1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. 社會科學學院
  4. 期刊論文
  5. Item

學術產出-期刊論文

文章檢視/開啟

書目匯出

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

引文資訊

TAIR相關學術產出

題名 Environmental policy competition and heterogeneous capital endowments
作者 賴育邦
Lai, Yu-Bong
貢獻者 財政系
關鍵詞 Environmental scarcity rents ; Interjurisdictional competition ; International trade ; Mobile capital ; Monopolistic competition
日期 2019-03
上傳時間 27-四月-2020 16:00:37 (UTC+8)
摘要 In a model with monopolistic competition, international trade, and mobile capital, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between two countries with different capital endowments in terms of environmental regulations. The conventional result is that the capital-abundant country will charge a higher tax rate than the capital-scarce country. This present paper, however, finds that the opposite result may occur. Another feature of this paper is that governments strategically use the distribution of environmental rents as a tool to attract capital inflows. We show that in the absence of capital mobility, the two countries will distribute all of the pollution tax revenues to the general public. The presence of capital mobility induces the governments to allocate some or all of the environmental rents to the polluting firms to attract capital inflows. The capital-abundant country has a stronger incentive to allocate rents to the firms than the capital-scarce country. We also consider the case with global pollution, in which both countries tend to set less stringent regulations.
關聯 Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol.Volume 75, pp.107-119
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.01.011
dc.contributor 財政系
dc.creator (作者) 賴育邦
dc.creator (作者) Lai, Yu-Bong
dc.date (日期) 2019-03
dc.date.accessioned 27-四月-2020 16:00:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 27-四月-2020 16:00:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 27-四月-2020 16:00:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/129509-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In a model with monopolistic competition, international trade, and mobile capital, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between two countries with different capital endowments in terms of environmental regulations. The conventional result is that the capital-abundant country will charge a higher tax rate than the capital-scarce country. This present paper, however, finds that the opposite result may occur. Another feature of this paper is that governments strategically use the distribution of environmental rents as a tool to attract capital inflows. We show that in the absence of capital mobility, the two countries will distribute all of the pollution tax revenues to the general public. The presence of capital mobility induces the governments to allocate some or all of the environmental rents to the polluting firms to attract capital inflows. The capital-abundant country has a stronger incentive to allocate rents to the firms than the capital-scarce country. We also consider the case with global pollution, in which both countries tend to set less stringent regulations.
dc.format.extent 2176662 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol.Volume 75, pp.107-119
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Environmental scarcity rents ; Interjurisdictional competition ; International trade ; Mobile capital ; Monopolistic competition
dc.title (題名) Environmental policy competition and heterogeneous capital endowments
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.01.011
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.01.011