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題名 家族企業多角化併購與市場反應之探討
Family Firm Diversified M&A and Market Performance作者 詹愷恩
Chan, Kai-En貢獻者 吳啟銘
詹愷恩
Chan, Kai-En關鍵詞 家族企業
多角化併購
代理人理論
管家理論
併購績效
Family Firms
Diversification
M&A
Agency theory
Stewardship theory日期 2019 上傳時間 7-八月-2019 16:03:34 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究探討家族企業進行多角化併購與市場反應績效之關係，以公司治理之變數探討市場對於家族企業進行多角化併購時的反應，著重於代理理論以及管家理論之間的探討，進一步將家族企業的特有性質家族企業創辦人以及家族接班狀況納入研究。本文以台灣經濟新報(TEJ)併購資料庫中2001 年至2017年之多角化併購案件為樣本進行研究。研究發現，樣本中之家族企業在執行多角化併購時市場會反應其對於代理人問題之疑慮，導致當公司偏離程度愈大其市場反應績效愈差。但樣本中之多角化併購案件中並無反應出市場對於家族企業的管家理論行為。另外，家族企業的多角化併購行為當中考量創辦人仍否任職以及家族企業的接班狀況進行分析後，發現創辦人任職與否之無顯著性，但影響方向為正。而市場是否會對二代以上接班人之多角化併購行為給予負面評價，實證結果發現與預期方向一致，為負向關係但並無顯著性。
This study explores the relationship between diversified M&A (diversification) and market response performance (CAR) in Taiwan’s family firms, and explores the reaction of the market to the diversified M&A of family firms based on the variables of corporate governance, focusing on the discussion between agent theory and stewardship theory, and further the unique nature of the family business founders and family succession status are included in the study. The sample of the diversified M&A cases from 2001 to 2017 in the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) M&A Database. The study found that the family companies in the sample responded to the agent`s problems when performing a diversified M&A, resulting in a worse market performance as the company deviated. However, the diversified M&A cases in thesample did not reflect the market`s stewardship theory behavior for family businesses.In addition, in the diversified M&A activities of the family business, it is considered that the founder still has the position and the succession of the family business. After discovering that the founder has no significant position, the direction of influence is positive. Whether the market will give a negative evaluation of the diversified M&A behavior of the second generation or more successors, the empirical results are consistent with the expected direction.參考文獻 林宛瑩, & 許崇源. (2008). 台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議. 交大管理學報, 1, 269-312.林灼榮, 李秀英, 彭作奎, & 施佩雯. (2017). 集團企業家族控股, 董事會組成與企業績效之關聯性-配對法之應用. 企業管理學報, (113), 31-60.戴怡蕙. (2017). 控制股東的股權偏離程度與公司績效: 持股率與類別的調節效果. 會計審計論叢, 7(2), 85-115.Kuo, T., & Wang,C.Y.(2017).公司治理如何影響家族企業之績效? 長期縱貫分析 (How Does Corporate Governance Affect the Performance of Family Businesses? A Long-Term Longitudinal Analysis).Lin, C. J., Pan, C. J., & Wang, T. W. (2015). 從家族企業論析自由現金流量與投資決策之關聯性. 臺大管理論叢, 26(1), 95-123.Cubbin J. S. and D. Leech (1983). The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on theDegree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement, TheEconomic Journal, 93(370), pp. 351-369Claessens S., S. Djankov, L.H.P. Lang, (2000). The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2),pp. 81-112.Cucculelli, M. and Micucci, G. (2008). Family succession and firm performance:Evidence from Italian family firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(1), 17-31.Craninckx, K. and Huyghebaert, N. (2015). Large shareholders and value creationthrough corporate acquisitions in Europe. The identity of the controllingshareholder matters, European Management Journal, Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 116-131.Duggal, R., & Millar, J. A. (1999). Institutional ownership and firm performance: Thecase of bidder returns. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(2), 103-117.Feldman, E.R., Amit, R.R. and Villalonga, B. (2016), Corporate divestitures andfamily control, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 429-446.Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Kintana, M. L. (2010). Diversification decisions infamily‐controlled firms. Journal of management studies, 47(2), 223-252.Gleason, K.C., Pennathur, A.K. and Wiggenhorn, J. (2014), Acquisitions of familyowned firms: boon or bust?, Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 38 No. 2,pp. 269-286.Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costsand Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305-360.Worek, M. (2017). Mergers and acquisitions in family businesses: current literatureand future insights. Journal of Family Business Management, 7(2), 177-206. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理學系
106357003資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106357003 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 吳啟銘 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) 詹愷恩 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Chan, Kai-En en_US dc.creator (作者) 詹愷恩 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chan, Kai-En en_US dc.date (日期) 2019 en_US dc.date.accessioned 7-八月-2019 16:03:34 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 7-八月-2019 16:03:34 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-八月-2019 16:03:34 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0106357003 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124693 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財務管理學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 106357003 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究探討家族企業進行多角化併購與市場反應績效之關係，以公司治理之變數探討市場對於家族企業進行多角化併購時的反應，著重於代理理論以及管家理論之間的探討，進一步將家族企業的特有性質家族企業創辦人以及家族接班狀況納入研究。