| dc.contributor | 財管系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 陳聖賢 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chen, Sheng-Syan | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chou, Robin K. | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lee, Yun-Chi | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2018-12 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 20-二月-2020 14:30:27 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 20-二月-2020 14:30:27 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 20-二月-2020 14:30:27 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/128722 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | We show that corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in controlling managers’ opportunistic behavior. Low executive equity compensation and a high intensity of outside monitoring help to discourage undesirable self-interested disclosure decisions by management before share repurchases. Corporate governance mechanisms also have a significant impact on long-run abnormal stock prices and operating performance. Firms that manipulate pre-repurchase disclosures experience positive long-term abnormal stock returns. However, we do not find that these firms experience positive long-run operating performance. Corporate governance mechanisms significantly attenuate the tendency toward negative pre-repurchase disclosures and their effects on stock prices and operating performance. | |
| dc.format.extent | 781601 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 54, 111-158 | |
| dc.title (題名) | The Effects of Executive Compensation and Outside Monitoring on Firms’ Pre-Repurchase Disclosure Behavior and Post-Repurchase Performance | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
