學術產出-期刊論文
| 題名 | The Effects of Executive Compensation and Outside Monitoring on Firms` Pre-repurchase Disclosure Behavior and Post-repurchase Performance |
| 作者 | 周冠男 Chou, Robin K. 陳聖賢 Chen, Sheng-Syan 李芸綺 Lee, Yun-Chi |
| 貢獻者 | 財管系 |
| 關鍵詞 | Corporate governance ; Repurchase ; Voluntary disclosure ; Long-term performance |
| 日期 | 2020-01 |
| 上傳時間 | 26-五月-2020 13:41:52 (UTC+8) |
| 摘要 | We show that corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in controlling managers’ opportunistic behavior. Low executive equity compensation and a high intensity of outside monitoring help to discourage undesirable self-interested disclosure decisions by management before share repurchases. Corporate governance mechanisms also have a significant impact on long-run abnormal stock prices and operating performance. Firms that manipulate pre-repurchase disclosures experience positive long-term abnormal stock returns. However, we do not find that these firms experience positive long-run operating performance. Corporate governance mechanisms significantly attenuate the tendency toward negative pre-repurchase disclosures and their effects on stock prices and operating performance. |
| 關聯 | Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol.54, pp.111-158 |
| 資料類型 | article |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-00785-1 |
| dc.contributor | 財管系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 周冠男 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chou, Robin K. | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 陳聖賢 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chen, Sheng-Syan | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 李芸綺 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lee, Yun-Chi | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2020-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 26-五月-2020 13:41:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 26-五月-2020 13:41:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 26-五月-2020 13:41:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/129865 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | We show that corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in controlling managers’ opportunistic behavior. Low executive equity compensation and a high intensity of outside monitoring help to discourage undesirable self-interested disclosure decisions by management before share repurchases. Corporate governance mechanisms also have a significant impact on long-run abnormal stock prices and operating performance. Firms that manipulate pre-repurchase disclosures experience positive long-term abnormal stock returns. However, we do not find that these firms experience positive long-run operating performance. Corporate governance mechanisms significantly attenuate the tendency toward negative pre-repurchase disclosures and their effects on stock prices and operating performance. | |
| dc.format.extent | 1555912 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol.54, pp.111-158 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Corporate governance ; Repurchase ; Voluntary disclosure ; Long-term performance | |
| dc.title (題名) | The Effects of Executive Compensation and Outside Monitoring on Firms` Pre-repurchase Disclosure Behavior and Post-repurchase Performance | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1007/s11156-018-00785-1 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-00785-1 |