本文以台灣經濟新報(TEJ)併購資料庫中2001 年至2017年之多角化併購案件為樣本進行研究。研究發現，樣本中之家族企業在執行多角化併購時市場會反應其對於代理人問題之疑慮，導致當公司偏離程度愈大其市場反應績效愈差。但樣本中之多角化併購案件中並無反應出市場對於家族企業的管家理論行為。另外，家族企業的多角化併購行為當中考量創辦人仍否任職以及家族企業的接班狀況進行分析後，發現創辦人任職與否之無顯著性，但影響方向為正。而市場是否會對二代以上接班人之多角化併購行為給予負面評價，實證結果發現與預期方向一致，為負向關係但並無顯著性。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study explores the relationship between diversified M&A (diversification) and market response performance (CAR) in Taiwan’s family firms, and explores the reaction of the market to the diversified M&A of family firms based on the variables of corporate governance, focusing on the discussion between agent theory and stewardship theory, and further the unique nature of the family business founders and family succession status are included in the study. The sample of the diversified M&A cases from 2001 to 2017 in the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) M&A Database. The study found that the family companies in the sample responded to the agent`s problems when performing a diversified M&A, resulting in a worse market performance as the company deviated. However, the diversified M&A cases in thesample did not reflect the market`s stewardship theory behavior for family businesses.In addition, in the diversified M&A activities of the family business, it is considered that the founder still has the position and the succession of the family business. After discovering that the founder has no significant position, the direction of influence is positive. Whether the market will give a negative evaluation of the diversified M&A behavior of the second generation or more successors, the empirical results are consistent with the expected direction. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 3第一節 家族企業之企業經營績效相關文獻 3第二節 家族企業併購投資相關文獻 4第三章 研究方法 8第一節 主要資料來源與樣本 8第二節 研究模型 9第三節 研究變數之定義 10第四章 實證分析結果 15第一節 研究變數之敘述統計分析 15第二節 研究變數之相關係數分析 17第三節 實證分析結果 20第五章 結論與建議 24參考文獻 26 zh_TW dc.format.extent 670007 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106357003 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 家族企業 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 多角化併購 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理人理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 管家理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 併購績效 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Family Firms en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Diversification en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) M&A en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Agency theory en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Stewardship theory en_US dc.title (題名) 家族企業多角化併購與市場反應之探討 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Family Firm Diversified M&A and Market Performance en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 林宛瑩, & 許崇源. (2008). 台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議. 交大管理學報, 1, 269-312.林灼榮, 李秀英, 彭作奎, & 施佩雯. (2017). 集團企業家族控股, 董事會組成與企業績效之關聯性-配對法之應用. 企業管理學報, (113), 31-60.戴怡蕙. (2017). 控制股東的股權偏離程度與公司績效: 持股率與類別的調節效果. 會計審計論叢, 7(2), 85-115.Kuo, T., & Wang,C.Y.(2017).公司治理如何影響家族企業之績效? 長期縱貫分析 (How Does Corporate Governance Affect the Performance of Family Businesses? A Long-Term Longitudinal Analysis).Lin, C. J., Pan, C. J., & Wang, T. W. (2015). 從家族企業論析自由現金流量與投資決策之關聯性. 臺大管理論叢, 26(1), 95-123.Cubbin J. S. and D. Leech (1983). The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on theDegree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement, TheEconomic Journal, 93(370), pp. 351-369Claessens S., S. Djankov, L.H.P. Lang, (2000). The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2),pp. 81-112.Cucculelli, M. and Micucci, G. (2008). Family succession and firm performance:Evidence from Italian family firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(1), 17-31.Craninckx, K. and Huyghebaert, N. (2015). Large shareholders and value creationthrough corporate acquisitions in Europe. The identity of the controllingshareholder matters, European Management Journal, Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 116-131.Duggal, R., & Millar, J. A. (1999). Institutional ownership and firm performance: Thecase of bidder returns. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(2), 103-117.Feldman, E.R., Amit, R.R. and Villalonga, B. (2016), Corporate divestitures andfamily control, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 429-446.Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Kintana, M. L. (2010). Diversification decisions infamily‐controlled firms. Journal of management studies, 47(2), 223-252.Gleason, K.C., Pennathur, A.K. and Wiggenhorn, J. (2014), Acquisitions of familyowned firms: boon or bust?, Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 38 No. 2,pp. 269-286.Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costsand Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305-360.Worek, M. (2017). Mergers and acquisitions in family businesses: current literatureand future insights. Journal of Family Business Management, 7(2), 177-206. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU201900549 en_US
