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題名 Respect Breeds Integrity and Incompetence Incites Deception: A Lab Experiment on How Taxpayers are Treated and the Competence of the Tax Authority
作者 鄧軫元
Teng , Joshu Chen-Yuan
詹昀姍
Chan , Yun-Shan
彭祐宜
Peng , Yu-I
傅健豪
Fu, Chien-Hao
貢獻者 社會科學論叢
關鍵詞 psychological tax contract  ;  tax morale  ;  slippery slope framework  ;  fiscal exchanges
日期 2019-12
上傳時間 11-十一月-2020 11:47:56 (UTC+8)
摘要 The theory of the psychological tax contract suggests that tax authorities can enhance tax morale of intrinsically motivated taxpayers by respecting them. Testing this experimentally faces the difficulty of becoming an incompetent auditor. Given that tax evasion is always intentional in the standard tax morale experiments, in which a precise income level is shown to subjects, approving deceivers with respect could be a sign of a weak auditor, which creates a motive to evade, according to the ＂slippery slope framework＂. The results then contradict to the prediction of the psychological tax contract due to incorporating respect into experiments inappropriately. To overcome this problem, we create inadvertent tax evasion by showing subjects several income components for only ten seconds. Consistent with the theory, we find that tax morale was higher in the respectful treatment. This effect disappeared for subjects who could calculate total income within ten seconds. They might think that experimenters could not identify their purposeful evasion. Hence, their tax morale could only be raised by treating them harshly.
關聯 社會科學論叢, 13(2), 77-101
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.30401/RSS.201912_13(2).0003
dc.contributor 社會科學論叢-
dc.creator (作者) 鄧軫元-
dc.creator (作者) Teng , Joshu Chen-Yuan-
dc.creator (作者) 詹昀姍-
dc.creator (作者) Chan , Yun-Shan-
dc.creator (作者) 彭祐宜-
dc.creator (作者) Peng , Yu-I-
dc.creator (作者) 傅健豪-
dc.creator (作者) Fu, Chien-Hao-
dc.date (日期) 2019-12-
dc.date.accessioned 11-十一月-2020 11:47:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-十一月-2020 11:47:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-十一月-2020 11:47:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/132476-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The theory of the psychological tax contract suggests that tax authorities can enhance tax morale of intrinsically motivated taxpayers by respecting them. Testing this experimentally faces the difficulty of becoming an incompetent auditor. Given that tax evasion is always intentional in the standard tax morale experiments, in which a precise income level is shown to subjects, approving deceivers with respect could be a sign of a weak auditor, which creates a motive to evade, according to the ＂slippery slope framework＂. The results then contradict to the prediction of the psychological tax contract due to incorporating respect into experiments inappropriately. To overcome this problem, we create inadvertent tax evasion by showing subjects several income components for only ten seconds. Consistent with the theory, we find that tax morale was higher in the respectful treatment. This effect disappeared for subjects who could calculate total income within ten seconds. They might think that experimenters could not identify their purposeful evasion. Hence, their tax morale could only be raised by treating them harshly.-
dc.format.extent 839558 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) 社會科學論叢, 13(2), 77-101-
dc.subject (關鍵詞) psychological tax contract  ;  tax morale  ;  slippery slope framework  ;  fiscal exchanges-
dc.title (題名) Respect Breeds Integrity and Incompetence Incites Deception: A Lab Experiment on How Taxpayers are Treated and the Competence of the Tax Authority-
dc.type (資料類型) article-
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.30401/RSS.201912_13(2).0003-
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.30401/RSS.201912_13(2).0003-