRAD SPITZ & RUTH JANAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE USED FOR ENFORCEMENT OF EC COMPETITION LAW BY THE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN CIVIL COURTS (2007).
DAVIS, PETER & ELIANA GARCES, QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (2010).
DOUGHERTY, CHRISTOPHER, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS (2011).
HOVENKAMP, HERBERT, FEDERAL ANTIRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE (3d ed. 2005).
JONES, ALISON & BRENDA SURFIN, EU COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2014)
LIANOS, IOANNIS, PETER DAVIS & PAOLISA NEBBIA, DAMAGES CLAIMS FOR THE INFRINGEMENT OF EU COMPETITION LAW (2015).
MOTTA, MASSIMO, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2004).
POSNER, RICHARD A., ECONOMIC ANALysis OF LAW (8th ed. 2011)
ROBSON, ALEX, LAW AND MARKETS (2012).
RUBENSTEIN, WILLIAM B., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed. 2011)
YEAZELL, STEPHEN C., CIVIL PROCEDURE (2004).
2. 期刊論文
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3. 專書論文
Buccirossi, Paolo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers Still Go to Prison?, in: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 81 (Vivek Ghosal & Johan Stenne eds. 2007).
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4. 其他
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德文部分
1. 專書
Logemann, Hans Philip, Der kartellrechtliche Schadensersatz: Die zivilrechtliche Haftung bei Verstößen gegen das deutsche und europäische Kartellrecht nach Ergehen der VO(EG) Nr. 1/2003 und der 7. GWB Novelle, 2009.
2. 期刊論文
Brand, US-Sammelklagen und kollektiver Rechtsschutz in der EU, NJW 2012, S. 1116ff.
Haas, Matthias/ Dittrich, Johannes, Anm. zu BGH Urt. v. 28.6.2011 – KZR 75/10, LMK 2012, 327348.
Hempel, Ende des kollektiven Rechtsschutzes im deutschen Kartellrecht? NJW 2015, S. 207ff.
Kießling, Neues zur Schadensabwälzung, GRUR 2009, S. 733ff.
Montag, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz in Europa und der Gesetzentwurf zur Einführung von Gruppenklagen, ZRP 2013, S. 172ff.
Podszun, Rupprecht/ Kreifels, Stephan, Kommt der Ausforschungsanspruch? – Anmerkungen zum geplanten § 33g GWB 2017, GWR 2017, S. 67ff.
Schreiber, Kristina, Nach der „ORWI“-Entscheidung des BGH: Was müssen indirekte Abnehmer bei der Geltendmachung von Schadensersatz beachten? GRUR-Prax 2012, S. 78ff.
Seegers, Martin, Einwand der Schadensabwälzung nach dem neuen § 33c GWB 2017, WuW 2017, S. 236ff.
3. 註釋書
Emmerich, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker, Wettbewerbsrecht, 5. Aufl. 2014.
Hoffmann, in: Dauses/Ludwigs, Handbuch des EU-Wirtschaftsrechts 2017.
Ollerdißen, in: Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 3. Aufl. 2016.
Rehbinder, in: Loewenheim/ Meessen/ Riesenkampff/ Kersting/ Meyer-Lindemann, Kartellrecht, 3. Aufl. 2016.
4. 其他
Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/10207.
Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/3640.		zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/THE.NCCU.LAW.035.2018.F10en_US