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題名 ORGANIZATIONAL FORM, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND CEO TURNOVER: EVIDENCE FROM THE PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY
作者 Cheng, Jiang;Cummins, J. David;Lin, Tzuting
貢獻者 商學院保險中心
日期 2017-03
上傳時間 22-十二月-2018 11:47:06 (UTC+8)
摘要 We investigate the role of organizational form and ownership structure in corporate governance by examining CEO turnover for U.S. property-casualty insurers. Our article extends the prior literature by decomposing stock insurers into publicly traded and nonpublicly traded (closely held) entities and breaking down both types of stocks into family-owned and nonfamily-owned categories. We further subdivide family firms into those with family-member CEOs and those with nonfamily CEOs. We find that the probability of nonroutine turnover has a significant negative relationship with firm performance. Turnover probabilities vary significantly by organizational form and ownership structure. Family firms with family-member CEOs have the lowest turnover rate of any ownership type. The probability of nonroutine CEO turnover is lower for mutuals than for publicly traded nonfamily stock firms and also for all other types of stocks except closely held family stock firms and publicly traded family stocks with family-member CEOs. The results provide further evidence that organizational form matters in terms of controlling agency costs in financial services firms.
關聯 JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE,84(1), 95-126
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jori.12083
dc.contributor 商學院保險中心-
dc.creator (作者) Cheng, Jiang;Cummins, J. David;Lin, Tzuting-
dc.date (日期) 2017-03-
dc.date.accessioned 22-十二月-2018 11:47:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 22-十二月-2018 11:47:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-十二月-2018 11:47:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/121465-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) We investigate the role of organizational form and ownership structure in corporate governance by examining CEO turnover for U.S. property-casualty insurers. Our article extends the prior literature by decomposing stock insurers into publicly traded and nonpublicly traded (closely held) entities and breaking down both types of stocks into family-owned and nonfamily-owned categories. We further subdivide family firms into those with family-member CEOs and those with nonfamily CEOs. We find that the probability of nonroutine turnover has a significant negative relationship with firm performance. Turnover probabilities vary significantly by organizational form and ownership structure. Family firms with family-member CEOs have the lowest turnover rate of any ownership type. The probability of nonroutine CEO turnover is lower for mutuals than for publicly traded nonfamily stock firms and also for all other types of stocks except closely held family stock firms and publicly traded family stocks with family-member CEOs. The results provide further evidence that organizational form matters in terms of controlling agency costs in financial services firms.en_US
dc.format.extent 259236 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE,84(1), 95-126-
dc.title (題名) ORGANIZATIONAL FORM, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND CEO TURNOVER: EVIDENCE FROM THE PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRYen_US
dc.type (資料類型) article-
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1111/jori.12083-
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jori.12083-